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EDITOR'S NOTE 
What fol lows i s  the written product of the "Conference on Jurisdic­
tion, Justice, and Choice of Law for the Twenty-First Century," hosted 
by the New England School of Law, on October 28-29, 1 994 . 
Prior to the Conference, five fact patterns rais ing complex j urisdic­
tion and choice of law i ssues were presented to various academic ex­
perts. These academic  experts then attended the Conference in October, 
where they communicated their particular point of v iew both orally and 
in print. Four of the five fact patterns were presented to these panelists 
who in turn, acting as members of the judiciary, rendered j udicial 
opi nions.  The fifth fact pattern was presented to el icit  commentary 
rather than j udicial opinion. These written opinions and commentary are 
published within. 
I n  an effort to promote a freer flow of communication and interac­
tion among the panelists, the Conference portion of thi s  book replaces 
the traditionally rigid law review citation with the more relaxed 
practitioner' s form of c itation. To aid the reader, the panel ists '  names 
are cap ital ized when reference to their Conference contribution i s  made. 
The New England Law Revierv is grateful to the fol lowing panelists 
for their written contributions :  
Professor Robert G .  Bone (Boston University School of Law) ;  Professor 
Patrick  J .  Borchers (Albany School of Law) ;  Professor Robert D .  
Brussack (University of  Georgia School of Law) ;  Professor S tephen D .  
B urbank (University of  Pennsylvania School of  Law) ; Professor Stan 
Cox (New England School of Law) ;  Professor Thomas C. Fischer (New 
England School of Law) ;  Professor Larry Kramer (New York University 
School of Law) ;  Professor Harold G. Maier (Vanderbi l t  Univers i ty Law 
School ) ;  Professor Linda S. Mullenix (University of Texas School of 
Law); Professor Marti n  H. Redish (Northwestern University School of 
Law) ;  Professor Linda J. S i lberman (New York University School of 
Law) ;  Professor Joseph Will iam Singer (Harvard University Law 
School) ;  Professor Michael P. Scharf (New England School of Law) ;  
Professor Michael E. Solimine (University of Cincinnati Col lege of 
Law) ;  Professor Allan R. Stein (Rutgers, the State Universi ty of New 
Jersey School of Law, Camden) ;  and Professor Russell J. Weintraub 
(University of Texas School of Law) .  
Special thanks to Professor S tan Cox,  New England School of Law, 
for init iating and pursuing the concept of this Conference on conflicts. 
In addition, this Conference would not have been possible without the 
financ ial support of the New England School of Law. 
Case One: Choice of Forum Clauses 
INTRODUCTION* 
This selective overview and response to the panel ists ' opm10ns 
disproportionately focuses on the Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U . S .  64 
( 1 93 8) ,  half of the problem confronting our "Court," and fil ters some of 
the panelists '  approaches taken to solve it through my own lens of dis­
satisfaction regarding current Erie doctrine. I see in the opinions that 
fol low, not only lack of consensus about what Erie requires, but vary­
ing degrees of comfort with the current state of Erie doctrine. Some of 
our panelists (Professors MULLENIX and WEINTRAUB) find the Erie 
issue relatively straightforward, believing that the purpose of the forum 
selection c lause is  clearly substantive, that no federal statute stands in  
the way, and that therefore state l aw must apply .  Most of the  others 
(Professors BURBANK, REDISH, SILBERMAN, and SOLIMINE) see 
the Erie i ssue here as more muddied by the approach the Court has 
taken i n  Hanna v. Plumer, 3 80 U .S .  460 ( 1 965), and subsequent cases, 
but stil l  capable of being resolved in favor of applying state law. Some 
of our panelists (Professors B URBANK and SILBERMAN) seem criti­
cal of the way the Court in  Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. , 487 U .S .  
22 ( 1 988 ), handled the Erie problem before i t ,  but find room enough 
between the facts before us  and Stewart to reach a different result .  I 
share that dissatisfaction with Stewart and believe that eventual ly the 
tension i nherent i n  that decis ion, prefigured by Hanna, should be better 
resolved i n  favor of state i nterests. Two of our panel ists, however, 
(Professors BORCHERS and STEIN)1 would resolve any tension in  
favor of federal interests, Professor BORCHERS preferring not to  have 
any Erie doctrine at all, and Professor STEIN extending the Stewart 
rationale to embrace at least al l diversity forum selection situations 
* Stanley E. Cox: Assistant Professor of Law, New England School of Law. 
1. The panelists are to be congratulated that their discussions of the hypothetical 
provoked Professor STEIN's thoughtful written response included in this section of 
opinions. Professor STEIN was not an original participant on this panel at the confer­
ence, having graciously volunteered, instead, to moderate the personal jurisdiction dis­
cussion and to introduce the written product from that discussion. 
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involving domestic parties selecting a domestic forum. In their  conclu­
sions, but more so in  the w idely divergent methods they use to reach 
these conclusions, our panel ists confirm that basic disagreement st i l l  
exists about what Erie means and should require. 
At one end of the spectrum, Professor MULLENIX, categorizing 
forum selection clauses as raising i ssues solely of substantive state 
contract law, finds it obvious that Georgia state law should control.2 
She finds i t  equal ly obvious and compell ing, both on policy and Erie 
precedent grounds, that only the Supreme Court of Georgia  law should 
be fol lowed on this i ssue, even though other Georgia appellate courts 
currently are reinterpreting and reformulating Georgia law on party 
autonomy. Until and unless the Supreme Court of Georgia makes c lear 
that Georgia  has abandoned its prior precedents which indicate nonen­
forcement of forum selection clauses, all federal courts hearing d iversity 
cases removed in Georgia must refuse to enforce forum selection c laus­
es. 
Driving Professor MULLENIX' s  interpretation of Erie is an e mpha­
sis that Erie is  a constitutional dictate ; federal courts sitting in d iversity 
have no room to fashion substantive law differently from their state trial 
court counterparts .  Professor MULLENIX is distrustful ,  and with good 
reason, of what happens whenever a federal court is given room to 
"di scover" l aw different from what the state's highest appel late court 
has made. By preventing federal courts from applying law differently 
than has the Supreme Court of Georgia, Professor MULLENIX bel ieves 
she promotes the twin aims of Erie : inequitable administration of the 
laws ,  and forum shopping. 
I believe Professor MULLENIX, however, in her desire to rei n  in 
other panel ists' "free wheeling balancing test[s ]," and keep federal 
courts in l ine, promotes too rigid a rule and therefore an arguably 
anomalous result . 3 In the instant case, accepting arguendo Professor 
MULLENIX' s  point that forum selection clauses are issues purely of 
state contract law (even for underlying tort suits, and even when the 
result is determining what court wi l l  have jurisdiction to adj udicate), the 
state law here is unclear, at least regarding the viabi l i ty of the Supreme 
Court of Georgia precedent. Under my reading of Erie and its progeny, 
a federal trial court judge should be wearing the same substantive law 
2. S imilarly, Professor WEINTRAUB finds "it inconce i vable that on a matter so 
signi ficantly related to state views of freedom of contract, state law shou ld not 
control ." WEINTRAUB, infra. at 554. 
3. MULLENIX, infra, at 541. S i mi lar concerns are voiced by Professor 
BURBANK. See BURBANK, infra, at 536. 
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"hat" as i ts state trial court counterpart. A state trial court j udge, faced 
with intermediate level appel late decis ions on party autonomy, would 
not be free to ignore them. 
If these intermediate appellate opinions have become the de facto 
Georgia l aw regarding forum selection clauses, federal courts that cl ing 
to a sub silentio-overruled or discarded Supreme Court of Georgia 
precedent wil l  promote exactly the sort of forum shopping and inter­
ference wi th state policy formulation that Erie discourages, as Professor 
REDISH notes .4 Only the federal courts wi l l  refuse,  automatically, to 
enforce such clauses. Thus ,  the Supreme Court of Georgia  may be 
invited to hear a lower appellate case, not because i t  needs to c larify 
confusion among its lower appel late courts, but rather to send a mes­
sage s ideways to the federal court about misinterpretation of state poli­
cy .  
Cert ification of the state Jaw i ssues, if the federal j udge i s  unsure of 
the reach of the lower appellate decisions, would seem a more certain 
way to confirm the Georgia j udiciary ' s  change in policy .  Thi s  is true, 
despite the real risks, which Professor MULLENIX notes, of such "ad­
v isory" answers fail ing to develop Georgia policy i n  the same way as 
controversies l i tigated ab initio through the Georgia court system.5 Pro­
fessor MULLENIX' s  faith that relying only on not-overruled Supreme 
Court of Georgia precedent wi l l  in the long run produce more unambig­
uous state policy, and leave indiv idual federal l it igants i n  the short run 
without the benefits of de facto Georgia law. If faithfulness to substan-
4.  Professor REDISH reads Erie and its progeny as authorizing the federal trial 
judge to assume the rol e  of the state supreme court when the trial j udge perceives 
state law to be in flux .  See REDISH, infra, at 545. 
5. Exploring the adequacy and propriety of cert ification procedures to ascertain 
and/or formulate state Jaw is  a worthy project for another day. For example, why 
should a certification statute be e nacted such that the federal trial court i s  able to 
bypass normal Georgia appe l late review? Why should the statute not instead permit 
the state supreme court to "remand" to lower state appel l ate courts for first formula­
tion of l aw i n  tru ly unsett led areas? Or a l ternat ive ly ,  why shoul d  the statute not give 
federal d iversity litigants a "right" to demand that Georgi a  appe l l ate courts of first 
resort review any decisions of state law which they think are erroneously rendered by 
the federal district judge? Exploring how actual or hypothet ical  certification proce­
dures modify the normal Erie practice, that it is the federal court ' s  duty to ascertain 
state Jaw, would give addit ional i nsight into Erie doctrine .  Professor MULLENIX's  
skepticism about the values of  the  cert ification process seem, general ly ,  to  speak to a 
belief that the federal courts systemical l y  or as a matter of federal ism are better off 
with already settled rather than to-be-formulated determinations of state law. Yet, if 
these courts are real ly exercising the same substant ive authority as their state counter­
parts, there must be some freedom to formulate l i ving law. 
520 NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol .  29 : 5 1 7  
tive state law principles in  the individual case i s  part o f  the goal of 
Erie and its progeny, the federal trial court, on our hypothetical  facts, 
cannot avoid trying to determine the actual state of Georgia law about 
the validity of forum selection clauses. 6 
Professor BORCHERS i s  at an opposite extreme, both as regards the 
compulsions of Erie and the evi ls of forum shopping. He asserts that 
there is a significant federal interest in resolving the validity of forum 
selection clauses as a matter of federal law, and accordingly would rule 
under Erie's balancing test that the val idity of such clauses is governed 
by federal l aw in federal diversity suits .  In reali ty ,  Professor 
BORCHERS is stalking bigger game. He w ishes to overrule Erie, and 
therefore, in the meantime, ignores i t  to the greatest extent possible .  His 
argument that the real choice i s  between i nterstate or intrastate forum 
shopping, and that we should err on the side of discouraging interstate 
forum shopping, applies i n  al l  Erie situations and effectively e l iminates 
the Erie doctrine. 
As a necessary result, intrastate forum shopping is an accepted and 
acceptable course of conduct under Professor BORCHERS ' s  rul ings. 
The goal i s  to make federal non-preemptive common law the best pos­
s ible, let the chips fal l where they may. Professor MULLENIX, on the 
other hand, is decidedly troubled by s ituations where federal l aw on 
s imi lar facts leads to opposi te results. Her solution to the forum shop­
ping abuses i nherent in Court decisions such as Stewart and Ferens v. 
John Deere,7 is  to encourage Congress to pass preemptive federal statu­
tory law governing forum selection clauses . 
Federal statutory substantive l aw certainly e l iminates inconsistencies 
(and also any Erie problems) ,  but at the expense of any abi l i ty of states 
6.  Granted, this g ives federal courts abi l i ty to manipu late under the gu ise of 
in terpret ing state Jaw, which is  presumably why Professor M ULLENIX res i sts th is  ap­
proach. 1 do not read Professor MULLENIX, however, as insisting that there can 
never be Jack of certainty about state Jaw content, and thus inherent potent ia l  for 
some i nconsistency ; she simply seems to wish to cut back on this potent ial wherever 
possible .  I would tolerate more potential for inconsistency as being inherent in con­
cepts of dual sovereignty, and search for new appel late devices to bring consi stency 
when the federal system exercises state power. 
7. 494 U .S .  5 1 6  (1990) (ru l ing that transfer pursuant to U .S .C .  § 1 404 could be 
in it iated by plaint iffs who brought half a suit in Mississippi, and thereby, pursuant to 
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S .  7 1 7  ( 1 988), were able to l it igate in federal cou11 
in Pennsylvania a suit that could not have been ini t iated in Pennsylvan ia state 
courts ) ;  Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. , 487 U .S .  22 ( 1 988) (rul ing that U.S .C. § 
1 404(a )  was widely enough drafted to make the presence of forum selection c lauses 
nearly determinative, thereby swallowing Erie federa l ism concerns). 
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to deal with what might at heart be state J aw issues . To el iminate fo­
rum shopping ent irely, federal law must be entirely preemptive and 
thereby el iminate all state sovereignty regarding the issue addressed. B ut 
do we, us ing Professor MULLENIX ' s  characterization of this case, 
really want a preemptive federal statutory law of contracts? The reality 
of overlapping state court legi slative j urisdiction is a normal part of 
confl icts inqui ries, but, despite occasional efforts (such as current Re­
publican attempts at federal tort ''reform"), such lack of substantive 
uniformity usual ly is  not thought to requi re that al l  inconsistencies in 
state law be el iminated by passing a preemptive federal statute . 
The real question i s  whether federai procedural rules should be 
allowed to evade state substantive law, and the real problem may be 
that Erie doctrine has become so significantly eroded v ia mechanical 
application of Hanna 's congressional authorization presumptions, that 
Professor B ORCHERS is describing the de facto result in many Erie 
situat ions-federal courts go their own way w ithout regard to the un­
derlying substantive i ssues i n  the suit .8 For those troubled by the i ncon­
s istency between federal and state results because of federal procedural 
statutes being read too expansively, a less drastic solution than e ither 
federal iz ing all state law or preventing federal courts from exercis ing 
state law-formulating powers, would be to prevent federal courts from 
trivial izing all Erie inquiries. This means reconsidering and perhaps 
reversing prior Court deci sions which have let the federal courts move 
too far from what state courts would do on similar facts. 
Professor SILBERMAN, at least partially, advocates such an ap­
proach when she emphasizes that "if § 1404 had been i nvoked and I 
were i n  a position to do so, I would urge the Supreme Court to recon­
sider the path it chose in Stewart." SILBERMAN, infra, at 550. Work­
ing within the fact pattern of the hypothetical, she emphasizes how a 
more balanced Erie inquiry would proceed . For Professor SILBERMAN, 
it makes sense to consider the l i tigation as a whole rather than the fo­
rum selection clause i n  isolation. Recognizing that "choice of law and 
choice of forum clauses must be v iewed together to reflect Georgia's 
regulatory policies against l imiting l iabil ity i n  tort cases of this type," 
she concludes the i ssue before the panel is  one reflecting important 
substantive state policies and one which therefore must be governed by 
state law. S ILBERMAN, infra, at 55 1 .  
Professor STEIN, on the other hand, seems to divorce the substan-
8. Rather than continue to pay lip service to Erie, under Professor 
BORCHERS's approach. the courts should simply abandon i t .  
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tive concerns underly ing this l itigation from the question of where suit 
wil l  proceed. His  conclusion i s  that a defendant' s motion to dismiss is 
not the proper vehicle for enforcement of forum selection c lauses, but 
that i nstead § 1 404(a) should be the exclusive vehicle for enforcing 
such clauses i n  diversity suits i nvolving domesti c  parties seeking domes­
tic fora. Accordingly,  on our hypothetical  facts specifying exclus ively a 
state forum, defendant Ski Vacations , i n  Professor STEIN' s  view, has 
the chance to move under § 1 404(a) for transfer, and might thereby 
force the l itigation to proceed in Vermont federal district court. This 
result-possible frustration of important Georgia  policies-is ,  as he 
admits, "an odd conclusion for someone who has argued in the face of 
black-letter law that state law should exert a greater i nfluence on federal 
court access than is generally acknowledged ."  STEIN, infra, at 570. 
Believing that the Stewart Court reached the right result ,  although 
agreeing that the Court should have offered more convincing logic for 
its dec i s ion, Professor STEIN seems wi l l ing also to accept that Hanna 
properly authorizes Congress to determine j urisdiction, or to use h is  
term, court access, v ia  rules of procedure .  He thus leaves i t  to others 
(perhaps myself in a future foolhardy work) to argue that there are 
inherent problems in Congress legislating away Erie's federal i sm com­
mands without providing any preemptive substantive law. 
Having accepted Stewart and Hanna as control l ing ,  Professor 
STEIN's  task is to apply  them to forum selection clauses which desig­
nate forums outside the federal system. He correctly notes that Stewart 
creates a conundrum, on our facts, for the federal court which would 
otherwise desire to honor Georgia  policy of not enforcing such c lauses. 
If the federal court denies defendant ' s  motion to dismiss, because this 
would seem the right result under Georgia law and because Stewart 
does not directly govern motions to dismiss, that same court is l ikely to 
be faced with a fol low-up § 1 404(a) motion for transfer. Under Profes­
sor STEIN' s  reading of Stewart, that motion could result in transfer to 
Vermont.9 It would be better from the beginning, in Professor STEIN' s 
9 .  Professor STEIN emphasizes that transfer is not compe lled. and suggests that 
the Stewart case on remand properly applied Stewart criteria in finding no obligation 
to transfer. See STEIN, infra, at 557 I am not so sure. Given at least two Justices' 
emphasis in Stewart that forum selection c lauses should a lmost always be enforced, 
and that there is no meaningful difference between the standards that should govern 
i nquiries under admiralty versus d iversity, see Stewart, 487 U.S. at 33 (Kennedy, J . ,  
concurring) ;  and given the  Court's unhesitating expansion of  c lause enforcement i n  
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v .  Shute, 499 U.S. 585 ( 1 99 1  ), I am doubtful that a 
majori ty of the current Court would see the same difference in standards between § 
1 404(a) and other federal jurisdiction dismissal s  or transfers whi..:h Professor STEIN 
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view, to acknowledge that the enforceabi l ity of forum selection clauses 
in d iversity cases designating domestic fora is always a matter of feder­
al law, governed by the rationales which should have been put forth 
more clearly by the Court i n  Stewart but are implied from that deci sion. 
Professor STEIN offers as j ustifications for always proceeding under 
§ 1 404 that thi s: 1 )  allows for more flexibil i ty to varied c ircumstances 
than the mechanical knee-jerk enforcement exhibited in Carn ival Cruise 
Lines, Inc. v. Shute; 10 2) emphasizes that courts are not ousted of juri s­
diction by private agreements, but rather enforce or choose not to en­
force such agreements by way of exerc is ing their j ur isdiction;  and 3) 
provides for procedural consolidation of these i ssues and promotion of a 
s ingle federal standard. Although he concedes that forum non con ve­
niens dismissal provides alternatively good conceptual fit for addressing 
a defendant ' s  motion to enforce a forum selection c lause, Professor 
STEIN considers thi s  approach foreclosed by the general understanding 
that § 1 404 preempts traditional forum non analysis .  
I find it difficult to  critique Professor STEIN' s approach, s ince I do 
not so readily accept that dec isions such as Stewart, or Hanna, have 
taken us down the proper Erie path . In arguing that § 1 404 best empha­
sizes the horizontal nature of a covenant to sue in  a particular place, i t  
further seems to me Professor STEIN predisposes towards h i s  answer in 
the way he sets up this question. Section 1 404 being solely an intra­
system statute, can address only what he label s  horizontal concerns .  
What remains  unexplained, because foreclosed by Stewart, is  why mo­
tions to enforce forum selection clauses should not take more account 
of what the underly ing suit is about and why giving effect to a forum 
selection clause wi l l  not frustrate the state' s  law which got the diversity 
plaintiffs to the courthouse in the first place. Similarly, only because 
courts have assumed that § 1 404 el iminates more traditional forum non 
conveniens doctrine does it make sense to argue, as Professor STEIN 
does, that a conditional forum non conveniens dismissal might be appro­
priate for a vertical s ituation, 1 1  but not for a horizontal s ituation. 1 2 
advocates. I address a l leged lack of Vermont connection to th is  l i tigation. 
I 0. 499 U.S 585 (1991) (forum selection clause enforced as a matter of federal 
admiralty law) .  
II. On the hypothetical facts before this panel ,  such a vertical situation would 
occur under Professor STEIN ' s  analysis when a defendant' s  § 1404 motion to transfer 
i s  granted, and the case is transferred to Vermont. In federal d istrict court in Ver­
mont, the defendant would then be free to renew a motion to dismiss and, § 1404 
being then inapplicable, the federal district court would not be prevented from apply­
ing more traditional forum non conveniens analysis .  
1 2 . The horizontal s ituation would occur i f  the defendant moved to dismiss in  
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Professor SILBERMAN' s  approach to the hypothetical seems to me 
more satisfying. Drawi ng to our attention one district j udge ' s  attempts 
to wrestle with Erie's concerns in l ight of Stewart's increased pressure 
to grant transfer, Professor SILBERMAN emphasizes that i t  i s  the un­
derly ing Georgia policy regarding choice of law and choice of forum 
clauses, considered together, which should determine where our hypo­
thetical case will be adjudicated. See SILBERMAN, infra, at 549 . In the 
case she cites, when a New York j udge received, via § 1 404(a) transfer, 
a case originally filed in Puerto Rico Superior Court, the New York 
j udge neither reflexively applied Puerto Rico' s  choice of law rules, nor 
considered himself automatically free to decide the case as would a 
New York tribunal . Instead, the transferee court tried to ascertai n  how a 
Puerto Rico court would have v iewed the entirety of the l i t igation, were 
it sti l l  proceeding in Puerto Rico courts. Professor STEIN, on the other 
hand, apparently would allow a federal j udge on our facts to rule as a 
matter of federal law, see STEIN, infra at 557, whether the l it igation 
ultimately will proceed in Vermont state court. Professor SILBERMAN 
rules instead that the Georgia state pol icies regarding choice of law, in 
combination with policies about choice of forum, mean that this  l i t iga­
tion should not only remain in federal district court in Georgia, but also 
remain subject to Georgia choice of law rules. 
Professor STEIN may be right that the complicated analys is  he 
offers i s  required under Stewart and current forum non conveniens doc­
trine, and he may also be correctly solv ing the dilemmas created by 
these doctrines, although as Professor SILBERMAN notes, at least one 
federal j udge has found a different way to navigate between Stewart 
and Erie. My incl ination is to take such signs of necessary, but counter­
i ntuitive complication, as symptoms that something is wrong wi th cur­
rent doctrine. Professor STEIN is right to remind us, however, of the 
Georgia federal di strict court, on the basis of the forum selection clause. Under 
Professor STEIN's analysis, § 1404 would preempt traditional forum non conveniens 
doctrine if transfer could be made to a district where the selection clause pointed. 
Professor STEIN reads the stipulation of state court forum in our hypothetical facts 
as not determinative of how a federal court should use the clause for deciding 
whether to transfer. Accordingly, no dismissal, even a dismissal condi tional on suit 
being re instituted i n  Vermont state court, can occur in Georgia federal court. 
From the l itigants' perspective, however, these procedural movements surely 
seem l ike a waste of time and resources, and exaltation of  technicalities over sub­
stance. If the real issue i s  whether the case wi l l  be l i tigated in Vermont state court 
or not at all, and even assuming that this issue is one which should be governed by 
federal law, it i s  at least counter-intuitive that only a Vermont federal court can 
make that determination. 
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post-Stewart procedural reality that § 1 404 motions al most always will 
be coupled w ith motions to dismiss, and that accordingly the defendant 
has an opportunity to get this l i tigation out of the Georgia federal court 
on our hypothetical facts, despite any strong Georgia state policies to 
the contrary. 
Contrary to Professor STEIN, Professors REDISH, B URBANK, and 
SOLIMINE reason, under their versions of Erie analysis ,  that Stewart 
does not foreclose finding forum selection c lauses l ike the one i nvolved 
in our hypothetical to be potentially governed by state law. Professor 
REDISH, acknowledging that hi s position is significantly undercut by 
Hanna, nevertheless concludes that i t  would be appropriate to apply to 
the case facts a balancing test derived from Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. 
Coop., 356 U.S .  525 ( 1 958) .  Such a test emphasizes "the systemic con­
cerns of federalism that are necessarily impl icated by any Erie choice." 
REDISH, infra, at 547. S ince this approach requires comparing the im­
portance each system attaches to resolving the issue under its own law, 
and since Georgia l aw seems in  flux, Professor REDISH would remand 
to the district court to determine in the first instance both what Georgia 
law i s ,  and what pol icies underlie that law . He provides, however, some 
guidance in discerning these state pol icies .  For example, if the district 
court determined clauses would not be enforced under Georgia law, 
Professor REDISH would view this as a substantive pol icy decision to 
protect cit izens from adhesion contracts and to provide them a forum 
for vindicat ing their rights. He would defer to such state substantive 
concerns under his reading of Erie. 
Professor SOLIMINE reasons that regardless of which Erie method­
ology is appl ied, the val idity of the forum selection clause wi l l  be gov­
erned by state law. First, he argues that if federal law is assumed to 
support more enforcement of such clauses, the intrastate forum shopping 
counseled against by Hallna should not be here encouraged. Alternative­
ly ,  under a Byrd balancing approach, he contends i t  would be difficult 
to find on our facts a federal procedural interest which would override 
the state ' s  presumed regulatory interest in pol icing bargai ns .  Finally, 
Professor SOLIMINE notes that the presence of a choice of law clause 
in our facts cannot circumvent the Erie inquiry, emphasizing that the 
Erie choice of whether state or federal law should govern "is a structur­
al i ssue not amenable . . . to advance determination by the parties." 
SOLIMINE, infra, at 573 .  
Professor BURBANK concludes that validity o f  forum selection 
clauses l ike the one at issue should be evaluated under state law, deriv­
ing support for his position by comparing to the lack of federal regula­
tion of personal j urisdiction for d i versity jur i sdiction. Professor 
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B URBANK emphasizes attempting to find federal policy reasons ,  i n  the 
absence of more direct congressional intent, for uniform rules of court 
access for diversity suits . Whereas Congress has specifical ly  l imited 
access through amount in controversy ,  and has modified access (once 
obtained) through venue and real location of business status ,  it has cho­
sen not to l imit or expand general access beyond what state personal j u­
risdiction law would permit. 13 Professor B URBANK interprets this si­
lence as evidence of no strong federal desire for uniform access rules, 
and accordingly leaves the i ssue of validity of our forum selection 
clause to Georgia law by default. 
Professor B URBANK thus impliedly rejects Professor STEIN' s ap­
proach of reading a general federal procedural statute, like § 1 404, as 
incorporating within it broader policy concern s  about court access. 
Without explic i tly  criticizing Stewart, although noting that the case 
curiously "grounded decision in [§ 1404] without reference to the law 
governing validity," Professor BURBANK' s approach under Erie i s  not 
to read such decisions expansively . 14 Only where Congress has un­
equivocally spoken,  or a c learly rational policy j ustification for federal 
uniformity can be discerned, does federal law preempt; otherwise, state 
law governs .  
I think Professors B URBANK and SILBERMAN correctly draw 
attention to tension inherent in current Erie practice. I would argue for 
reversing the current trend of federalizing juri sdiction i ssues under cover 
of procedural statutes .  But until the Court itself changes directions ,  the 
approaches of our paneli sts in trying to distinguish Stewart (or in the 
case of Professor STEIN embracing it) seem ways a circuit court of ap­
peals could address these issues. S ince those federal appel late robes are 
the garb our panelists were asked to wear for purposes of thi s first 
13. Assuming I am reading Professor BURBANK' s  argument correctly, there i s  
inherent within i t  an assumption about congressional abi l i ty to  expand personal juris­
dict ion for diversi ty suits which I would chal lenge. Under my theory of juri sdict ion, 
see, e.g., COX, infra, at 642, courts never have more juri sdictional reach than they 
have legit imacy to apply thei r  own law. S ince, under Erie, in diversi ty jurisdiction 
s ituations, federal courts must apply state substantive law rather than federal substan­
tive law, it would be anomalous if  federal courts could hear state-law based suits 
which could not be heard in the state system. To explore i n  any meaningfu l  detai l  
the impl ications of thi s  theory for federal statutes which attempt to authorize larger 
juri sdictional reach i s  beyond the scope of this i ntroductory essay. 
1 4. Professor BURBANK cri t ic izes the result in  Hanna as the Court succumbing 
to the temptation "to hear federal statutes or Federal Rules speaking when they 
appear to be s ilent, or at least to hear enough noise nearby to si lence state law." 
BURBANK, infra, at 537 .  
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"adj udication," their  "opinions" make interesting reading as to how 
lower courts might be able to navigate through or around current Erie 
doctrine in efforts to uphold state or plaintiff rights .  
Summing up the decis ion on the Erie i ssue, under rationales or 
variations on rationales recounted above, a majority of our "Court" rules 
that Georgia law controls whether the forum selection clause indicating 
suit in Vermont is valid (Professors BURBANK, MULLENIX, 
S ILBERMAN, SOLIMINE and WEINTRAUB). 1 5 On the second i s­
sue-whether the clause should be enforced, and the case dismissed-a 
four vote plurality finds that the c lause should not be enforced 
( P rofe sso rs  B O R C H ER S , M U L L E N I X ,  S I L BE R M A N  a n d  
WEINTRAUB), with two more "judges" remanding for further inquiry 
as to the content of state law on this i ssue (Professors BURBANK and 
REDIS H). 
Either to buttress their  conclusion about the invalidity of the c lause, 
or, in  Professor BORCHERS ' s  case, as necessary part of his decis ion 
(since he bel ieves the c lause is  governed by federal standards) ,  three of 
the plurality judges attempt to distinguish Carnival Cruise Lines on the 
merits, and argue that our clause would not survive even that decision, 
were that admiralty decision controll ing on our facts. Like Professor 
BORCHERS , I also consider Carnival Cruise Lines "a miserable deci­
s ion that I would cheerfully overrule," BORCHERS, infra, at 534, but I 
find the panel ists' efforts to distinguish it on the merits unpersuasive, 
and i t  i s  only that aspect of the second issue "opinions" upon which I 
wish briefly  to comment before concluding this introduction. 
Professors BORCHERS, SILBERMAN, and WEINTRAUB all claim, 
for example, that underlying Carnival Cruise Lines i s  approval for con­
solidating l itigation in  one forum so as not to subject the cruise ship to 
multiple suits in  diverse fora arising out of a single i nc ident. This sort 
of situation,  however, was not factually before the Carnival Cruise 
Lines Court. A single plaintiff slipped aboard a single ship and attempt­
ed to recover for this discrete injury. Moreover, in si tuations of mass 
catastrophe involving those drawn together from disparate areas, it is  
not immediately apparent that a shared location more factually connect­
ed with the events giving rise to the catastrophe can never be found. 
The Carnival Cruise Lines Court, however, was content to endorse 
consolidati on on defendant' s designated playing field, w ithout regard to 
I 5. "Judge" REDISH remands for further consideration, "Judge" BORCHERS 
rules that federal law applies. and "Judge" STEIN, whi le overru l ing defendant ' s  
motion to dismiss ,  apparently would affirm gr::mt of a motion to transfer brought 
pursuant to § 1404, if that situation came before h im after reversal and remand. 
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what other possibil ities might be avai lable. 
The real rationale underlying Carn ival Cruise Lines, as Professor 
SOLIMINE correctly notes, is economic. And although I do not endorse 
that rationale, I think Professor SOLIMINE correctly emphasizes that 
the rationale cannot be avoided by pointing to contrary facts or policies 
in our hypothetical .  Just as a cruise l ine operator wishes to keep com­
petitive (or increase profits) by discouraging dispersed l itigation in every 
forum from which it solicits customers, Ski Vacations wishes,  with 
l imited l iability, to solicit customers from around the country to its 
scattered resorts. Professors WEINTRAUB and B ORCHERS also argue 
that Plaintiff s physical disabi l ity (being a quadriplegic as a result of 
this accident) prevents her from conducting meaningful trial in Vermont. 
My guess is the seriousness of the injury would make it worth a con­
tingency fee attorney ' s  while to try the suit wherever recovery could be 
had. As Professor SOLIMINE points out, the logistical l it igation diffi­
culties of the hypothetical case are surmountable. The real unfairness in  
forcing Plaintiff to Vermont i s  the substantively unfavorable Jaw when 
the Vermont choice of law clause is  applied, especially s ince both the 
state of residence (which was also where solicitation for the trip oc­
curred) and the state of the inj ury (Colorado) have law more favorable 
to Plaintiff. 
I sympathize with Professor WEINTRAUB ' s  antipathy to assisting 
Vermont in  becoming "the Delaware of ski res011s by winning the race 
to the bottom . . . .  " WEINTRAUB. infra, at 556 .  But it stretches the 
facts too far, as Professor SOLIMINE emphasizes , to claim or imply 
that Vermont has no significant interest in  this l itigation. Professor 
SOLIMINE properly notes that although Defendant Ski V acations ' s 
principal place of business is in New York, the company operates ski 
resorts in upstate New York and Vermont. Even if there were no such 
connections, the company legitimately might choose a Vermont forum 
precisely because of that state's presumed expertise in l i tigating inci­
dents of this  sort. The real personal due process issues are notice and 
lack of meaningfu l  consent, and on those issues, as Professor 
SOLIMINE again points out, the Carnival Cruise Lines facts are every 
bit as egregious as those before our panel .  
Given this identity to Carnival Cruise Lines, the question is  whether 
that admiralty decision' s  logic appl ies to this  case. Accordingly ,  we are 
back at our starting point of addressing the Erie issue of whose law 
should be fashioned or used to determine the validity of the clause. 
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FACTS 
Ski Vacations i s  a New York corporation which operates ski resorts 
primari ly  in upstate New York and Vermont, and has recently opened a 
small faci l i ty in Colorado . Plaintiff, an Atlanta, Georgia  resident, re­
sponded to a local newspaper ad promoting inexpensive Colorado ski 
vacations. An Atlanta agency had placed the ad, responding to Ski 
Vacations' s  fom1 mai l ings advertis ing special package deals and good 
commiss ions as part of its start up campaign.  Plaintiff booked, paid a 
deposit on a package trip, and received a confirmation letter from Ski 
Vacations ' s  Colorado office containing information about the resort . 
Included in  the information was a notice entitled "Conditions of Con­
tract." Condition 3 indicated that any and all disputes aris ing out of Ski 
Vacations ' s  provis ion of services or goods, including any tort c laims, 
must be brought in  Vermont state court and are to be governed by 
Vermont law. 
Plaintiff went on the Colorado ski trip, paying the balance due upon 
arrival and signing a "Conditions of Contract" form identical to the one 
received in the mai l .  While on the slopes, Plaintiff was injured and i s  
now a quadriplegic. Emergency treatment was rendered in  Colorado. 
Soon after, Plaintiff returned to Georgia and continues to reside there. 
Plaintiff brought negligence and strict l iabil ity c laims i n  Georgia state 
court against Ski Vacations for allegedly allowing the use of inappropri­
ate equipment and to ski on an inappropriate and poorly designed slope. 
Assume significant differences between Georgia, Colorado, and Vermont 
Jaw on one or more important substantive law issues; also assume Ver­
mont law i s  most favorable to defendant Ski Vacations on each of these 
issues. Assume choice of forum clauses which oust Georgia of jurisdic­
tion were not traditionally honored under Georgia law as against public 
pol icy. Recent mid-level cases, however, have approved forum clauses, 
indicating some confusion or uncertainty about the current state of 
Georgia l aw on this i ssue. Assume that Georgia normally  enforces con­
tract choice of law c lauses unless against public pol icy, but has not 
squarely ruled whether choice of law can be pre-negotiated for tort 
actions via contract terms. Assume Georgia is a vested rights jurisdic­
tion that does not apply renvoi . 
Defendant Ski Vacations removed Plaintiff' s suit to federal court on 
the basis of diversity and, c iting the forum selection clause, moved to 
dismiss  for lack of personal j urisdiction and/or improper venue. Assume 
the federal di strict court sitting in Atlanta granted this motion, holding 
that the i ssue was governed by federal law and that Stewart Org. , Inc. 
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v. Ricoh Corp. , 487 U .S .  2 2  ( 1 988) ,  and Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. , v. 
Shute, 499 U .S .  585 ( 1 99 1  ), i ndicate federal policy to enforce such 
clauses. Plaintiff appeals the dismissal .  
As the federal Appeals Court sitting e n  bane m 1 1 th Circuit ,  how 
should we rule on this appeal? 
Please address the fol lowing two Issues : 
1 )  B y  what l aw,  state or federal ,  should we determine the validity of 
the forum selection clause? 
2) Regardless of whether we apply federal or state law, should we 
honor the forum selection clause on the stated facts? 
Those who decide that the i ssue is  properly governed by state law 
should assume that there is  enough room in Georgia precedents to al low 
a rul ing either way on these facts. 
* * * 
BORCHERS, J. * : (reversing and remanding) 
Thi s  case presents two different i ssues relating to party autonomy. 
First, in  diversity cases . does state law or "federal" common l aw 1 gov­
ern the enforceabi l ity of choice-of-forum clauses? Second, should the 
choice-of-forum clause be honored in this case? 
I. 
It seems odd that the fundamental question whether federal common 
* Patrick J .  B orchers: Professor of Law and Associate Dean, A lbany Law 
School of Union University. 
I .  I place "federal" in  scare quotes here because the reference is not to preemp­
tive federal law that would govern both in state and federal court by v i rtue of the 
Supremacy Clause. See Louise Weinberg, The Curious Notion that the Rules of Deci­
sion Act Blocks Supreme Federal Common Law, 83 Nw.  U. L. Rev.  860 ( 1 989) .  
Rather, "federal" common law here is a shorthand way of referring to general, j udge­
made rules articulated by federal courts that do not purport to disp lace state rules as 
they might apply i n  state court. This kind of common Jaw differs from the preemp­
tive sort of judge-made ru le, such as the rule articulated in Clearfield Trust Co. v. 
United States, 3 1 8  U.S .  363 ( 1 943) .  For purposes of this opinion,  when I use the 
term "federal common law" or some variant, I have in  mind the non-preempt ive 
kind. 
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law or state law governs the enforcement of an agreement so ordinary 
as a forum selection agreement remains shrouded i n  mystery . The un­
fortunate state of the matter, however, i s  that the S upreme Court posi­
tively delights in refusing to lay down intell igible rules, or even princi­
ples, in thi s  area of the law. 
Analysis  of the question of which law governs must begin  with the 
Supreme Court ' s  decis ion in Stewart Org. , Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. , 487 
U .S .  22 ( 1 988) .  Stewart presented a problem similar to the one here . In 
that case, Alabama state l aw denied-on grounds of "publ i c  pol icy"­
enforcement of exclusive forum selection clauses. Federal common law 
favors enforcement. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U .S .  585 
( 1 99 1 )  (exclusive forum selection agreement enforced in  an admiralty 
case as a matter of federal common law) ;  The Bremen v. Zapata Off­
Shore Co. , 407 U .S .  1 ( 1 972) .  In  Stewart, the Supreme Court appeared 
to be confronted with a conflict between federal common and state l aw 
requiring a "relatively ungu ided," see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U .S .  460, 
47 1 ( 1 965),  choice under the l ine of cases beginning with Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S . 64 ( 1 938) .  
Rather than answering that question, however, the S upreme Court 
asked and answered one of its own. The Stewart Court decided that the 
federal venue transfer statute, 28 U.S .C.  § 1 404 ( 1 988) ,  was broad 
enough to incorporate the exi stence of a forum selection c lause as a 
factor i n  the analysis .  Deciding that the federal venue statute covered 
the subject removed the state/federal choice from the realm of the seri­
ously debatable, because the only c ircumstance in  which a federal stat­
ute does not trump state law is i f  Congress lacks affirmative authority 
to pass i t .  Stewart said, sensibly enough, that congressional authority to 
pass a venue statute was "not subject to serious question," Stewart, 487 
U.S.  at 32 (citing Hanna, 380 U .S .  460), and thus federal law appl ies if 
transfer under § 1 404 is the mechanism for enforci ng the forum-selec­
tion c lause. 
Stewart, of course, rai ses more questions than it answers. But the 
most important one for our purposes i s :  What law governs enforcement 
of forum selection c lauses if § 1 404 is not in the picture? In our case, 
of course, § 1 404 is not available, because the forum selected here i s  a 
Vermont state court . The concurring Justices in Stewart hinted that 
federal common law should govern, but the dissent (which was forced 
to reach the "relatively unguided" Erie question by virtue of its nar­
rower construction of § 1 404) thought that state law must be supreme. 
Stewart, 487 U.S .  at 33 (Kennedy, J., concurring);  id. at 33 (Scalia, J . ,  
dissenting) . With thi s  obscure guidance, it is  not surprising that lower 
federal courts have divided sharply on the question.  See Northwestern 
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Nat '! Ins. Co. v. Donovan , 9 1 6  F.2d 372,  374 (7th Cir. 1 990) (federal 
law) ; Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Cucci Am. ,  Inc. , 858  F.2d 509, 5 1 2  (9th 
Cir. 1 988 )  (federal law) ; Farmland Indus. , Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Com­
modities, Inc. , 806 F.2d 848 ( 8th Cir. 1 986) (state law) .  I n  fact ,  our 
circuit has managed to find itself on both s ides of the question, because 
the en bane opinion for the court in Stewart, reviewed by the Supreme 
Court ,  took the position that the matter was governed by federal com­
mon law ,  but a three-judge panel l ater held that state law governs .  See 
Alexander Proudfoot Co. World Headquarters v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 9 1 2  
( 1 1 th Cir. 1 989) .  
The most sensible answer to the question i s  that the federal common 
law rule favoring enforcement should apply."  The asserted goal of the 
Erie l ine of cases constru ing the Rules of Deci sion Act is to prevent 
"forum shopping" and "inequitable administration" of law. Hanna, 380 
U .S .  at  468 . B ut in  this  context, forum shopping cannot be avoided. 
Rather, the choice i s  between interstate and intrastate forum shopping. 
If federal courts sitting in  diversity are required to follow state l aw on 
this subject, thi s  wi l l  make the choice between state and federal court in 
any given state less significant. B ut i t  wi l l  up the ante s ignificantly as 
to the state in which the plaint iff chooses to file (whether i n  federal or 
state court) because that choice wi l l  determine the enforceabi l i ty of the 
forum selection clauses. As long as the states continue to differ on the 
enforceabil i ty of these clauses (and there are a dozen or so that refuse 
to enforce them under any circumstances, see Patrick J .  Borchers , Fo­
rum Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts After Carnival Cruise: 
A Proposal for Congressional Reform, 67 Wash. L. Rev . 55 ,  57 n .7  
( 1 992)) parties wanting to  avoid the effect of  such clauses wi l l  shop for 
fora that wil l  ignore them. 
The choice, then, is not between avoiding and promoting forum 
shopping, it i s  between promoting interstate or i ntrastate forum shop­
ping. The lesser of the evils, it seems to me, is intrastate forum shop­
ping. Intrastate forum shopping is a less serious threat to fai rness be­
cause i t  does not discriminate against c iv i l  defendants. If a diversity 
2. The record i ndicates that the contract also inc luded a choice-of- law c lause se­
lecting Vermont state law. The majority rul e  appears to be that choice-of- l aw c lauses 
do not govern the val idity of companion choice-of-forum clauses. See, e.g . ,  A VC 
Nederland B. V. v. A trium lnv. Partnership, 740 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1 984); L.A .  Pipe­
line Co11tr. Co. v. Texas E. Prod. Pipeline Co. , 699 F. Supp. 1 85 ,  1 86-87 (S .D. Ind. 
1 988) ;  Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am. , 683 F.2d 7 1 8  (2d Cir. 1 982) .  Absent 
some c lear i ndication to the contrary, therefore, I would hold that the choice-of- law 
clause excludes the choice-of-forum clause from its ambi t .  
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plaintiff prefers federal court, it can fi le there; if a diversity defendant 
prefers federal court, it can remove the case as long as it is sued out­
s ide its home state. See 28 U.S .C .  § 1 44 1  ( 1 988) .  The only antidotes 
available to defendants for interstate forum shopping are the far less 
certain devices of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens dis­
missals. Application of general standards in diversity cases also benefits 
both parties by making the enforcement of these clauses more predict­
able .  Subjecting these clauses to the vagaries of local law only compli­
cates any calculus of their commercial value and enhances the possibil i­
ty of surprising results .  Thus, even assuming the essential validity and 
persuasive value of the Erie l ine of cases, the result should  be that 
general principles, not local law, apply .  
A deeper question is  whether the Erie-and-Klaxon l ine of cases 
makes any sense. Historical research has shown that the essential pur­
pose of section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1 789-which came to be 
known as the "Rules of Decision Act" and was the foundation for Erie 
-was to codify the then-commonly-accepted notion that there was a 
"general" law appl icable to general subjects, and local law governed 
only "local" subjects. Wilfred Ritz, Rewriting the History of the Judicia­
ry Act of 1 789 ( 1 990) ; see also Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of 
Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New 
World for Erie and Klaxon ,  72 Tex . L. Rev. 79 ( 1 993) .  The reference 
in that statute to "the laws of the several states" was surely a reference 
to the legal principles held in common-that is, held "several ly"-by 
the states ,  and legislative activity contemporaneous with the Judiciary 
Act' s passage shows unmistakably that the First Congress thought that 
local state laws would not apply  in diversity cases. 
The essential insight of the First Congress-which was eventually  
lost to  our modern legal tradition-is that diversity cases , by bringing 
together parties from disparate legal systems, are handled most sensibly 
and fairly, in  many instances, by application of uniform rules. Conflicts 
rules are just the sort of subject for which uniform treatment across al l  
federal courts makes sense. The cost of honoring state law is  unfairness 
and the promotion of interstate forum shopping, and that cost is too 
high. 
Accordingly, the enforcement of the forum selection clause should 
be governed by federal common law, not local Georgia law. 
II . 
The second issue is  whether this c lause merits enforcement under 
federal common law. It does not. 
The Supreme Court ' s  decision In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore 
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Co. , 407 U .S .  1 ( 1 972) set i nto motion a trend i n  the United S tates to­
wards enforcement of exclusive forum selection clauses. B ut Bremen did 
not give an unqual i fied endorsement to these clauses. Instead, the Court 
held only that reasonable clauses merit enforcement, see id. at 1 5 , and 
pointed to the strong bargaining position of both parties and the actual 
negoti ation over the clause as evidence that the agreement in that case 
merited enforcement. 
It is tempting to say, therefore, that the clause in this c ase fai l s  the 
Bremen reasonableness test because of the disparity of bargaining pow­
er, the l ack of actual negotiation, and the severe hardship to Plaintiff in  
l itigating away from home. The problem with this approach i s  the  Su­
preme Court ' s decision in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 
U .S .  585 ( 1 99 1  ) .  Carnival Cruise Lines held that a s imi lar c lause ap­
pearing on the back of a cruise ship ticket was enforceable notwith­
standing the disparity in bargaining power, the lack of actual negotia­
tion, and the hardship to the plaintiff in l i tigating outside her home 
state . Worse yet, Carnival Cruise Lines appears to create a rul e  of near­
ly per se enforcement of such clauses if they appear in form contracts 
produced by l arge enterprises and choose as a forum the p lace where 
one of the parties has some significant connection. This c lause is ,  of 
course, the product of mass production by a large enterprise and the 
place i t  chooses as a forum-Vermont-is one with which the defen­
dant has a substantial connection. 
Carnival Cruise Lines i s  a miserable deci sion that I would cheerful ly 
overrule .  See Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal 
Courts After Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional Reform, 
supra, at 57 n .7 .  Other academic commentary is in accord with my dim 
assessment of the Supreme Court ' s  performance on thi s  i ssue . See, e.g. , 
Jeffrey A.  Liesemer, Carnival 's Got the Fun . . .  and the Forum: A 
New Look at Choice-of-Forum Clauses and Unconscionability Doctrine 
After Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 53 U .  Pitt. L. Rev . 1 025 
( 1 992) ; Linda Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: 
Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual Personal Jurisdiction ,  27 Tex.  
Int' I L.J .  323 ( 1 992) ;  Wil l iam Richman, Carnival Cruise Lines: Forum 
Selection Clauses in Adhesion Contracts, 40 Am. J. Comp. L .  977 
( 1 992); cf Michael Sol imine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privat­
ization of Procedure, 25 Cornell Int' I L.J. 5 1  ( 1 992). The problem with 
allowing enforcement of such c lauses is that consumers l ack adequate 
information to assess the costs of these provisions to them and their 
value to the other party, and the cost of obtain ing this information-i. e. , 
legal advice-is prohibitive given the s ize of the transaction .  The facts 
of this case demonstrate this shortcoming. Even if we charge Plaintiff 
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with reading the contract, and assume further that Plaintiff understood 
the significance of the clause, Plaintiff st i l l  cannot ascertain the cost and 
the defendant' s benefit . Consumers are in  a position to compare price ,  
length of stay, and the other customary amenities of a ski vacation. B ut 
a consumer cannot-without obtaining legal advice-discount the value 
of the vacation by the probabi l i ty of i ncurring the cost of an expensive 
lawsuit far from home. For this reason, the major i nternational conven­
tions on j urisdiction, such as the Brussels Convention, deny effect to 
agreements of this sort where one party is at an acute disadvantage as 
in  insurance, consumer, and employment contracts .  
Even taking Carnival Cruise Lines at  face value, however, there are 
some significant differences between this case and that one. First, in 
Carn ival Cruise Lines, although the lower court opinion, see Shute v. 
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. , 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1 988) ,  found that 
the plaintiff was unable to journey from Washington to Florida for tria l ,  
the Supreme Court refused to defer to that finding. The Carnival Cruise 
Lines opinion, therefore, treated as unproven the allegation that the 
clause would be unfair to the plaintiff because of extreme hardship in 
attending trial . In our case, however, it is undisputed that Plaintiff is a 
permanent quadriplegic and that the burden on Plaintiff by enforcing the 
clause would be severe. Bremen makes clear that a he2vy burden of thi s  
kind can, in appropriate circumstances, j ustify excusing a party from the 
obligations of such a clause. 
Second, the Carnival Cruise Lines Court understood the plaintiffs ' 
counsel to have conceded the issue of "notice" of the clause. !d. at 590. 
No such concession has been made here. Other courts have, in the 
wake of Carnival Cruise Lines, found preprinted form contracts to be 
insuffic ient notice of the clause. Cf Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Supe­
rior Court, 286 Cal .  Rptr. 323 ( 1 99 1 )  (remand to trial court to deter­
mine whether printing of clause on the back of a t icket provides "no­
tice") .  Here, the defendant took no special steps to appri se Plaintiff of 
the clause ' s  existence. The Supreme Court' s opinion in Carnival Cruise 
Lines is di stinguishable for this reason as wel l .  
For these reasons, I would refuse to enforce the clause. This requires 
me to reach the question of whether the defendant is subject to personal 
juri sdiction in Georgia. For the reasons stated in my discussion of the 
Brake-0 case, I would hold, as did the Ninth Circuit in  Carnival Cruise 
Lines, that the defendant is subject to personal j urisdiction.  Carnival 
Cruise Lines, 897 F .2d at 377 .  
I would reverse and remand for further proceedi ngs .  
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* * * 
BURBANK, J .  * : (reversing and remanding) 
In granting the defendant' s motion to dismiss, the distric t  court 
determi ned that federal law governed the enforceabil i ty of the forum 
selection clause and relied on the Supreme Court ' s decisions  in Stewart 
Org. , Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. , 487 U.S .  22 ( 1 988) ,  and Carnival Cruise 
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U .S .  5 85 ( 1 99 1 ) , for a federal policy i n  favor 
of enforcement . It is a curious fact  about these cases that the first 
grounded decis ion in 28 U .S .C.  § 1 404 ( 1 98 8) without reference to the 
law governing validity, while the second grounded decis ion in federal 
law, without reference to § 1 404. In any event, neither of the Supreme 
Court decis ions rel ied on by the di strict court for the content of federal 
law tell s  us whether federal law applies .  
The district court did not make c lear on which of the two grounds 
advanced by the defendant, l ack of personal j urisdiction or i mproper 
venue, it based the order of dismissal .  Notwithstanding a suggestion to 
the contrary in Stewart, see 487 U .S .  at 28 n . 8 ,  we do not think i t  
matters . Indeed, defendant' s objection might as  easily have been lack of 
subject matter j uri sdiction . 
Rules regulating personal jurisdiction and venue take account, how­
ever crudely ,  of the interests of both p laintiffs and defendants. In  that 
sense, each set of rules cofifers rights on prospective plaintiffs as well 
as prospective defendants, rights that, i f  the law permits, can be traded 
in advance (as well as traded or lost after litigation has been com­
menced) . S imi larly,  although parties are not permitted to confer  subject 
matter jurisdiction on the federal courts, i t  has been c lear s i nce  The 
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Oil Co. , 407 U .S .  1 ( 1 972),  that, i n  certain 
c ircumstances, they have the power to trade the right to such access as 
the rules of subject matter j urisdiction afford . Our first task is to deter­
mine whether the di strict court was correct in deciding that federal law 
determines whether Plaintiff effectively traded the right to sue the de­
fendant in state or federal court in Georgia. 
The resolution of the problem of lawmaking power in this diversity 
case is not as easy as some of my colleagues apparently believe. Cer­
tainly, i nvocation of neither Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U .S .  64 ( 1 938) ,  
nor state contract law would resolve i t .  just as federal lawmaking power 
exists to prescribe rules of subject matter j urisdiction, personal juri s-
* Stephen B. Burbank: Robert G .  Ful ler, Jr. , Professor of Law, Uni versity of 
Pennsylvania. 
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diction and venue for the federal courts, so  i t  exists to  prescribe the 
circumstances in  which those rules can be varied by private agreement. 
This  power exists for cases that find their way into the federal courts 
only because the requirements of the diversity statute are met, whether 
directly or through removal. The questions we must answer are whether 
the power was exercised in prospective l aw made before the distric t  
entered its order, i f  so, whether i t  was exerci sed by a duly authorized 
federal lawmaker, and if not, whether in entering the order of dismissal 
on the basis of federal law, the district court was such a lawmaker. 
When federal law speaks on a subject, confl icting state l aw must 
y ield i f  the federal law is val id.  At least s ince Hanna v .  Plumer, 3 80 
U .S .  460 ( 1 965),  the val idity of pertinent federal law contained in  legis­
lation or the Federal Rules has been hard to dispute and easy to con­
firm. Hanna did l i ttle, however, to ease the task of those who seek to 
displace state law with j udge-made federal law in  d iversity actions, and 
the Court ' s subsequent decis ion in Walker v. A rmco Steel Corp. ,  446 
U .S .  740 ( 1 980), confirmed j ust how difficult that task i s .  
With the source of  the appl icable l aw turning on  what may seem to 
be the fortuity of federal l awmaking arrangements, it is an understand­
able temptation to hear federal statutes or Federal Rules speaking when 
they appear to be s i lent, or at least to hear enough noise nearby to 
s ilence state law. The Supreme Court succumbed to a s imil ar temptation 
in Hanna itself, 1 and it  has taken that approach twice in  recent years, 
extending the domain of a Federal Rule in Burlington Northern R.R. 
Co. v. Woods, 480 U .S .  1 ( 1 987) ,  see Ralph U. Whitten, Erie and the 
Federal Rules: A Review and Reappraisal After Burlington Northern 
Railroad v. Woods, 2 1  Creighton L .  Rev .  1 ( 1 988) ,  and of a federal 
statute in Stewart. 
No such opportunity is available to us .  Under the terms of the fo­
rum selection clause at i ssue here, transfer to another federal court, 
under either 28 U.S .C. § 1 404 or § 1 406, is not in the cards .  If Con-
l .  
The court o f  appeals '  gloss confim1s what a fair reading o f  the [ state] statute 
[ involved in Hanna] suggests, namely that the statutory provisions in  question 
were the functional equivalent of a tol l ing rule .  The Supreme Court ' s  attempt 
to bi furcate the statute i nto l imitations provisions and notice provisions was 
art i ficial , which may explain why Justice Harlan deemed Ragan impossible to 
dist inguish and was moved to express his disagreement with the resu l t  in that 
case . 
Stephen B .  Burbank, The Rules Enabling A ct of 1 934, 1 30 U .  Pa. L. Rev .  1 0 1 5 , 
1 1 74-75 ( 1 982) (citing Hanna, 380 U .S .  at 462-63 n . J ;  id. at 476-77 (Harlan, J . ,  
concurring) ). 
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gress had taken responsibil ity for, rather than displaced part of, the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens, the Court ' s approach i n  Stewart 
might be open. But  federal forum non conveniens doctrine i s  j udge­
made law, and it provides a mantle of validity no larger than federal 
j udge-made l aw concerning forum selection c lauses. 
In the absence of a pertinent federal statute or Federal Rule, we are 
compelled to make the inquiry suggested by Hanna 's dictum, see 
Hanna, 380 U .S .  at 466-69, the vitality of which was confi rmed in  
Walker. See Walker, 446 U .S .  at 744-47, 752-53 .  There can  be no  
doubt that dii:ferences in  the rules applied by  federal and state courts to 
assess the validity of forum selection c lauses could material l y  affect the 
character or result of l i tigation. Upholding such a clause, and dismissing 
a lawsuit filed in derogation of it ,  might bring a second effort within 
the bar of a statute of l imitations .  Moreover, such c lauses owe their 
exi stence to the knowledge that the location of litigation can material ly  
affect i t s  character, a s  in expense, and i t s  result, as  through the  opera­
tion of a choice of law c lause (which it is often the primary p urpose of 
a choice of forum clause to fructify) .  
Similarly, there can be no doubt that differences between federal and 
state law on this matter could lead to forum-shopping. The perception 
of difference evidently did so :n this case. There are strong indications 
in  Walker that that is the end of the matter, that if  either of the "twin 
aims of Erie," Hanna, 3 80 U .S .  at 468 ,  would be frustrated by the 
appl ication of federal judge-made law instead of state law, the l atter 
must govern. See Walker, 446 U .S .  at 753 .  We believe that it is useful ,  
however, also to consider whether application of federal common l aw 
on the issue of the validity of the forum selection c lause-assuming 
always that i t  i s  consequential ly different from state law-would lead to 
" inequitable administration of the laws," Hanna, 380 U .S .  at 468, and 
thus frustrate the other of Erie 's "twin aims." 
In concluding on this aspect of the analysis that there was "simply 
no reason why" federal common law should displace state law in Walk­
er, 446 U .S .  at 753 ,  the Court might be thought to have suggested that 
good reasons could j ustify such displacement, perhaps even if differenc­
es would lead to forum-shopping. If so, there would be some room for 
the consideration of federal policies other than the policies imputed by 
the Court to Erie, although not for the free-form balancing of federal 
and state policies that some lower federal courts and scholars, as well 
as some of my col leagues, have imputed to Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural 
Elec. Coop. , 356 U .S .  525 ( 1 958) .  See Stephen B. B urbank, 
lnterjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Com­
mon Law: A General Approach , 7 1  Cornell L. Rev . 733,  7 87-9 1 ( 1 986) 
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[hereinafter lnte rjurisdictional Preclusion] .  
We should consider, therefore, whether some federal policy would 
be served by the application of uniform federal j udge-made rules with 
respect to the validity of forum selection clauses in diversity cases. For 
this purpose, our search for relevant policies must be confined to exist­
ing federal law that might be affected by the content of the law on the 
issue in question. Although we have concluded that no existing federal 
statute or Federal Rule is pertinent on the forum selection c lause i s­
sue-in the sense that, as interpreted, i t  provides the legal standards for 
resolution of the issue-federal law speaks in more than one voice, and 
sometimes it may simply call for other federal lawmakers to fashion the 
rules. The Rules of Decision Act says as much. See 28 U.S .C.  § 1 652  
( 1 988 ) ;  B urbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion, supra, a t  759 ,  762, 790-
9 1 .  
The effect of the enforcement of the forum selection clause in this 
case would be to deprive Plaintiff of state and federal forums otherwise 
proper as a matter of subject matter j urisdiction and, we assume, as a 
matter of personal j urisdiction. Although the protections, benefits, or 
rights afforded by the rules governing both matters may be waived, it 
would be entirely rational to require that uniform federal Jaw prescribe 
the circumstances of an effective waiver of a federal forum.  That is not, 
however, a policy fairly derived from the diversity statute, the removal 
statute, or any other federal statute or Federal Rule of which we are 
aware. We thus need not consider how, if  it existed, such a policy 
should be weighed against the policies imputed to the diversity statute 
in Erie and its progeny.  
Perhaps the best gauge of Congress ' s  level of concern w ith access to 
the federal courts by diverse parties who satisfy the amount in contro­
versy requirement ( itself an index of Congress ' s  level of concern) is the 
extent to which it has chosen to regulate personal j urisdiction . 
Rules of personal jurisdiction and venue may be redundant, see 
Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court 
Access Doctrine, 1 33 U. Pa. L. Rev. 78 1 ( 1 985) ,  but in  recent years at 
least, the relevant federal rules are not very much al ike when viewed 
from the perspective of expressed federal interest. Legislation regu lates 
the venue options of prospective federal court plaintiffs (and protections 
of prospective defendants) in  considerable, and often puzzling, detai l ,  
and legislation also regulates the reallocation of business among the 
federal courts .  See, e.g. , 28 U.S .C .  § §  1 39 1 ,  1 404 ( 1 988) .  There is very 
l ittle federal legislation that speaks, directly or indirectly ,  to the question 
of personal j urisdiction, and whatever the ambitions of those responsible 
for the Federal Rules of Civi l  Procedure, they have been kept pretty 
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well under control by the Rules Enabling Acts. See Stephen B .  
B urbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural La w  for Interna­
tional Civil Litigation, 57 Law & Contemp. Probs .  1 03,  1 46 & n .347 
( 1 994 ) .  As a result , in  most cases brought i n  or removed to federal 
court, particular! y cases founded i n  diversity, the question of personal 
j urisdiction depends on the fortuity of state law. 
Congress ' s  refusal generally to enact federal standards of amenabi l i ­
ty ,  leaving regulation to delegated lawmakers whose powers in the area 
are-and are recognized to be-severely l imited, see Omni Capital Int ' l 
v. Rudolf Wolff & Co. , 484 U .S .  97 ( 1 987) ,  renders i t  impossible for us 
to impute to the d iversi ty statute or the removal statute a pol icy i n  
favor o f  uniform federal law on a cognate matter of access .  To b e  sure, 
we would displace any element of state law found to be hosti l e  to or 
inconsistent with those statutes, other federal statutes, or the Federal 
Rules. B ut until and unless that need arises, state law governs the i ssue 
of the val idity of the forum selection clause. 
We are told that Georgia  law is  in  flux, but we do not deem i t  
appropri ate to  have the first word on  the subject in  this case. The  Su­
preme Court has decided that appellate review of district court decis ions  
concerning the content of state law should be  plenary. Salve Regina 
College v. Russell, 499 U .S .  225 ( 1 99 1 ) .  That standard of review does 
not require us to dispense with the considered views of the learned 
district judge. Our incl ination to have the benefi t  of those v iews i s  
strengthened by the possibi l i ty that Georgia law may call for factual 
determinations on matters as to which, some of my colleagues '  sympa­
thetic assertions notwithstanding, the present record is  only suggestive, 
as for instance the impact of enforcement of the clause on Plaintiff s  
abi lity to maintain a lawsuit .  We only mention here a few consider­
ations that may be relevant to the difficult task that confronts the dis­
trict judge on remand: 
1 .  The choices confronting Georgia lawmakers are not confi ned to the 
polar extremes represented by the traditional Georgia rule on the one 
hand and the federal rule as implemented in Carnival Cruise Lines on 
the other. In predicting how the Supreme Court of Georgi a  w i l l  deal 
w ith thi s issue in  the future, the district com1 may wish to consider not 
only recent decisions of the lower Georgia  courts regarding forum se­
lection clauses, but Georgia law on the enforceabi li ty of arbi tration 
clauses and, i ndeed, that state ' s  juri sprudence as a whole relating to 
consumer contracts . 2  
2.  Waiting for the  Supreme Court of Georgia to  reevaluate i t s  posi t ion on thi s  
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2. To the extent that practical access to the forum designated i n  the 
contract i s  relevant under Georgia  law, as i t  i s  under federal law, the 
district court may wish to consider how Plaintiff financed this lawsuit 
and whether the same or s imilar arrangements are, or are l ikely to be, 
available in  Vermont. 
3. I t  is not c lear whether Plaintiff also challenges the choice of law 
clause. The district court need formally consider such a challenge only 
i f  it finds the choice of forum clause i nvalid. In any event, we have no 
occasion to address i t .  
Reversed and Remanded. 
MULLENIX, J. * : 
* * * 
(reversing and remanding) 
I .  
I concur with my colleagues that this federal diversity action re­
quires that the Erie doctrine supply the rule of decis ion governi ng en­
forceabi l ity of the forum selection clause .  Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S .  64 ( 1 938) .  Unl ike my col leagues, however, I do not believe this 
case presents as i ncredibly compl icated an Erie question as they seem 
determined to make it .  Hence, I do not bel ieve the facts present a "re la­
tively unguided Erie choice" derived from dicta in  Hanna v. Plumer, 
380 U .S .  460, 47 1 ( 1 965) .  Nor do I believe that this case authorizes us  
to  conduct an  ad hoc free-wheel ing balancing test under Byrd v .  Blue 
Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. , 356 U .S .  525 ( 1 958) ,  invoking such jargon­
laden concepts as a "l i tigant-oriented approach" determined by "system­
mien ted standards ."  
This  case simply asks whether the Georgia federal court, in  its di­
versity j urisdiction, should apply  underly ing Georgia  state substantive 
contract principles. If  ever there was a "pure" Erie question, thi s  is it .  
The facts do not involve a direct conflict between a Federal Rule of 
Civi l  Procedure and a contrasting state procedural rule exactly on point, 
issue. as one of my col leagues suggests, cou ld lead to problems of the sort that the 
Supreme Court ' s  Erie jurisprudence has sought to min imize. See Mark R .  Kramer, 
The Role of Federal Courts in ChanRing Stare Law: The Emplovment at Wi/1 Doc­
trine in Pennsylvania, 1 33 U. Pa. L. Rev. 227, 233-38 ( 1 984 ) .  
* Linda S .  Mul lenix :  Bernard J .  Ward Centennial Professor of Law,  Un iversity 
of Texas Law School ;  Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School 1 994-95 ; B .A . ,  1 97 1 ,  
The City Col lege of New York; M .  Phi l . .  1 974, Ph .D. ,  1 977 ,  Columbia University ; 
J .D  . . 1 980, Georgetown University Law Center. 
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as in  Hanna. Moreover, the fact that thi s case ari ses in  the court ' s  
removal jurisdiction does not convert this case i nto a Hanna problem. 
Cf Stewart Org. , Inc. v .  Ricoh Corp. , 487 U .S .  22 ( 1 988 ) .  Nor do the 
facts implicate a tension between a federal constitutional provis ion and 
a competing weak state pol icy,  as in Byrd. Nor do these facts entail a 
state rule (statute of l imitations) that exists in  the absence of a paral lel  
federal rule, as in  Guaranty Trust Co. v .  York, 326 U.S.  99 ( 1 945) .  
Apparently, my  colleagues feel free to  roam over fifty years of Erie 
j urisprudence, selectively plucking standards, rules, principles, and aca­
demic exegesis, with little regard to the actual Erie problem in this 
case. 
I I .  
Similarly, I believe that my colleagues have turned the problem of 
ascertaining applicable state law into a more complicated exercise than 
is  necessary . The Supreme Court of Georgia has held that forum selec­
tion clauses are unenforceable. However archaic this rul ing may be, i t  i s  
control l ing authority until the Georgia legislature or the Supreme Court 
of Georgia decides otherwise. For this Court to now hold differently 
would be to announce a rule of law that the federal court thinks Geor­
gia should adopt. See McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. ,  622 
F.2d 657, 669 (3d Cir. 1 980) (Higginbotham, J . ,  dissenting) .  
Moreover, w e  are not deal ing with a case where the state ' s  h ighest 
cou11 has not spoken on the legal issue,  which would permit the federal 
court to look more broadly to state intermediate appellate decisions or 
other sources to determine appl icable law. See Salve Regina College v. 
Russell, 499 U .S .  225 ( 1 99 1 ) ; Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 
U .S .  456 ( 1 967) . Whi le i t  is  interesting that some Georgia intermediate 
decisions have adopted the federal approach to forum selection c lauses, 
these lower court decisions c2.nnot provide the basis for this federal 
court independently to conclude that Georgia has changed its law.  
Even where there i s  evidence that developing state doctrine casts 
doubt over estab lished precedent, we should be wary of permitting 
federal judges broad-ranging authority to second-guess what a state 
legislature or state high court might do if the substantive law i ssue were 
newly raised in either forum. Such l icense inevitably wi l l  subvert the 
twin aims of Erie and reintroduce the very problems that Erie was 
intended to el iminate ( inequ itable administration of the laws and the evil 
of forum-shopping) .  If federal judges in divers ity cases may disregard 
existing state supreme court precedent and consider all avai l able data to 
determine appl icable l aw, then l awyers seeking to evade unfavorable 
state law (such as the unenforceabi l ity of forum selection c lauses) have 
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a great inducement to maneuver their cases into federal court, hoping 
that federal judges will apply some other perceived "better" law. Such a 
result embodies the j urisprudential doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 4 1  U .S .  
( 1 6  Pet. )  1 ( 1 842) ,  a s  well a s  the forum shopping opportunity of  Black 
& White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Trans­
fer Co. , 276 U .S .  5 1 8  ( 1 928) ,  both soundly repudiated in Erie. 
Final ly, my colleagues' proposals to remand this case to ascertain 
Georgia law or alternatively to certify the question to the Supreme 
Court of Georgia are intuitively attractive, although i t  seems better to 
ask the state court to speak on this question rather than a federal j udge .  
See Ga. Sup. Ct .  R .  37 .  Whi le  the state certification process exists i n  
Georgia and many other jurisdictions, thi s  approach i s  less than idea l .  
The cert ification process wi l l  cause the Supreme Court of  Georgia to 
i ssue essential ly an advi sory opinion on the enforceabil i ty of forum 
selection c lauses, in  the absence of an actual case or controversy .  The 
federal cour1 might achieve a better result if  i t  s imply appl ied existing 
Georgia law and refused to enforce the forum selection clause, allowing 
this l it igation to proceed as a federal diversity suit .  Not only would this  
determi nation be faithful to the Erie doctrine, but  i t  also would encour­
age future litigants to directly challenge Georgia ' s  exi st ing law in state 
court .  I f  Georgia truly desires to change its approach to the enforceabi l ­
i ty of  forum selection clauses, such change either should come from 
legislative action or the Supreme Court of Georgia' s considered re-eval­
uation of its prior rul ings in the context of actual l itigation . 
III .  
Final ly ,  I write to express concern with the consequences of this 
Court invalidating the forum selection clause under state law pursuant to 
the Erie doctrine.  
The Supreme Court has now spoken at least three times on the i ssue 
of the enforceabi l ity of forum selection clauses and, taken together, 
these cases manifest a strongly stated federal pol icy favoring enforce­
abi l ity, subject to usual contract principles . See Carnival Cruise Lines v. 
Shute, 499 U .S .  5 85 ( 1 99 1 ) ; Stewart Org. , Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. ,  487 
U.S . 22 ( 1 988 ) ;  and The Bremen v .  Zapata Off-Shore Co. , 407 U.S .  1 
( 1 972) .  As a federal divers ity action, then, thi s case arises i n  a proce­
dural posture not present in the three leading Supreme Court precedents . 
The easy Erie solution i s  to apply existing Georgia law,  reverse the 
federal dismissal based on Carnival Cruise Lines, and remand for fur­
ther federal court proceedings.  
Thi s  Erie solution, however, leaves federal court l i tigants with an 
array of logically consistent rules but globally incoherent doctrine .  Thus,  
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we wi l l  now have one set of enforceabi l ity rules for cases i n  the federal 
court ' s  admiralty jurisdiction, Bremen, 407 U.S at 8- 1 9 ; another set of 
enforceabi l i ty rules for diversity-based cases (fol lowing di sparate state 
laws under the Erie doctrine) ; a third set of governing principles for 
state cases removed and transferred within the federal system, Stewart, 
487 at 28-32;  and possibly yet another undetermined set of standards 
for federal question cases . Further, i t  is not inconceivable that federal 
courts could develop different enforceabi l ity principles for federal cases 
grounded in some other j urisdictional basis, such as a Congressional 
charter provision. See, e .g. , American Nat '! Red Cross v. S. C. , 1 1 2 S .  
Ct. 2465 ( 1 992). 
My colleagues are undisturbed by this phenomenon , characterizing 
these disparate rules, principles, standards, and results as the "normal 
dislocations" of federalism.  B ut i t  seems to me that thi s  dismiss ive 
attitude tri vializes some very real problems. 
The enforceabi l i ty of forum selection clauses ought not to turn on 
fortuitous fact circumstances or contrived procedural choices .  Hence, it 
makes very l ittle sense to me that Mrs. Shute ' s  case should come out 
differently depending on where she had the bad luck to s l ip and 
fal l-whether at sea off the coast of Mexico or on the gangplank in  
Los Angeles. If Mrs. Shute had been a Georgia resident and had she 
fal len on the gangplank in  Los Angeles, then a diversity removal i n  
Georgia might have compel led the Supreme Court to dec ide Carnival 
Cruise Lines entirely differently. And, if Mrs. Shute from Washington 
state knocked over a Georgia resident in the same gangplank accident 
and both sued Carnival Cruise Lines in  their home states,  then on di­
versity removal Mrs . Shute probably would be bound by the forum 
selection c lause, while the Georgia res ident would not. To make matters 
even worse, these results would be different if the forum selection 
clause permitted transfer to another federal court, in which i nstance 
Stewart would apply  to permit the federal court to apply federal Bremen 
standards. 
Other anomalies abound among the developing federal rules relating 
to the enforceab i li ty of forum selection clauses. If in  Stewart the con­
tract had spec ified only a state court as a permissible forum (precluding 
a federal transfer pursuant to 28 U.S .C .  § 1 404 ( 1 988)) ,  then presum­
ably Stewart would have been decided differently because Alabama does 
not recognize the enforceabi l ity of forum selection clauses .  This i s  
precisely the question the Supreme Court deflected in Stewart, i nstead 
relying on the Hanna-branch of the Erie doctrine to apply federal stan­
dards .  At least one lesson derived from the Court' s Stewart holding i s  
that a contractual l imitation to  a state forum may enhance the  abil i ty to  
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defeat a forum selection clause, while inclusion of a federal forum 
should enhance the ability to have the provision enforced under Bremen 
principles. 
Preci sely these distinctions inevitably wi l l  cause transactional and 
l i tigating attorneys to conform their conduct to the most adventit ious 
l i tigation opportunity available. Hence, all prospective defendants are 
well-advised to draft documents with contractual forum selection c lauses 
that include a federal forum.  This s imple provision wi l l  always assure 
application of Stewart and Bremen. On the contrary, a l l  prospective 
plaintiffs , i f  possible,  should sue in those states that do not recognize 
the enforceabi lity of forum selection clauses. 
Final ly ,  these various rules encourage forum shopping for a more 
favorable court as wel l  as more favorable law. My colleagues, apparent­
ly agreeing with Justice Scal ia (see Ferens v. John Deere, 494 U.S .  5 1 6  
( 1 990)) ,  are not offended by such strategies. But i t  seems to me that 
such a cavalier approach to blatant manipulative behavior reintroduces 
precisely the kinds of systemic abuse that the Erie decision was intend­
ed to el iminate . We should be offended by the result in Ferens, not 
applauding clever lawyering.  Unless the federal courts have repudiated 
the rationales underlyi ng the Erie doctrine, these concerns ought to be 
as compell ing today as they were in  1 93 8 .  If not, then the Erie doctrine 
and its progeny amount to nothing more or less than a highly manipu­
lable set of rules. 
IV .  
Although the . Erie doctrine compel s  the result in this case, the con­
clusion is an unhappy one. Because of the burgeoning doctrinal disarray 
in this area, if there is a national consensus favoring enforcement of 
forum selection c lauses, then perhaps Congress could better resolve this 
problem. 
Reversed and remanded. 
* * * 
REDISH, J . * :  (remanding) 
In reviewing the decision of the court below, we are required to 
resolve two distinct issues: ( 1 )  in this diversity case, should the federal 
court apply its own l aw on the validity of the forum selection clause or 
* Martin  H. Redish :  Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public 
Pol icy, Northwestern Univers ity School of Law. 
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i nstead apply the relevant l aw of the state of Georgia, and (2) assuming 
that thi s  Court concludes that federal law controls the issue of forum 
selection c lause val idity ,  the content of that federal standard. I t  i s  my 
opinion that the first question cannot be answered without i ni ti al ly  
ascertaining the content of  Georgia  law on the issue of forum selection 
c lause validity-apparently a difficult task that requires either c areful 
examination and analysi s of the appl icable state court precedents by  the 
district court or perhaps resort to certification to the state' s  h ighest court 
for clarification of the issue, if such a procedure is available u nder 
Georgia law. For this reason, the case must be remanded for consider­
ation of these issues by the district court .  Even if this Court were to 
conclude that federal law controls the question before us, according to 
control l ing Supreme Court precedent, the case must in any event be re­
manded to the district court in order to enable that court to make factu­
al findings concerning the level of inconvenience and unfairness that 
would result to Plaintiff as a result of enforcement of the c lause .  
I .  DETERMINING WHOSE LAW CONTROLS 
At the outset, i t  should be made c lear that the case of Carnival 
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S . 5 85 ( 1 99 1 ) , in no way controls 
determination of the relevance of state law under the present c ircum­
stances. That case i nvoked the federal courts ' admiralty j urisdiction, a 
jurisdiction in which-rightly or wrongly-federal common law controls 
even the most substantive question. Hence, i t  i s  not surpri s ing that the 
Court in Carnival Cruise Lines proceeded on the assumption that feder­
al law control led. However, when a case fal l s  within our diversity j uris­
diction, the dictates of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 ( 1 938) ,  and 
i ts progeny-a doctrine with no appl icabi l i ty to our admiralty j urisdic­
t ion-control our deci sion. 
Resolution of the issue as to which system' s law controls  in this 
case, then, necessarily  impl icates the Erie doctrine, a doctrine as con­
fused as it is  venerable.  It i s  c lear, under both Erie itself and subse­
quent deci sions, that i t  i s  unconstitutional-as beyond Congress ' s  power 
under Article I of the Constitution-to employ the diversity j uri sdiction 
in  order to vest in  the federal j udiciary the power to fashion common 
law principles that supplant applicable state law that is  pure ly substan­
t ive-i. e. , law that in no way regulates the fairness or accuracy of the 
truthfinding process .  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S .  460 ( 1 965) .  That i s  
c learly not the case for a forum selection c lause, which a t  least to a 
certain extent affects matters of process or procedure. For questions that 
are in some sense procedural ,  the i ssue i s  ultimately a matter of con­
gressional choice. When no more specific federal statute is app l icable, 
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i. e. , 28 U.S .C.  § 1 404(a) ( 1 988) ,  the longstanding Rules of Decis ion 
Act, 28 U.S .C.  § 1 652 ( 1 982) ,  controls .  A lthough the Act' s  text may not 
easi ly lend itself to many of the possible i nterpretive modes that have 
been suggested over the years, each of these potential standards finds 
some level of support in Supreme Court doctrine . Indeed, one can find 
reasonable support in  one or more Supreme Court decis ions-deci sions 
that have never been formal ly overruled-for the foll owing, seemingly 
mutuall y  excl usive standards : ( l )  a systemic balancing process ,  that 
weighs the federal forum' s  interest in appl ying its own common l aw 
principles against the state ' s  interest in  having its law applied; (2) an 
"outcome determination" test, that app lies state law when use of a dif­
ferent federal standard would result  i n  a possible al teration in  the case ' s  
outcome; and ( 3 )  a "modified outcome determination" test, which dic­
tates the use of state law when use of a distinct federal standard would 
l ikely i nfluence a reasonable p laintiff' s strategic choice between state 
and federal fora. 
If a court were to employ either of the latter two standards, the Erie 
i ssue would be a relatively easy one: any meaningfu l  difference between 
state and federal law on the question of enforcement of the forum se­
lection c lause would necessari ly  dictate directly oppos ite results concern­
ing the validity of the plaintiff' s selection of forum;  unde:- one standard 
the clause would be valid and under the other standard it would be 
inval id .  Whatever state law turns out to be, then, any departure from 
that rule by the federal court wou ld undoubtedly  influence a plaintiff' s 
choice of forum.  Under one v iew of the Erie doctrine, this difference i s  
of  primary concern because i t  gives rise to  the assumed evi l  of  forum 
shopping on the part of the p laintiff. 
According to another version of the values underlying the Erie doc­
trine (what can be properly described as the ' 'systemic balancing" mod­
e l ,  derived l argel y  from the Supreme Cour t ' s decision in Byrd v. Blue 
Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. , 356 U.S .  525 ( 1 958)) the dangers of forum 
shopping have been grossly overstated, and (at l east in  the procedural 
context) are actual ly  relative ly triv ial .  Much more important, under this 
theory of the values underlying Erie, are the systemic concerns of fed­
eral ism that are necessarily impl icated by any Erie choice. 
I must candidly acknowledge that the weight of Supreme Court 
precedent appears to be on the side of the more l itigant-oriented ap­
proach to the Erie quest ion.  Both the Court ' s dictum in Hanna and its 
subsequent dec ision in Walker v. A rmco Steel Corp. , 446 U.S .  740 
( 1 980), reflect this fact .  Nevertheless, it should be noted that the 
Court ' s  deci sion in Byrd has never actually been overruled, and lower 
courts have for many years continued to invoke its system-oriented 
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standards .  Hence, I conclude that the Erie issue i n  this case should be 
resolved by resort to a systemic balancing analysis ,  because such an 
approach properly grounds the Erie doctrine i n  concerns of federal ism. 
Such an analysis cannot be conducted, however, absent a ful l  under­
standing of both the current status of Georgia law on the issue at h and 
and the policies which that law is  intended to foster. 
As we understand it, the current state of Georgia law i s  i n  flux .  
Whi le state supreme court precedent, which has yet to be overruled, 
refuses to enforce forum selection clauses, apparently more recent mid­
level state decisions have indicated a wi l lingness to enforce such c laus­
es .  I n  ascertaining app licable state law, i t  i s  appropriate for a federal 
court to assume the role of the state supreme court, rather than that of 
a state trial  court. If the federal court were to assume the role  of a state 
trial court it would be bound to enforce existing state supreme court 
precedent, even though the state supreme court i tself might wel l  choose 
to overrule that precedent were i t  given the opportunity. A state trial 
court decision, of course, may be appealed ultimately to the state su­
preme court, while a decision of a federal di strict court may not. Thus, 
if  a federal court were to act as a state trial court without the possibil i­
ty of review in  the state ' s  highest court, a new type of forum shopping 
for substantive law on the part of plaintiffs could be created. 
I do not believe we are competent at this point to ascertain state law 
on the forum selection clause issue. Instead, we need the benefi t  of a 
careful review of that question by an experienced district j udge. In 
addition to ascertaining the current state of Georgia law, I would direct 
the district court to ascertain the policies underlying that law.  If  the 
state would, in fact ,  enforce forum selection clauses, uncertainty exists 
as to the state ' s  underlying pol icy goal . On the one hand, the state may 
do so i n  order to fulfi l l  the values of individual self-determination that 
provide the basis for the freedom of contract in  the first place. Under 
these c ircumstances, I believe that the state ' s  interest would extend 
beyond the four walls of the courtroom, constituting an important state 
substantive policy choice which could be seriously undermined by a 
contrary federal common law rule.  I would therefore enforce state l aw .  
On the other hand, the state might choose to  enforce forum selection 
clauses simply out of a "housekeeping" concern for docket control : 
enforcement of such clauses has the beneficial procedural effect of 
reducing the state ' s already crowded j udicial dockets. If thi s i s ,  i n  fact, 
the state ' s  pol icy choice, it would in no way be undermined by a con­
trary rule in federal court .  The state ' s  asserted interest, in other words, 
would not extend beyond the four wal l s  of its courtroom, and the feder­
al court should be deemed free to determine for i tself the val idity of 
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forum selection clauses. 
If i t  were to be determined that under state law the clause would 
not be enforced, the state' s policy goal appears clear. The state would 
be attempting both to protect its cit izens from what amount to contracts 
of adhesion and to assure a fair and convenient forum i n  which its 
cit izens may effectively v indicate their  rights. If so, I bel ieve that a 
federal court would be required to enforce that important substantive 
policy choice. The interests of federalism dictate such a result .  
II .  DETERMINING FEDERAL LAW 
If it i s  ultimately decided that federal law controls the validity of 
forum selection clauses, I believe a hearing must be held in  the district 
court in order to determine whether enforcement would effectively de­
prive the plaintiff of a forum.  This  is the lesson of the Supreme Court ' s 
decis ion i n  Carnival Cruise Lines. There, the Court rejected the court of 
appeals ' s  finding that plaintiffs l acked a forum, because no such finding 
had been made in  the trial court. Thus,  the Supreme Court in  that case 
effectively held that such factual determinations must be made at the 
trial  court level .  While there appears to be a strong chance that such a 
finding could be made i n  this case given plaintiff' s obviously precarious 
position, we must leave that question, in the first i nstance, to the dis­
tric t  court .  
Case remanded, for proceedings consistent with this opm10n. 
S ILBERMAN, J . * : (reversing) 
The judgment below i s  reversed. 
* * * 
The present case presents a welcome opportunity to both clarify and 
revi si t  the jurisprudence of party autonomy with respect to jurisdiction 
and choice of law. 
I. 
On the i ssue of whether state or federal law control s the validity of 
the forum selection clause in this diversity action , we are presented with 
a classic Erie problem. An inquiry into the nature and purpose of forum 
selection clauses was avoided by the S upreme Court in Stewart Org. , 
Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. , 487 U.S .  22 ( 1 988) ,  because the Court found that 
* Linda J .  S i lberman : Professor of Law, New York Un iversity School of Law; 
B .A .  University of M ichigan, 1 965 ; J.D. Universi ty of Michigan. 1 968. 
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2 8  U .S .C .  § 1404 ( 1 988 ) ,  a federal statute with an avowedly procedural 
purpose, controlled in the face of a direct collision with state law . Stew­
art, 487 U .S .  at 32 .  However, Justice Scalia, dissenting in Stewart, criti­
cized the majority for its assumption that § 1 404 in  any way spoke to 
the weight to be given to a forum selection clause. /d. at 33 -4 1 (Scal ia, 
J . ,  dissenting) .  
No transfer motion has been made in this action, 1 and thus Stewart 
does not control .  Indeed, if § 1 404 had been invoked and I were i n  a 
position to do so, I would urge the S upreme Court to reconsider the 
path i t  chose in Stewart. 
Whether state standards control the validity of forum-selection c laus­
es depend in part on the state ' s  reasons for upholding or i nval idating 
such clauses. As Justice Harlan so astutely observed in his concurring 
opinion in Hanna v .  Plumer, 3 80 U.S.  460 ( 1 965) :  "if the choice of 
rule would substantial ly affect those primary decis ions respecting human 
conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation . . . 
Erie and the Constitution require that the state rule · prevai l ,  even in  the 
face of a cont1icting federal rule." !d. at 475 (Harlan, J . ,  concurring) .  
An i nitial inquiry i s  to determine what l ies behind Georgia' s pol icy 
of disregarding forum selection c lauses . If the Georgia rule i s  merely an 
attempt to control its own courts '  jurisdiction , then it would appear to 
fal l  i nto the category of housekeeping or procedural rules that should 
have no application in a federal court .  If, on the other hand, the invali­
dation of forum selection clauses retlects Georgia' s protection of resi­
dent consumers i n  order to allow them to bring suit at home and to 
ease the costs of l itigation, t!lose seem to be the kind of protective rules 
that should be honored by a federal court. 2 Indeed, it is  precisely those 
kinds of policies that led Judge Friendly in the Arrowsmith v. United 
Press Jnt 'l, 320 F.2d 2 1 9  (2d Cir. 1 963) ,  to conclude that state and not 
federal standards should control amenabi lity to suit in diversity li tiga­
tion. /d. at 23 1 .  
Further support for the choice of state rather than federal l aw can be 
I .  Plaintiff sued i n  state court i n  her home state of Georgia ;  Defendant removed 
to federal court and then moved to dismiss on the basis of the forum selection 
clause. Presumably, no transfer motion was made in connection with the forum 
selection c lause because the chosen forum is the Vermont state court .  
2 .  I t  should be noted that some states might make precisely the opposite policy 
choice in order to further quite different state policies. See, e.g. , N .Y .  Gen. Oblig. 
Law § 5- 1 402 (McKinney 1 989) ( permitting  choice of New York forum when non­
resident defendant agrees i n  contract to submit to j urisdiction i n  New York, chooses 
New York law to govern, and the obligation arises out of a transaction coveri ng at 
least one mi l l ion dol lars ) .  
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found in other values reflected in the Erie l ine of cases. In order to 
avoid the forum selection clause, Plaintiff sues i n  Georgia state court to 
take advantage of Georgia policy, which ostensibly inval idates the fo­
rum selection clause and allows Plaintiff to sue in Georgia .  If the feder­
al court i s  free to apply a different federal standard, the result  wi l l  be 
the type of state-federal forum-shopping that Erie was designed to 
avoid. Of course, merely having suit i n  Georgi a  as opposed to suit  i n  
Vermont may not b e  the type o f  outcome difference w ith which Erie 
was concerned. But choice of forum differences are exacerbated by 
differing choice of l aw approaches fol lowed in different fora. That is 
evident in the present case, where a choice of l aw c lause in the contract 
selecting Vermont law may be criti cal to the decisive substantive i ssues 
in the case. Certainly, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. , 3 1 3  U .S .  
487  ( 1 94 1  ) , would require the federal court to  follow the state ' s  choice 
of law approach on that question. The choice of law and choice of 
forum c lauses must be v iewed together to reflect Georgia ' s regu latory 
pol ic ies against l imiting l iabi l i ty in tort cases of this type. When viewed 
in this context, there can be l ittle question that Erie requ ires the federal 
court s i tting i n  diversity to honor the state policies .  Needless to say, i f  
Congress should dec ide,  a s  a matter o f  its i nterstate commerce power, 
to regulate nationwide ski resorts or to establ ish federal standards to 
govern choice of forum and choice of law clauses in ski-vacation con­
tracts, federal law would trump.3 But the federal standard would then 
be the applicable standard in both the state and federal courts.4 Howev-
3. In prior writing I have suggested that courts treat the l aw governing forum 
selection c lauses in international cases as a matter of federal common law.  In this 
context, parochial values of individual states should give way to the need for a uni­
form federal standard in transnational l i tigation. That standard would then apply in  
both state and federal courts .  See Linda S ilberman, Development in Jurisdiction and 
Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Pro­
posal for a Uniform Standard, 28 Tex.  Int ' l  L .J .  50 1 ,  528-29 ( 1 994) ; see also, 
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Litigation and the Quest for Reasonableness 
(Hague Academy General Course on Private International Law), 245 Recuei l  des 
Cours 255-9 1 ( 1 994-I) ( urging a un iform federal standard for enforcement of iorum 
selection c lauses in i nternational commercia l  cases ) .  Note that such an approach goes 
further than e i ther The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. ,  407 U .S .  I ( 1 972) ,  or 
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U .S .  585 ( 1 99 1  ) ,  both of which are admi­
ralty cases, and do not necessari ly speak to situations where the claims in  federal 
court are based on state law or when international commercial  contract cases are 
brought i n  state court. 
4 .  See, e.g, the Supreme Court ' s  recent decision in A llied-Bruce Terminix v. 
Dobson, I 1 5  S. Ct. 834 ( 1 995) ,  applying the Federal Arbitration Act to enforc� an 
arbitration clause in  a termite bond-enforceable under the Federal Act-but unc:n-
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er, in  the absence of congressional action to that effect (or a rej uvena­
tion of federal common law in this  area) , the Georgia standard with 
respect to forum selection c lauses must control . 
II .  
On the issue of the validity of this particular forum-selection c lause, 
enforcement i s  unlikely under either a state or federal standard. Recent 
decisions, such as The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. , 407 U . S .  I 
( 1 972) and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. , 
473 U .S .  6 1 4  ( 1 985) ,  which have furthered the cause of party autonomy 
and upheld various types of forum-selection clauses, are distinguishable 
as involving international commercial matters .  Of course, Carnival 
Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U .S .  585 ( 1 99 1  ), does offer the possibi l ity 
that forum-selection clauses wi l l  be enforced even as against an unwit­
ting consumer. However, i n  Carnival Cruise Lines, the Court noted the 
cruise l ine ' s  special interest in  l imiting the fora where a s ingle mishap -
could subject the cruise l ine to l it igation i n  several different fora. !d. at 
593 . The forum-selection clause as a consol idation device may have 
been given particu lar force in that context. But multi-party l i tigation 
raising common c laims is less l ikely with respect to l itigation against 
Ski Vacations. Individual plaintiffs with claims against S ki Vacations 
are more l ikely to present different grievances against the potential 
defendant. 
The Restatement (Second) of Confl icts provides that the parties' 
agreement as to the place of the action wi l l  be given effect unless it is  
unfair or unreasonable. Restatement (Second) of the Contlicts of Laws § 
80 ( 1 97 1  ) .  There seems little j ustification for the selection of  Vermont 
as the forum. The choice of Vermont seems to be a blatant c:ttempt to 
have Vermont law applied (although it i s  not c lear on just what particu­
lar i ssue) .  Because Vermont has almost no connection to the parties and 
the transaction, the choice of Vermont law does not seem to meet the 
standards for upholding a choice of law clause. See Restatement (Sec­
ond) of the Confl icts of Laws § 1 87 ( 1 97 1  ) .  Again ,  looked at together, 
the choice of forum and choice of law clauses appear to violate the 
fundamental policy of Georgia and should not be enforced.5 
forceab le  under an Alabama state statute i nval idating predispute arbi trat ion agreements .  
The Court in  Terminix reaffirmed its decision i n  Southland Corp. v .  Kearing. 465 
U.S .  I ( 1 984), holding that the Federal Arbitration Act applies in both federal di ver­
sity cases and state courts, and construing the reach uf the Federal Arbi trat ion Act to 
the l imits of the federal commerce c lause power. 
5. Note the thoughtful attempt by one district j udge to implement the pol ic ies of 
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* * * 
WEINTRAUB, J . * : (reversing) 
Reversed. The forum selection clause and the choice-of- law clause 
are unenforceable. State law governs these issues, but there i s  no reason 
to think that, on these facts, Georgia and federal law would produce 
different results .  The law of Colorado applies in accordance with 
Georgia' s choice-of- law rules. The motion to dismiss for lack of person­
al j uri sdiction is denied. 
I .  ERIE 
A split of authority has ari sen between the circuits as to whether the 
enforceabi lity of a forum selection clause is determined in diversity 
cases by state or federal law .  See, e.g., Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Cucci 
America, Inc. , 858  F .2d 509 (9th Cir. 1 988 )  (federal ) ;  General Eng 'g 
Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, 783 F .2d 352 (3d Cir .  1 986) (state) .  
I n  Stewart Org. , Inc. v .  Ricoh Corp. , 487 U.S.  22 ( 1 988) ,  the S upreme 
Court did not resolve this issue because the defendant had moved to 
Erie and Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U .S .  6 1 2  ( 1 964 ) , after transfer on the basis of 
a forum selection c lause. In Caribbean Wholesales & Serv. Corp. v. US JVC Corp. , 
855 F. Supp. 627 (S .D .N .Y .  1 994) ,  the plaintiff brought an action to recover for 
violation of the Puerto Rico Dealers' Act in state court i n  Puerto Rico, notwi thstand­
ing the distributorship agreement containing choice of law and choice of forum 
c lauses speci fying New York. Defendant removed the case to federal court and the 
case was transferred to New York on the authority of Stewart Org. , Inc. v. Ricoh 
Corp. , 487 U.S .  22 ( 1 988) .  However, on the issue of which choice of law and 
u l t imately which substantive  law should govern the case, the district court had more 
difficulty .  The transferee judge indicated that it should be the state policies of the 
transferor forum that shou ld  be respected; therefore, if the state courrs in the 
transferor forum would not h ave dismissed the case on the basis of the forum selec­
tion c lause, then the choice of law rules of the transferor state should apply. But i f  
the state courts would have enforced the forum selection clause and dismissed on 
forum non conveniens, then the choice of law rules of the transferee state should 
govern, s ince choice of law rules would have played no role .  The dec ision in  Carib­
bean tries to give real meaning to the claim that transfers under Stewart should 
remain ' 'housekeeping measures" and not continued jockeying between the state and 
federal courts for choice of law advantages. Finding that Puerto Rico would not have 
enforced the forum selection c lause on public pol icy grounds and would have re­
tained the case, the court determined the choice of l aw rules of Puerto Rico, the 
transferor fomm, should apply. 
* Russe l l  J .  Weintraub: Professor of Law and holder of the John B. Connally 
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transfer under 2 8  U .S .C .  § 1 404(a) ( 1 988) .  This, the Court held, caused 
the issue to be governed by federal § 1 404(a) standards under which 
the forum selection clause was but one factor to be considered. Here, 
because the chosen forum is a Vermont state court ,  the defendant, in­
stead of moving for a § 1 404(a) transfer to another federal court, moves 
for dismissal for improper venue. Thus, the Erie fat i s  back i n  the fire . 
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U .S .  64 ( 1 938 ) .  
I n  resolving the Erie problem, the purpose of  the state rul e  i s  often 
the key. If the state rule has a purpose that re lates only to the state as 
forum-such as a rul e  that favors dismissal in order to c lear crowded 
dockets-the rule might wel l  be regarded as inapplicable in another 
forum, even in a federal court s i tting in the state. The Georgia  rule, 
now perhaps being displaced, refusing to dismiss a suit brought in 
violation of a forum-selection clause, can have no such forum-related 
purpose. We find i t  inconceivable that on a matter so significantly relat­
ed to state views of freedom of contract, state law should not contro l .  
We distinguish those cases in  which circuit courts have applied a 
federal view of forum non conveniens to dismiss actions, even though 
the federal courts were sitting in states that abjure or restrict that doc­
trine.  See, e.g. , Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co. , 757 F.2d 1 2 1 5  ( 1 1 th Cir . ) ,  
cert. denied, 474 U.S .  948 ( 1 985 ) .  The "public" interest aspect of forum 
non conveniens can plausibly be argued to trigger the i nherent power of 
a federal court to control its docket and refuse to expend i t s  scarce 
resources on a matter that could more conveniently be tried elsewhere. 
There i s  no such factor present here. This  case can as conveniently, 
nay, more conveniently, be tried here as in Vermont. This  i s  true not 
only with regard to the private convenience considerations of the par­
ties, but also with regard to the public factors affecting effic ient use  of 
judicial resources . 
Because Georgia law control s, it might wel l  be prudent, as Judges 
B URBANK and REDISH suggest, to remand this case to the di strict 
j udge to receive the benefit of her expert i se on that state ' s  law.  A lterna­
tively, we might cert ify the question to the Supreme Court of Georgia.  
See Ga. Code Ann . § 1 5 -2-9 (Michie 1 994) ; Ga. S .  Ct .  R. 37.  Plaintiff, 
however, is  gravely injured and every effort should be made to acceler­
ate the determi nation of Plaintiff' s cause. Remand or certification for 
determination of Georgia l aw would in  al l  l ikel ihood be a w aste of 
time. There is no reason to think that federal and state standards for 
enforcing forum-selection c lauses would produce different resul ts  i n  this 
case. First, Georgia  seems headed toward joining the mainstream on this 
i ssue. Second, even i f  the Supreme Court of Georgia would reject the 
direction assayed by i ts lower courts, this is  a case in which the strong 
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federal presumption in  favor of forum selection is rebutted. Whatever 
the Georgia  rule, there is no l ikel ihood that it would enforce a forum­
selection c lause that the federal rule would reject . Thus, certification to 
the Supreme Court of Georgia may not be poss;ble because we could 
not represent that state l aw i s  "determinative" of the cause, as i s  re­
quired by the Georgia statute and rule.  
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. , 407 U .S .  1 ( 1 972) ,  stated that 
a forum-selection clause should be enforced unless enforcement would 
"be so manifestly and gravely i nconvenient . . .  that i t  wi l l  . . .  effec­
tively [deprive the plaintiff] of a meaningfu l  day in court," id. at 1 9 ; or 
the c lause was affected "by fraud, undue i nfluence, or overweening 
bargaining power," id. at 1 2 ; or "enforcement would contravene a 
strong public policy of the forum," id. at I 5 .  Each of these reasons for 
non-enforcement i s  present here. Plaintiff' s disabi lity erects, i f  not phys­
ical, then economic ,  barriers that prevent Plaintiff from going to Ver­
mont; the c lause is in an unbargained consumer contract ; and enforce­
ment would shock the conscience. 
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S . 585 ( 1 99 1 ) , applying 
economic theory apparently gleaned from the back of a bubble gum 
wrapper, enforced the c lause buried in the bed-side reading for insomni­
acs on the cruise ticket. An outraged Congress promptly abrogated 
Carnival Cruise Lines by amending the Vessel Owner ' s  Liabi l ity Act, 
46 U .S .C.  App. § 1 83(c) ,  to insert the boldface word in the subsection 
outlawing any t icket provi sion "purporting to lessen . . . the right of 
any claimant to a trial  by any court of competent j uri sdiction ." Act of 
Nov. 4, 1 992, Pub. L. No. 1 02-587, § 3006, 1 992 U .S .C.C.A.N.  ( 1  06 
Stat . )  5039, 5068 . The cruise indu stry thereupon mobi l ized its lobbyists 
and "any" i s  not there any more . Act of Dec . 20, 1 993 ,  Pub . L .  No. 
1 03-206, § 309, 1 993 U.S .C .C.A.N.  ( 1 07 Stat . )  24 1 9, 2425 . 
Be that as i t  may, Carnival Cruise Lines i s  distingu ishable, even 
aside from the c ircumstance that it was an admiralty matter and this i s  
not. A forum-selection c lause on a cruise ticket might be  designed to 
protect the shipping company from the draconian prospect of hundreds 
of lawsuits in many forums ari s ing out of the same mass disaster. There 
is much less l ikelihood that a skier' s c laim wi l l  be one of many based 
on the same event. Furthermore, Justice Blackmun notes that "the Dis­
trict Court made no finding regarding the physical and financial impedi­
ments to the Shutes' pursuing their case in Florida." Carnival Cruise 
Lines, 499 U .S .  at 594. Here, the finding of p laintiff' s heart-wrenching 
disabi l i ty i s  manifest. Justice B lackmun also states :  ' 'Any suggestions of 
such a bad-faith motive [to discourage consumers from pursuing legi t i­
mate c lai ms] i s  belied by two facts: petitioner has i t s  principal place of 
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business in  Florida, and many of its cruises depart from and return to 
Florida ports ." !d. at 595 .  Here, defendant ' s  principal p lace of busi ness 
i s  in New York. The selection of a Vermont forum a:1d Vermont law i s  
patently designed not only to discourage a suit  such as the one before 
us ,  but also to make the suit i nfeasible .  If Vermont wishes to be the 
Delaware of ski resorts by winning the race to the bottom, i t  i s  with 
s ingular pleasure that we frustrate that ambition. 
Eighteen members of the European Union and the European Free 
Trade Association value forum selection clauses.  Article 1 7  of their 
Convention on Juri sdiction and Enforcement of Judgments (Offic ia l  
J .E .C .  1 89,  v .  33 ,  July 28 ,  1 990, pp. 1 -34, reprinted 29 I .L .M. 1 4 1 3  
[E.U.  "Brussels" Convention] ;  28 I .L .M.  620 [E.F.T.A. "Lugano" Con­
vention ] [hereinafter E .U.-E.F.T .A . ] )  provides w ide scope for the part ies 
to an agreement to select an exclus ive foru m  for l it igation of d isputes 
that may arise between them. Our brethren abroad have more sense, 
however, than to extend this freedom to consumer contracts. Section 4 
of that same Convention (arts . 1 3 - 1 5 )  protects the consumer of goods or 
services from bargain ing away her right to sue at home when " in  the 
S tate of the consumer' s domici le the conclusion of the contract was 
preceded by a speci fic  invi tation addressed to [her] or by advert is ing." 
E .U.-E.F.T.A. ,  supra, art. 1 3 (3)(a) .  The resu lt i n  Carnival Cruise Lines 
might survive the Convention for the Convention' s  consumer provi sions 
do "not apply to contracts of transport." E.U.-E.F.T.A . ,  supra, art .  1 3  <][ 
3 .  Of course, the contract i n  Carnival Cruise Lines could be found not 
to be one of transport, but of a different service. I am not sure what. 
Perhaps the priv ilege of stuffing yoursel f  with all the mediocre food 
you can eat .  In any event, the wise provisions of our European cousins 
strengthen our conclusion that this forum-selection clause should not be 
enforced. 
I I .  CHOICE OF LAW 
For the same reasons, neither we nor the Georgia courts w i l l  enforce 
the choice-of-law c lause i n  the "Conditions of Contract ." Restatement 
(Second) of the Confl ic ts of Laws § 1 87 cmt. b ( 1 97 1 ) ,  provides that 
"the forum wi l l  scrutinize such contracts (as are contained on t ickets) 
with care and wi l l  refuse to apply any choice-of-law provi sions they 
may contain i f  to do so would result in substantial inj ustice to the 
adherent ." !d. That comment appl ies here . 
III .  JURISDICTION 
We also dismiss defendant' s  1 2 (b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of 
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personal juri sdiction. The same E.U.  and E.F.T.A. Convention provi­
sions protecting the consumer from adhesion forum-selection c lauses, 
confer juri sdiction over the other party at the consumer' s domici le .  The 
Atlanta travel agency was the defendant' s agent for the purpose of 
establishing at the consumer' s home the contacts (concluding the con­
tract and advertis ing) that, u nder the Convention, permi t  the consumer 
to sue the other party there .  E.U.-E.F.T.A. ,  supra, arts .  1 3 (3 ) (a), 1 4  CJ[ 1 .  
Surely juri sdiction that our European cousins regard as proper and civi­
l ized cannot v iolate due process, or our Constitution is on its head. 
* * * 
STEIN, J .  * : (concurring) 
I would deny defendant ' s  motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction because the forum selection c lause, even if enforceable, does 
not divest thi s  Court of jurisdiction. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1 2(b)(2) and 1 2(b)(3) i s  
not a n  appropriate mechanism to enforce the c lause. Use o f  this proce­
dure i s  analytically i ncoherent and unnecessarily  confuses the source of 
l aw governing the enforceabi lity of forum selection c lauses in federal 
court. 
Plaintiff' s contention that state, rather than federal, l aw governs the 
present motion is predicated on the distinction between the procedural 
posture of this case and that of Stewart Org. , inc. v. Ricoh Corp . ,  487 
U .S .  22 ( 1 988) .  Stewart resolved definit ively that the enforceabl il ty of a 
forum selection clause asserted as grounds to transfer pursuant to 28 
U.S .C .  § 1 404(a) ( 1 98 8) i s  governed by federal law.  To find a l ive Erie 
issue i n  the wake of Stewart, plaintiff rel ies on the fact that defendant 
has attempted to enforce the forum selection c lause through a motion to 
dismiss for l ack of personal j urisdiction. In this posture,  § 1 404(a) 
seems to exert no influence, and the court must grapple with the 
"relatively unguided" choice between state and federal common law. ' 
The other members of this Court apparently accept Plaintiff' s j urisdic­
tional characterization and therefore assume that defendant ' s  motion to 
* Al lan R. Stein :  Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law-Camden .  I would 
l ike to thank Steve B urbank, Perry Dane, Roger Denn is ,  M ichael Dorf, Richard 
Hyland, Larry Kramer, Earl Maltz, Dennis Patterson and Linda S i l berman for their 
helpfu l  suggestions. 
l .  Hanna v .  Plumer, 380 U .S .  460, 47 1 ( 1 965) .  The "relat ively unguided Erie 
choice" refers to the choice between federal and state procedural l aw whtn the 
application of federal law is not speci fical ly authorized by federal legis lation. /d. 
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dismiss for Jack of j uri sdiction i s  the appropriate procedural mechanism 
to enforce the forum selection c lause. That assumption confuses,  I con­
tend, rather than clarifies, the choice of law. 
In  this case, the parties have entered into an agreement that all 
disputes between them wi l l  be resolved i n  the state courts of Vermont. 
Plaintiff was al legedly injured at defendant ' s  ski faci lity in  Colorado 
and, i n  v iolation of the agreement, has filed suit in the state courts of 
Georgia.  Defendant removed to federal court, and then moved to dis­
miss for lack of personal jurisdiction and venue. The law of Georgia 
traditionally held that forum selection clauses were unenforceable (al­
though there i s  some i ndication that the l aw may be changing) .  Thus, 
the key i ssue for the rest of the court i s  whether the federal courts may 
extend the federal common law position developed in the admiralty 
contexe and dismiss in favor of the Vermont state forum notwithstand­
ing Georgia Jaw to the contrary. 
I have previously argued that state J aw has a central role to p lay i n  
court-access questions not governed by federal statute. See Allan R. 
Stein, Erie and Court Access, 1 00 Yale L.J. 1 936 ( 1 99 1 ) . I do not want 
to replay those arguments here. Instead, I conclude that this is not, i n  
fact ,  a n  "ungu ided" Erie choice. I would hold that the federal transfer 
statute (28 U .S .C.  § 1 404(a)) provides the exclusive mechanism for 
interstate venue adj ustments . I f  such a motion were granted, and that 
defendant stil l wanted to get i nto the Vermont state court, it should take 
that up with the Vermont federal court. 
My reasons for this conclusion are complicated and require an un­
derstanding of the various ways that the parties might seek to enforce 
the forum selection clause, and the interrelationship between those en­
forc�ment mechanisms.  
One way or another, i t  i s  l ikely that the motion under consideration 
wi l l  not be dispositive of the parties' rights under the forum selection 
clause. If the Court disregards state law and enforces the forum selec­
tion clause through dismissal per defendant ' s  Rule 1 2  motion, Pla intiff 
i s  free to refi le  in  Georgia state court . As a j urisdictional dismissal ,  that 
disposition is without prejudice to refi l ing in a different j urisdiction, 
namely the Georgia  state courts . 3 At that point, having been educated 
2. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U .S .  5 85 ( 1 99 1  ) ; The Bremen 
v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. , 407 U .S .  I ( 1 972) ;  . 
3. Federal Rule of Civi l  Procedure 4 l (b) provides that dismissals for l ack of 
jurisdiction are not adjudications upon the merits. Such dispositions are, accordingly, 
without prejudice to refi l ing. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 ( 1 96 1 )  (case 
dismissed on jurisdictional basis does not create res judicata bar to subsequent su i t ) .  
Spring, 1 995]  CASE ONE 559 
by the first go-around, plaintiff would undoubtedly attempt to JOin a 
non-diverse defendant to defeat removal . 
Alternatively, i f  the majority of this Com1 are correct i n  asserting 
that state law may govern outside of 28 U.S .C .  § 1 404 (as I believe 
they are). the Court will probably deny the motion to dismiss .  At that 
point, defendant would undoubtedly move to transfer to federal court in  
Vermont pursuant to  § 1 404 rather than lit igate in  federal court i n  
Georgia.4 Given the holding o f  Stewart, the Court would b e  hard­
pressed not to give the forum selection clause at least some consider­
ation i n  deciding the transfer motion notwithstanding Georgia law . 5  
Thus, permi tting a l itigant to enforce a forum selection clause 
through a jurisdictional di smissal wi l l  not, as a practical matter, resolve 
the rights of the parties under that c lause and will only encourage fur­
ther prel iminary maneuvering.  But even i f  enforcement of the forum 
selection clause through a j urisdictional dismissal did settle the question, 
I do not believe that i t  would be appropriate . 
In my view, the forum selection clause in question in fact creates 
two separate covenants rais ing distinct choice-of-law questions: a "hori­
zontal covenant"-the agreement to lit igate in Verrnont; and a "vertical 
covenant"-the waiver of the right to fi le in or remove to federal court 
there . Neither, I suggest, generates a j urisdictional defect. Accordingly, a 
Cf, Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp. , 486 U .S .  1 40 ( 1 988) (vacating, on anti- injunc­
tion act grounds, injunction against Texas state action filed after forum non conveni­
ens dismissal from federal court) ;  Parsons v. Chesapeake & 0. R. R. , 375 U .S .  7 1  
( 1 963) (state forum non conveniens dismissal does not require transfer from district 
court sitt ing in state) .  
4. Besides moving the case to a federal rather than state forum, the pri ncipal 
tactical d ifference between a § 1 404(a) transfer and a 1 2(b )(2) dismissal i s  that 2.. 
transfer wi l l  not affect the substantive law appl ied to the case. Under Van Dusen v. 
Barrack, 376 U .S .  6 1 2  ( 1 964 ) ,  the transferee court must apply the same law that 
would have been appl ied by the transferror court. Obviously if the case were dis­
missed and refi led in Vermont, plaintiff would have no assurance that Vermont would 
apply the same law as Georgia. 
5. There is, of course, no guarantee that the court wil l choose to transfer pursu­
ant to § 1 404(a). First, the court may be concerned that s ince the contract did not 
call for l i tigation in federal court at a l l ,  transfer to a federal court would not be 
giving effect to the contract. As discussed below, I do not bel ieve that concern is 
wel l  founded. Moreover, if there were no other significant connections with Vermont, 
transfer may be denied notwithstanding the forum selection c lause, as occurred i n  
Stewart fol lowing remand. See Stewart Org. ,  Inc. v .  Ricoh Corp. , 696 F .  Supp. 583,  
588-89 (N.D.  Ala .  1 988) .  Given the fact that plaint iff' s c la im arose in Colorado, and 
bore l i tt le re lation to Vermont, the transfer motion could wel l  be denied on this 
basis .  
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motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 1 2  i s  an inappropriate mechanism to 
enforce the agreement. 
Once it is recognized that the forum selection clause does not create 
a j urisdictional problem, the range of appropriate enforcement mecha­
nisms under federal practice narrows considerably .  The procedural 
mechanism selected wil l  have a direct impact on the law appl icable to 
the motion. 
The horizontal covenant, I argue, should be enforced domesticalll 
through the procedural mechanism best suited for that purpose, namely 
§ 1 404(a) .  Pursuant to Stewart, federal law will control the enforceabi l i ­
ty of that part of the forum selection clause. 
While there is some division of authority on the question , had the 
contract s imply said that the parties agree to l i t igate in  Vermont, wi th­
out  specify ing a state forum, many courts would now treat enforcement 
of that provision as within the exclusive domain of § 1 404(a) . 7 
Prior to Stewart, a myriad of mechanisms were commonly em­
ployed, inc luding motions under Federal Rules of Civi l  Procedure 
l 2(b )( I )  (subject-matter jurisdiction dismissal) , 1 2(b )(2) (personal juri s-
6. I nternational choice of forum c lauses raise different problems s ince the a l ter­
native foru m is outside the reach of § 1 404, which authorizes transfer to Un i ted 
States di strict courts only. Thus ,  § 1 404 could not be used to even part ia l ly  enforce 
i nternational forum selection c lauses. 
7. See, e.g. , Haske! v. The FRP Registry, Inc. , 862 F. Supp. 909 (E.D .N .Y .  
1 994) (refus ing to enforce forum selection c lause through 1 2(b)(3 ) ,  bu t  grant ing sua 
sponte transfer pursuant to § 1 404(a) ) ;  Wieczenski v. The Brake Shop, 1 994 W L  
1 1 1 082 (D .N .J .  Mar. 2 8 ,  1 994) (forum selection c lause properly enforced through § 
1 404, not § 1 406) ;  National Micrographics Systems, Inc. v. Canon U. S.A . ,  Inc. , 825 
F. Supp.  67 1 (D.N.J .  1 993 )  ( forum selection clause not properly raised by motion to 
dismiss for improper venue) ; Creditors Collection Bureau, Inc. v. Access Data, Inc. , 
820 F. Supp. 3 1 1 (W.D. Ky.  1 993)  (same). Accord, David H .  Taylor, The Forum 
Selection Clause: A Tale of Two Concepts, 66 Temple L. Rev. 785 ( 1 993) .  There are 
numerous cases to the contrary, as well .  See, e.g. , Pant v. Princess Cruises, Inc . ,  
1 994 W L  539277 (S .D .  Ohio Aug .  1 1 , 1 994) ( 1 2(b)(3 ) dismissal of action fi led i n  
violation  of forum selection clause ) ;  Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies. Ltd. , 
969 F.2d 953 ( l Oth Cir . 1 992) (forum selection c lause properly considered as venue 
defect in non-stipulated forum);  Medoil Corp. v .  Citicorp. , 729 F. Supp. 1 456,  1 457 
n . 1  (S .D .N .Y .  1 990) (same) ; 1 5  Charles A.  Wright, et a l . ,  Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 3827 n . 8  ( 1 986) ("[a] l though the courts have differed on how to treat a 
motion to transfer on the basis of a forum selection c lause, ' such a transfer is more 
appropriately treated under section 1 406 . . .  the nature of a motion to enforce a 
forum selection c lause is that venue is wrong i n  the first instance . ' "  (quoting 
Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp. , 57 1 F. Supp.  545, 55 1 (N .D .Tx . 1 982) ) ) :  Richard D. 
Freer, Erie 's Mid-Life Crisis, 63 Tul .  L .  Rev.  1 087, 1 1 1 8 ( 1 989) (arguing that  � 
1 406 i s  appropriate enforcement mechanism for forum selection c lauses) .  
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diction dismissal), l 2(b)(3) ( improper venue dismissal) ,  and 2 8  U .S .C .  § 
1 406 (transfer for improper venue) .H The use of these devices i s  depen­
dent on the defendant' s abi l i ty to characterize the problem generated by 
the breach of the forum selection clause as "jurisdictional ." That i s  to 
say, unless the forum selection clause actually divests a court of i ts 
statutory authority to adj udicate the dispute, the use of these devices is 
questionable. 
Stewart strongly i mplies that such a j urisdictional characterization is ,  
in  fact, inappropriate . In Stewart, defendant moved to transfer the case 
out of Alabama to New York, the venue stipulated i n  the forum selec­
tion clause, pursuant to § 1 404(a), or in the alternative, to dismiss or 
transfer pursuant to § 1 406. The domains of the two provisions appear 
to be mutually exclusive.9 Section 1 404 is avai lable to transfer cases 
from courts that have proper jurisdiction and venue, 10 while § 1 406 
provides for transfer or dismissal from "a district i n  which is filed a 
case laying venue in  the wrong division or district ." /d. While the Su­
preme Court did not address the matter directly, the Court did note that 
" [t]he part ies do not dispute that the District Court properly denied the 
motion to dismiss for improper venue . . . because respondent apparent­
ly does business in the Northern District of Alabama." Stewart, 487 
U .S .  at 28  n . 8 .  In other words, the forum selection clause did not ren­
der defective an otherwise appropriate venue. That statement should 
logically preclude all  motions predicated on the theory that the original 
court lacks jurisdiction or venue by virtue of the forum selection clause. 
Accord, David H.  Taylor, The Forum Selection Clause: A. Tale of Two 
Concepts, 66 Temple L .  Rev. 785 ,  830 ( 1 993) .  
Moreover, the Supreme Court ' s  attitude toward the forum selection 
c lause in Stewart was completely at odds with the view that the parties 
had contractually stripped the Alabama court of authority . The central 
holding of the opinion is that the forum selection clause is but one of 
numerous factors that a court must consider in deciding whether a 
transfer i s  "in the i nterest of j ustice:" 
8 .  See Note, Viva Zapata ' Toward a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause 
Enforcement in Diversity Cases, 66 N.Y.U .  L. Rev. 422, 445-447 ( 1 99 1 )  and cases 
c ited there in .  The Note persuasively argues that none of the current  enforcement 
mechanisms is appropriate and suggests legislation to provide a motion specifical ly  to 
eflt.orce forum selection c l auses. 
9. Accord, Federal Practice & Procedure, supra, at 264, (citing Liaw Su Teng 
v. Skaarup Sh ipping Corp. , 743 F.2d 1 1 40, 1 1 47 (5th Cir. 1 984)) .  
I 0 .  /d. See generally, David E .  Steinberg, The Motion to Transfer and the Inter­
ests of Justice, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 443 ( 1 990). 
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Section 1 404( a )  directs a district court to take account o f  factors other 
than those that bear solely on the parties'  private ordering of their 
affairs. The distric t  court also must weigh in  the balance the conve­
nience of the w itnesses and those public-interest factors of systemic 
i ntegrity and fairness that, in  addition to private concerns,  come under 
the heading of "in the interest of justice." I t  i s  conce ivable in  a part icu­
lar case, for example ,  that because of these factors a district court 
acti ng under § 1 404(a) would refuse to transfer a case notwi thstanding  
the counterweight of a forum-selection c lause, whereas the coordinate 
s tate rule might d ictate the opposite result .  . . . The forum-selection 
c lause, which represents the parties '  agreement as to the most proper 
forum, should receive neither dispositive consideration (as respondent 
might have it) nor no consideration (as Alabama law might have i t) ,  
but rather the consideration for which Congress provided in  § 1 404(a) .  
Stewart, 487 U .S .  at 30-3 1 (citations omitted) . 
Steft'art thus makes clear that while the statutory venue and j urisdic­
tion provi sions may be supplemented by private ordering, 1 1  such pri­
vate ordering does not strip the court of the statutory authority that it 
otherwise possesses. The forum selection clause s imply renders the 
stipulated forum a potentially preferable venue. While a court may 
choose to honor a forum selection clause,  i t  i s  not because the court i s  
without jurisdiction to  adj udicate . 1 2 Indeed, i f  the stipulated forum 
lacks other affi l iation with the l itigation, the courts wi l l  deny enforce­
ment of the clause and retain jurisdiction.  Thus, the whole structure of 
§ 1 404 and practice thereunder makes c lear that the parties do not con­
tractually divest the transferror court of jurisdiction . 1 3 Logically then, a 
I I . Jurisdiction by consent i s  one of the most time-honored bases for personal ju­
risdiction. I t  is recogn ized in  Pennover as an exception to its holding that a state 
only may exert j t;risdiction over persons or property present within i t s  borders. 
Pennoyer v. Nef , 95 U.S .  7 14, 735 ( 1 878) .  Voli tional affi l iation with a forum now 
forms the core of modem "purposeful avai lment" doctrine  i n  the law of  personal 
jurisdiction.  See generally, Allan R .  Stein, Styles of A rgument and Interstate Feder­
alism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 Tex .  L. Rev . 689 ( 1 987) .  
1 2. Cf . Foster v .  Chesapeake Ins. Co. , 933 F.2d 1 207 , 1 2 1 2  n .7 (3d Cir .  1 99 1 )  
(enforceabi l i ty of forum selection c lauses under Bremen i s  "predicated o n  the notion 
that while the federal court has subject j urisdiction, i t  should decl ine to exercise i t"); 
Wm. A .  Mueller & Co. v. Swedish Am. Line, Ltd, 224 F.2d 806, 808 (2d Cir .  1 955) 
(whi le reasonable forum selection c lauses may be enforceable,  ''the part ies  by agree­
ment cannot oust a court of juri sdiction otherwise obtaining:  notwithstanding the 
agreement ,  the court has juri sdiction"). 
1 3 . This is also why any motion to remand from Georgia federal to Georgia state 
court should be denied; the Georgia federal court does have jurisdict ion. It may 
choose to use that j urisdiction to enforce the forum selection clause, and remanding 
to the Georgia state court would not be an appropriate enforcement. The c lause does 
not render the Georgia state coun a preferabl e  forum. 
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case transferable pursuant to § 1 404(a) ought not be amenable to a 
jurisdictional or venue dismissal .  
However, as perceptively noted by Professor David Taylor, the Su­
preme Court ' s  deci sion i n  Carnival Cruise Lines did muddy the proce­
dural waters . See Taylor, supra, at 842-49 . In that case, the defendant 
was apparently permitted to enforce a forum selection c lause pursuant to 
28 U .S .C .  § 1 406 even though the forum selection clause in question 
could have been satisfied by transfer to a Florida federal court pursuant 
to § 1 404(a) . Section 1 406 is only avai lable where the transferor court 
l acks venue or j urisdiction, see generally, 1 5  Charles A.  Wright, et al . ,  
Federal Practice & Procedure 263-64 ( 1 986), thus suggesting that the 
forum selection clause generated such a defect. The procedural posture 
of the case, however, suggests that the case, in this regard, may be an 
anomaly, and should not be read as a repudiation of Stewart 's charac­
terization of forum selection c lauses as non-j urisdictional. 
Defendant in  Carnival Cruise Lines moved to dismiss for l ack of 
personal j urisdiction because it l acked contacts with Washington, or in 
the alternative to transfer to Florida pursuant to § 1 406. The district 
court dismissed for lack of personal j urisdiction over the defendant i n  
Washington. The court o f  appeals reversed the jurisdictional ruling, and 
further rejected enforcement of the forum selection c lause, an issue not 
addressed by the district court. The court of appeals found the c lause 
unenforceable under the under the Bremen standard of reasonableness 
controll i ng in Admiralty.  Without discussing the procedural  mechanism 
employed by defendant, the Supreme Court concluded that the c lause 
was enforceable under the Bremen standards and reversed .  However, its 
reversal s imply undid the court of appeals ' s  own reversal ,  thus leaving 
intact the district courts original jurisdictional dismissal . See, Taylor, 
supra, at 848. 
As the Supreme Court never considered the personal jurisdict ion 
issue, its intent could not have been to resolve the case on that bas is .  
However, no court in  Carnival Cruise Lines, i n  fact ,  ordered that the 
case be transferred. See Patrick J .  Borchers, Forum Selection Agree­
ments In the Federal Courts After Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for 
Congressional Reform, 67 Wash. L. Rev . 55 ,  74-75 .  ( 1 992) ; Taylor, 
supra, at 847-49 . The most reasonable reading of Carnival Cruise Lines 
then, is  that the Court never addressed whether forum selection clauses 
generate jurisdictional defects sufficient to justify enforcement outside of 
§ 1 404. 1 4  
14 .  Accord Haske/, 862 F. Supp .  a t  9 1 4  ( ' 'Carn ival Cruise left open the question 
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Accordingly, it i s  relatively clear that § 1 404 should provide the 
exclusive mechanism to move a case from one federal court to another 
where the first court has appropriate statutory j urisdiction and venue. 
Can it be then , that the specification of a state forum in the forum­
selection clause changes all  of thi s? If  a contract specifying l itigation in 
Federal Court B does not divest Federal Court A of jurisdiction,  a state 
forum selection clause can be no more debi l i tating. While one may 
question whether § 1 404 may be employed to transfer a case to a feder­
al court when the forum selection clause cal l s  for a state forum, the 
intra-federal cases ought to foreclose any j urisdictional dismissal based 
on a forum selection clause. 
Some courts have held that if the clause does not technical ly divest 
the court of jurisdiction, then at least it i s  enforceable via a motion to 
dismiss on the merits pursuant to Rule 1 2(b)(6) . 15 Such a characteriza­
tion, I believe, is even less persuasive than the j urisdictional one.  While 
the fil ing of a complaint i n  Georgia may well have been in breach of 
contract, i t  did not render the underlying complaint unredressable .  In­
deed, a 1 2(b ) (6) dismissal that did not otherwise stipulate would be 
treated as a judgment on the merits pursuant to Rule 4 1  (b) ,  an i ndefen­
sible consequence. Of course, the court could choose to stipulate that 
the dismissal was without prej udice. But  that would represent an ac­
knowledgment that the court was searching for the appropriate way to 
enforce the clause, and that 1 2(b)(6) does not quite fit. Taylor, supra ,  at 
798 ;  accord, Note, Viva Zapata! Toward a Rational System of Forum­
Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Cases, 66 N .Y .U .  L. Rev. 
422, 445-447 ( 1 99 1 ) . 
There is  one p lausible enforcement mechanism other than § 1 404(a) 
that might be employed: the common l aw doctrine of forum non conve­
niens . That device is used by federal courts to dismiss claims more 
appropriately brought in a foreign country. S ince § 1 404(a) i s  general ly 
thought to preempt forum non conveniens practice where the alternative 
forum is in  the United States , 1 6 there are virtually  no federal cases that 
of whether a forum selection c lause should be enforced through dismissal or transfer. 
I t  did not appear that the Court in tended to overrule Stewart." ) ;  Taylor, supra, at 
847 . 
I 5 .  See. e.g. , Lamhert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d I l l  0, 1 1 1 3 n .2  ( I  st Cir. J 993) ( motion 
to dismiss on bas is  of forum selection c lause must be brought under 1 2(b)(6) rather 
than 1 2(b  )(3 ) ) ; Crescent Int '/. , In c. v. Avatar  Communities, Inc. , 857 F.2d 943 (3d. 
Cir. 1 988) ;  
1 6. See Federal Practice & Procedure, supra, § 3828 ,  at 278 ("The doctrine of  
forum non conveniens has  on ly  a l imited cont inu ing v itality in federal courts .") .  Cf, 
Doran v. City of Clearwater, 8 1 4  F. Supp. ! 077 (D. Fla. 1 993)  (refusing to remand 
Spring, 1 995] CASE ONE 565 
use forum non conveniens domestical ly .  ConceptuaEy, however, forum 
non conveniens fits better than the other devices . Forum non conveniens 
is predicated on the existence of jurisdiction and venue i n  the original 
forum;  l ike § 1 404, i t  i s  specifically designed to mediate between com­
peting j urisdictional c laims. Moreover, since the alternative forum in the 
case of a state forum selection clause is not in the federal system, the 
preemptive impact of § 1 404 is not necessary. 
Nevertheless,  I would argue that forum non conveniens ought not be 
employed in this context. First of all ,  invocation of a doctrine that i s  
generall y  considered preempted by  federal statute can  only i ntroduce 
confusion into an already devi l ishly complex area. The uniformity 
achieved by consolidating enforcement into a single procedural mecha­
nism would seem to be well worth whatever marginal infringement i t  
imposes on state regulatory prerogatives . Remember that any state rule 
against enforcement of forum selection clauses wi l l  be defeated if  the 
case is subsequently transferred pursuant to § 1404 in any event. 
The primary impact of procedural consolidation wi l l  be to subject all 
forum selection clauses to a s ingle federal standard independent of 
where the claim is filed and of how defendant frames the motion. This 
is a particularly compelling benefit .  Not only does enforcement outside 
of § 1 404(a) encourage the kind of forum shopping for state law evi­
dent here, but i t  fac i litates the development of inconsistent federal law. 
Currently, different federal standards are appl ied to forum selection 
c lauses depending on whether or not enforcement is sought under § 
1 404(a) .  In Stewart, the courts ultimately decl ined to enforce a bar­
gained-for clause between two commercial parties because the stipulated 
forum lacked significant connection with the l it igants . Yet in Carnival 
Cruise Lines, the Court enforced a boi ler-plate c lause against a consum­
er. As noted by several commentators, any inconsistencies in the ap­
proach to forum selection clauses evident in Stewart as compared to 
Carnival Cruise Lines are exacerbated by the procedural dist inctions 
between the two cases: because Carnival Cruise Lines arose in the § 
1 406 context, the Court did not focus on the ful l  range of factors rele­
vant to a § 1 404(a) transfer. See Borchers, supra, at 75 ;  Taylor, supra, 
at 845-47 . Procedural consolidation will  lead to greater substantive 
uniformity . 
More significantly, if one accepts my characterization of the forum 
selection clause as creating two separate covenants, the horizontal com-
to state court on forum non conveniens grounds s ince "[t]he field  of that doctrine i s  
now entirely occupied by 28 U.S .C .  § 1 404(a)") .  
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ponent ought to be preempted by § 1 404 s ince that covenant can be 
ful ly enforced by transfer. Note that in assert ing that the contract i s  
comprised of  two separate covenants I am not making a c lai m  about the 
intent of the parties, or the severabi l ity of those covenants under con­
tract law . Rather, I am making an observation about the enforceabi l ity 
of two different aspects of the contract in  federal court .  Moving the 
case from one part of the country to another has d ifferent impl ications 
for the federal courts than divesting the federal courts of j urisdiction 
altogether. Distinguishing those two aspects c larifies the source of gov­
erning l aw and simplifies enforcement. The federal courts have a mech­
ani sm to move cases horizontal ly .  The fact that further proceedings wi l l  
be necessary to g ive ful l  effect to the contract ,  i. e. , a remand (of sorts) 
from the transferee court, is not sufficient j ustification to abandon that 
mechanism.  
Why not use § 1 404(a)? One possible objection may be that since 
the clause does not stipulate a Vermont federal forum, transfer would 
not be an appropriate enforcement of the c lause. There are two power­
ful responses of concern . First, as demonstrated by Stewart, the i ssue in  
a § 1 404 transfer i s  whether i t  i s  in the "interest of  justice" to  transfer, 
not per se whether to enforce the contract .  As between a Georgia and 
Vermont federal forum, it may be preferable to l i tigate in the state the 
parties anticipated l itigating in,  even if the case does not end up i n  the 
preci se court agreed to i n  the contract. It would be at least as compel­
l ing as transferring to a contractual ly-stipulated federal forum in Ver­
mont. 
Moreover, the case still may find its way into the Vermont state 
courts .  If the courts follow my approach of b ifurcating the enforcement 
of the contract, transfer to Vermont federal court i s  not inconsistent 
with enforcing the preci se terms of the contract; it is s imply the first 
step. 
While enforceabi l ity of the vertical covenant i s  not currently before 
thi s  Court, it is appropriate to examine that issue now in order to deter­
mine the propriety of bifurcating enforcement of the clause. 
Assuming the case would be transferred to the Vermont federal 
court, that court wi l l  then have to decide whether to enforce the vertical 
covenant and send the case to the Vermont state court .  The order at 
that point could not technically be a "remand" since there is no docket 
in Vermont, and the court would not be remanding or returning the 
case to the court from which it was removed. 1 7  However, the court 
1 7 .  Section 1 44 7 authorizes a remand "to the S tate court from which it was re-
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could stil l enforce the vertical covenant by entering a conditional forum 
non conveniens dismissal . 1 8 S ince no federal statute covers this vertical 
transfer of authority, there is  no preemption problem, as there might 
have been had the same motion been granted by the Georgia federal 
court. Moreover, by isolating the vertical component, the choice-of-law 
governing the vertical covenant is c larified. 1 9  
moved." Thus, a court may not , under the  statute, remand a case to a court from 
which it was not removed. See Bradgate Assocs. v. Fellows, Read & Assoc.� . . 999 
F.2d 745 , 750 (3d Cir. 1 993) (court may not remand portion of case fi led original l y  
i n  federal court). 
1 8 . Thi s  device is typical ly employed i n  i nternational forum non dismissals. The 
case is  dismissed on the condit ion that defendant makes h imself amenab le  to sui t  in 
the alternative forum. See, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at 
Bhopal, India, 809 F.2d 1 95 ,  203 (2d Cir. 1 987 )  (upho lding conditions p laced on 
forum non conveniens dismissal that defendant submit to personal j u ri sdiction i n  India 
and waive any personal j urisdict ion object ion) .  I n  this case, the problem i s  not 
defendant ' s  amenabi l i ty, but rather Plaint iff' s w i l l i ngness to pursue the claim in  
Vermont rather than i n  a Georgia state court. Thus, the court cou ld  threaten to  
reassert jurisdiction i f  Pla int iff rei n i tiated the  c la im anywhere other than i n  the  Ver­
mont courts .  A lternatively, the defendant could i n i tiate a declaratory j udgment pro­
ceeding i n  Vermont. 
A s imi lar device is employed in  certain forms of "abstention" where the feder­
al court deems it appropriate for the parties to pursue their c laims, at least ini t ia l ly ,  
in  state court .  See, e.g . .  Colorado River WMcr Consen·ation Dist. v .  United States, 
424 U .S .  800 ( 1 976) .  This power was c ited in support of the ALI Complex Li tiga­
tion Projec t  provis ion to transfer certain federal cases to state court. ALI Complex 
Li tigation Project Proposed Final D raft § 4.0 I ( April 5 ,  1 993) .  See Linda S. 
Mullenix ,  Complex Lirigation Reform and A rticle Ill Jurisdiction, 59 Fordham L. Rev. 
1 69, 2 1 4- 1 8  ( 1 990). 
1 9 .  My col league, Professor Perry Dane, has suggested that the isolation of the 
vert ical covenant is, in  fact, i l lusory. Once the federal court decides to enforce the 
vertical covenant and return the case to state court, the horizontal component comes 
i n to p lay again ;  the court must choose which state court to "return" the case to. The 
decision to conditionally dismiss i n  favor of a Vermont state court rather than re­
mand back to the Georgia state court thus replicates the di lemma posed by 
defendan t ' s  original 1 2(b)(3) motion in Georgia federal court .  Section 1 404 has not 
resolved enforcement of the horizontal covenant,  s ince that only settled where the 
case would be tried in the federal system. 
While this i s  a powerful crit ique, i t  is, I bel ieve, predicated on the assumption 
that the vertical covenant creates a jurisdictional defect .  There is no reason to return 
the case to the Georgia state court .  The vert ical  covenant does not divest the federal 
courts of jurisdiction; rather, it renders the Vermont state court a preferable venue 
over the Vermont federal court . No reasonable construction of the forum selection 
c lause renders the Georgia state court preferable to ei ther the Vermont state or 
federal courts .  Accordingly, it would  not be an appropriate enforcement of the verti­
cal covenant to remand to the Georgia state court, j ust as i t  would have been inap-
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There I S ,  I believe, a strong case to made for treating the vertical 
covenant as a matter of federal law, particularly following transfer to 
Vermont federal court. Note that fol lowing the transfer, the choice of 
forum is no longer between a federal forum and a Georgia state court. 
Rather, i t  i s  between a federal and Vermont state court. Accordingly ,  
Georgia, the source of any applicable state l aw on the question u nder 
Van Dusen would neither be vested nor divested of jurisdiction as a 
consequence of the vertical covenant . Any i nterest that i t  has i n  the 
case at this point would have to be derived from an i nterest in the 
substantive rights of the parties under the contract, as opposed to the 
mere "procedural" interest in regulating access to its own courts .  Ac­
cordingly,  i t  may not be at all clear that Georgia  would appl y  its own 
law outlawing forum selection c lauses to this transaction, or would be 
consti tutionall y  permitted to do so.  20 
G iven Plaintiff s  residence in Georgia ,  i t  may be that Georgi a  does 
have a legitimate interest in preventing its residents from being subj ect­
ed to oppressive terms in contracts of adhesion. But where is the "op­
pression" now? The primary consequence of the vertical covenant at 
this point wi l l  be to direct on which s ide of the street the l i ti gation wi l l  
occur.2 1 It may wel l  be that Georgia would not disapprove of forum 
selection c lauses that did not have any interstate consequences .22 In 
propriate for the Georgia federal court to remand there. The vertical covenant only 
makes sense i n  the context of asking whether the case should be tried in state or 
federal court in Vermont. Put in  other words, whi le the horizontal covenant might be 
given effect i ndependent of the vertical covenant, the converse is not true. According­
ly ,  the Vermont federal court does not have to choose where to "remand" the case. 
If the vertical covenant is  to be enforced, there i s  only one reasonable choice. 
20. But see Ferens v .  John Deere Co. , 494 U.S. 5 1 6 ( 1 990) (applying M issi ssippi 
statute of l imitations to tort action ari s ing in  Pennsy lvania but transferred from Mis­
sissippi federal court) . 
2 1 .  There may be some impact of the applicable law since the federal court 
under Van Dusen wi l l  be bound to apply the l aw of the transferror court ,  namely 
Georgia law. The Vermont state court, i n  contrast, wil l  be free to apply i ts own 
choice of law. The hypothetical record stipulates that Georgia normal ly  enforces 
choice of law provisions. Thus, it appears that under the contract, Vennont l aw w i l l  
appl y  to  the substantive issues regardless of whether the case is heard i n  state or 
federal court .  A significant change in the appl icable law resu lt ing from dismissal 
would create a more complex problem and might conceivably just ify retention of 
juri sdiction in the federal court. 
22. A simi lar distinction might be gleaned from the Alabama ''ouster doctrine" at 
issue in Stewart. The state law against forum selection c lauses only applied to con­
tracts spec ifying a forum outside of  Alabama. See Redwing Carriers. Inc. v. Foster, 
382 So. 2d 554, 556 (Ala. 1 980). Thus, the state ' s  concern over forum selection 
c lauses only extended to those prov is ions that had i nterstate consequence. 
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other words, its outlaw of horizontal covenants IS  not dispositive of its 
attitude toward vertical covenants. 
Moreover, it would be hard to say there is, in fact, any state law on 
the enforceabil ity of the vertical covenant. A covenant requiring lit iga­
tion in  federal court would ei ther be self-executi ng by the part ies '  
choice to file or remove to federal court, or unenforceable i n  the event 
federal j urisdiction did not otherwise exist .23 A covenant requiring l it i­
gation in state court would only be breached by l i ti gation in the federal 
courts .  Thus, any law on the enforceability of vertical covenants would 
necessarily be made by federal courts. While i n  theory, the question 
may sti l l  be a matter of "state law," there wi l l  not be any state law to 
consult. It thus seems a bit s i l ly to direct the federal court to this non­
existent state law.24 
Conversely, there would appear to be a particular federal interest in 
deciding whether parties may waive their right to a federal forum. The 
federal courts wi l l  absorb the costs of a no-waiver rule, and the federal 
interest i n  providing a diversity forum could be sacrificed by a pro­
waiver rule. 
In fact ,  federal law seems to be quite comfortable with waivers of 
federal j urisdiction. A party who fai ls to fi le a removal petition within 
the statutory twenty day period, as provided by 28 U .S .C .  § 1 447 
( 1 988) ,  uni laterally waives their right to a federal tribunal . Contractual 
waivers of j urisdiction are routinely enforced through the Federal Arbi­
tration Act, 25 as well as through the Bremen doctrine in  admiralty . 2 6  It  
is  hard to see why the contractual waiver here would be any more 
problematic . 27 Indeed, the federal courts routinely remand cases re-
23. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U .S .  
694, 702 ( 1 982) ("'no action of  the  parties can  confer subject-matter j urisdiction upon 
a federal court"). 
24. But see Ma1nse v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U .S .  
373 ( 1 985)  (federal court must determine whether state court would bar  on res 
judicma grounds federal anti trust cbim asserted after unsuccessful state l i tigation even 
though state court lacks subject-matter j urisdiction over federal antitrust c la ims) .  
25 .  9 U.S .C.  § §  l -208. Enforcement of an arbitration agreement necessari ly pre­
cludes the exercise of federal jurisdiction over the case. 
26. When an action i s  dismissed i n  favor of a foreign forum,  the court ,  in effect, 
recognizes that there is no inalienable "right" to a federal adjudication. 
27. But see Linda S .  Mullenix,  Another Choice of Forum, A nother Choice of 
Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 Fordham L .  Rev. 29 1 ,  
332 ( 1 988)  (arguing against remand of cases fi led in violation of forum selection 
c lauses) [hereinafter Another Choice of Forum] ; see also Taylor, supra, at 85 1 -52 
(arguing that procedural waivers and arbitration agreements are dist inguishable from 
agreements i n  advance of l i t igation to transfer authority from the federal to state 
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moved from state court i n  v iolation of a forum-selection c lau se w ithout 
consulting the forum-state law, at least where the parties have manifest 
an unequivocal intent to waive their rights to a federal forum. 28 
So where does that leave us?  Notwi thstanding the Georgia l aw 
against forum selection clauses, defendants are accorded an opportunity 
through this  bifurcated procedure to enforce the provision and lit igate m 
the Vermont state courts .  
This is perhaps an  odd conclusion for someone who has  argued m 
the face of black-letter law that state law should exert a greater i nflu­
ence on federal court access than is generally acknowledged.29 It seems 
to me, however, that the Supreme Court already crossed that bridge in 
Stewart. If Congress indeed wanted to preempt state forum-selection law 
in  the § 1 404 context, and if  § 1 404 generally  preempts forum non 
conveniens, could i t  possibly be appropriate to c ircumvent that combina­
tion by the expediency of characterizing defendant' s init ial motion as 
"jurisdictional" or by some other procedural sleight of hand? 
The jurisdictional characterization prolongs the inevitable .  I f  defen­
dant loses its motion to dismiss, it wi l l  make a § 1 404(a) motion any-
courts) .  
28 .  See, e .g . ,  Milk 'N' More, Inc. v .  Beavert, 963 F .2d 1 342 ( l Oth Cir .  1 992) ;  
Foster v .  Chesapeake Ins. Co. , 933 F.2d 1 207 (3d Cir .  1 99 1 ) ; Karl Koch Erecting 
Co. v. New York Convention Ctr. Dev. Corp. , 838 F.2d 656, 659 (2d C i r. 1 988) ;  
Pe/leport Investors, Inc. v .  Budco Quality Theaters, Inc., 741  F.2d 273 ,  280-8 1 (9th 
Cir. 1 984). Bw see Mul lenix,  supra, Another Choice of Forum, at 339 (arguing that 
there i s  "high probabi l i ty that the federal court w i l l  not enforce the forum c lause so 
as to order a remand of the l i tigation to state court") .  I do not read the cases c ited 
by Professor Mu llenix as supportive of her c la im that there is federal host i l i ty to 
vertical covenants. Most of the cases she c ites are refusals to enforce forum selection 
c lauses cal l ing for l it igation i n  other states, and are thus inapposite. See, e.g. ,  Cutter 
v. Scott & Fet::.er Co. , 5 1 0 F. Supp. 905 (E.D.  Wis.  1 98 1 ) ; Lulling v. Barbaby 's 
Family Inns, Inc. , 482 F. Supp. 3 1 8  (E.D. Wis .  1 980) . In other cases, the contract 
did not c learly speci fy exc lus ive jurisdiction in the state forum.  See, e.g. ,  Proyecfi.n 
de Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco Indus. de Venezuela, S.A . ,  760 F.2d 390 (2d Cir .  1 985) ;  
First Nat '/ City Bank v .  Nanz, Inc. , 437 F. Supp .  1 84 (S .D.N.Y.  1 975) .  I n  another 
case, the court decl ined to remand because the plaintiff was not a party to the forum 
selection clause rel ied upon. See Transure, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan, Inc. , 766 
F.2d 1 297, 1 299 n . l (9th Cir .  1 985) .  Professor Mullenix does not, in fact, c i te any 
cases where the federal court decl ined to enforce an unequivocal waiver  of  federal 
jurisdiction. 
29.  As I acknowledged i n  an earl ier art icle urging federal conformity to state 
forum non conveniens doctrine in some c ircumstances: "[v) irtual l y  no federal court 
has considered itself bound by doctrines providing greater court access than would be 
granted by federal law." Allan R .  Stein, Erie and Court Access, I 00 Yale L.J. 1 936,  
1 938  n .S  ( 1 99 1 ) . 
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way . As a matter of sound j udicial administration, i f  nothing else, it 
seems to me prudent to cut to the chase. 
There is also a substantial fri nge benefit to my approach that i s ,  
ironically, relatively protective of  state law. Given the federal courts '  
propensity to federalize all questions regarding federal court-access , 30 
the real risk of permitting enforcement of forum selection c lauses out­
side of § 1 404(a) i s  not that state law wil l  play too great a role, but 
that federal common law will run amok. While I am critical of this 
trend, there is  no denying that most federal courts , given the procedural 
opportunity, would extend federal common law developed in the admi­
ralty context to diversity cases, rather than consult state law.3 1  
Consolidating federal enforcement of forum selection clauses under § 
1 404(a) substantially buffers the excesses of free-standing federal com­
mon law evident in  Carnival Cruise Lines. That decision has been 
widely condemned as an unreflective enforcement of an unconscionable, 
unbargained-for, boiler-plate forum selection c lauses . 3c As several com­
mentators have noted, that approach was faci litated by the procedural 
posture of the question. Because the issue was not raised in the context 
of § 1 404(a), the Carnival Cruise Lines Court did not have to consider 
whether transfer was "in the interest of j ustice," the standard for trans­
fer under § l 404(a) . Borchers, supra, at 86 n.9; Taylor, supra, at 845 -
46. Rather, the question was simply whether the contract should be 
enforced. Whether or not Carnival Cruise Lines represented an appropri­
ate application of the Bremen reasonableness standard, it i s  c lear that 
30. See, e.g. , Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Cucci Am., Inc. , 858 F.2d 509, 5 1 4- 1 5  (9th 
Cir. 1 988) ( federal law controls enforceabi l i ty of forum selection c lause raised in 
motion to dismiss under rule 1 2(b) (3) ) ;  In re A ir Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 
La. , 82 1 F.2d 1 147 (5th Cir .  1 987) (federal court not bound by state law against 
forum non conveniens dismissals) ;  cf , Federal Practice & Procedure, supra, § 3828,  
at n .42, & 1 994 Supp. (control of federal docket i s  matter of federal law;  "Any 
other resul t  would be i nconsistent with the independent status of the federal courts .") .  
3 1 . As Professor BORCHERS has noted, this trend is a l ready apparent in  the 
case l aw addressing the enforceab il ity of forum selection c lauses outside of § 1 404 . 
Whi le there i s  a divis ion in the c ircuits ,  a majority of courts addressing the issue 
have extended Bremen rather than consult state l aw. See Patrick J .  Borchers, Forum 
Selection Agreements In the Federal Courts After Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for 
Congressional Reform, 67 Wash. L. Rev. 55, 79 ( 1 992). ("In diversity cases that 
have expl ic i t ly considered and resolved the i ssue, the preponderant, but by no means 
unanimous, v iew is that federal law applies ." ) .  Cf Stein, supra, at 1 98 1  n .2 1 8. 
32. See Borchers, supra, at 74-78 ;  L inda S .  Mullenix,  Another Easy Case, Some 
More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual Personal Jurisdiction ,  27 Tex. 
lnt ' l L . J .  323 ( 1 992) ;  Wi l l iam Richman, Carnival Cruise Lines: Forum Selection 
Clauses in Adhesion Contracts, 40 Am.  J. Comp. L. 977 ( 1 992) .  
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unhinging the i nquiry from the § 1 404(a) matrix set the stage for 
overenforcement of the provision. 
Section 1 404 i s  more than a procedural vessel ;  i t  imposes substan­
t ive l imitations on the enforcement of forum selection clauses. U nder § 
1 404(a), the forum selection clause is  but one of several factors the 
court must look to in deciding whether to transfer. To the extent that a 
federal law of forum selection clauses c lashes with state policies 
disfavoring these provisions, that conflict wil l  be abated by the flexibi l i ­
ty built  into § 1 404. 
* * * 
SOLIMINE, J .  * : (concurring in  part and dissenting in  part) 
I agree with the majority of my colleagues hearing this case en bane 
that state law governs the validity of the forum selection c lause in this 
diversity action. However, I conclude that on the facts of this case, 
Georgia law would not prohibit the enforcement of the c lause .  There­
fore, I would affirm the decision of the district  court. 
Plaintiff, pursuant to a contractual agreement with the defendant Ski 
Vacations, went on a ski trip to Colorado, was injured on the slopes, 
and rendered a quadriplegic .  Plaintiff brought a tort suit against Ski 
Vacations in  a state court in Plaintiff' s state of res idence,  Georgia .  The 
contractual papers included clauses directing that any tort claims be 
brought in a Vermont state court and would be governed by Vermont 
law. S ki Vacations removed the action to federal court on the basis of 
diversity jurisdiction, and moved to dismiss for lack of personal j uris­
diction and/or improper venue, primari ly  on the basis of the choice of 
forum clause. The court below granted the motion, holding that federal 
law governed the issue, and that cases such as Stewart Org. ,  Inc. v. 
Ricoh Corp. , 487 U .S .  22 ( 1 988) and Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. 
Shute,  499 U .S .  585 ( 1 99 1  ), favored enforcement of forum selection 
c lauses l ike that i nvolved in this case. 
I .  ERIE ISSUES 
I agree with Judges B URBANK, REDISH and S ILBERMAN that, in  
this action, state law governs the validity of  the clauses a t  i ssue. Unl ike 
Carnival Cruise Lines, this i s  a d iversity action, and no federal statute 
* Michael E. Sol imine: Donald T. Klekamp Professor of Law, Un iversity of 
Cincinnati College of Law. 
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or rule supplies a rule of deci sion on point. Despite the expansive inter­
pretation given the transfer of venue statute, 28 U.S .C .  § 1 404 ( 1 988) ,  
i n  Stewart, no such transfer i s  sought here and nothing i n  the text or 
purpose of the removal statutes ,  28 U.S .C.  §§ 1 44 1 -47 ( 1 988) ,  speaks 
to the i ssue of forum selection clauses. Unlike the discretion lodged in  
the former statute, the removal statute i s  more straightforward and re­
moval is automatic once the requirements of the statute are met, as 
here. 
The choice between federal and state law turns, then, on the "rela­
tively unguided Erie choice" found, among other places, i n  the dicta i n  
Hanna v. Plumer, 3 8 0  U . S .  460 ( 1 965) .  Like m y  colleagues (save for 
Judge B ORCHERS) I agree that application of federal law (which, for 
the moment, we can assume i s  more solicitous toward the clause at 
issue) would lead to intrastate forum shopping and the i nequitable ad­
ministration of law. A federal court should thus apply state law. 
I also agree with Judges REDISH and SILBERMAN that a more 
systemic approach, considering both federal and state i nterests, i s  possi­
ble given that Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural  Elec. Coop. , 356 U.S .  525 
( 1 958)  has not been overruled. (However, such an approach was 
deemphasized in Hanna and later Rules of Deci sion Act cases l ike 
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. , 50 1 U.S .  32 ( 1 99 1 ) ) .  But the result would 
be the same. It i s  difficult to d iscern a federal interest in a d iversity 
action paramount to a state regulatory interest l imiting forum selection 
clauses. This state interest is of course derived from the power to police 
contractual dealings, at least of those that have a connection with the 
state. I f  the state interest is
. 
based on other, perhaps more parochial , 
concerns,  then the state pol icy might be due less deference. Cf Allan 
R .  Stein, Erie and Court Access, 1 00 Yale L.J .  1 935 ,  1 982 ( 1 99 1 ) .  
However, an  examination of  state case l aw on  this point is apt to  be 
disappointing. The oft -cited case from Georgia  concluding that forum 
selection clauses wil l  not be enforced contains but two unhelpful  ex­
planatory paragraphs. Cartridge Rental Network v. Video Entertainment, 
Inc. , 209 S .E.2d 1 32, 1 33 (Ga. App. 1 974) . In these circumstances, i t  
would be  inappropriate to  assume that regulatory interests are not driv­
ing the Georgia pol icy,  at least in part . 
Finally, the relevance of the choice-of-Vermont-law c lause i s  worth 
mentioning. Like Judge BORCHERS , I would not argue that we should 
automatically credit that clause, and refer to state (Vermont) law to 
resolve the Erie issue. The Erie choice is a structural issue not amena­
ble (unlike other choice of law i ssues) to advance determ ination by the 
parties. Thus, the Erie i ssue should not be delegated to the parties and 
should remain to be decided by the court .  Moreover, there is no indica-
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tion that the parties wished the clause to reach this issue. (If they had, 
i t  i s  interesting to note that Vermont presumptively enforces choice of 
forum c lauses. Chase Commercial Corp. v. Barton, 57 1 A.2d 682 (Vt. 
1 990)) .  
For these reasons, Georgia law, not federal common l aw ,  supplies 
the rule of decision governi ng the validity of the forum select ion clause 
in  this case. 
II. APPLICATION OF GEORGIA LAW 
As noted above, Georgia has been regarded as a state which wi l l  not 
enforce forum selection clauses. However, more recent i n termediate 
decis ions  from Georgia have distingui shed the earlier cases and wi l l  
presumptively enforce such clauses. E. g. , American Fin. Serv. Group, 
Inc. v. Boswell Mem. Hasp. , 447 S .E .2d 333  (Ga. App. 1 994) ; Harry S. 
Peterson Co. v. Nat!. Union Fire Ins. Co. , 434 S .E.2d 778 (Ga.  App. 
1 993) .  Unti l and if  the Supreme Court of Georgia addresses this i ssue, 
we can safely assume that Georgia courts have, or will, fol low the trend 
in federal case law to generally enforce such clauses. (At this j uncture, 
as suggested by Judges REDISH and SILBERMAN, it is tempting to 
util ize the Georgia certification procedure, Ga. Sup. Ct. R. 37 ,  to permit  
the state supreme court to supply the definitive word . ) .  
Thus,  we return to Carnival Cruise Lines as point of reference. 
Most of my colleagues find this prospect dismaying, and argue either 
that Carnival Cruise Lines was wrongly decided, or i s  distinguishable 
from the facts of this case, or both. Even if we were so empowered, I 
would not overrule Carnival Cruise Lines. The decision in that case, 
enforcing a forum selection clause found in the fine print of a form 
cruise ticket contract, has been subject to scathing scholarly crit icism. 
E.g. ,  Patrick J .  Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal 
Courts After Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional  Reform, 67 
Wash. L .  Rev .  55 ( 1 992) ;  Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some 
More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual Personal Juris­
diction, 27 Tex .  Int ' l L.J .  323 ( 1 992) . My own view is that Carnival 
Cruise Lines is not an outrage and that forum selection clauses,  even 
those contained in form contracts, should be presumptively enforceable, 
absent persuasive reasons pressed by the party seeking to vi t iate the 
clause in a particular case. The principles of court review of such claus­
es should be drawn mainly, though not exclusively, from ordinary rules 
of contract law which would otherwise regulate contractual dealings 
among parties l ike the ones before us .  Michael E .  Solimine, Forum­
Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, 25 Cornell  Int ' l  
L.J .  5 1  ( 1 992) . 
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Contra Judge BORCHERS, Congress recently overturned, P .L .  1 03-
206, § 309 ( 1 993), an earl ier amendment to the Limited Liabi l ity Act, 
P.L. 1 02-587 ,  § 3006 ( 1 992), which would have overruled Carnival 
Cruise Lines as it pertains to cruise tickets . Compare 1 39 Cong. Rec. 
H 1 094 1 ( 1 993) (remarks of Congressman Studds) (most recent amend­
ment does not reinstate Carnival Cruise Lines) with 1 40 Cong. Rec . 
S 1 847-48 ( 1 994) (remarks of Senators S tevens and B reaux) (expressly 
disagreeing with Congressman Studds) . Congress i s  free to revis i t  this 
i ssue, as are the states. E.g. , N .C .  Gen. Stat. 22 § B -3 ( 1 994) (declares 
forum selection clauses unenforceable in all contracts entered i nto i n  
North Carolina) .  Until and if  the legis latures act, in  my v iew, Carnival 
Cruise Lines represents sound precedent. 
Likewise, I do not find Carnival Cruise Lines to be distinguishable, 
though I admit the facts of this case present a close question. The over­
all  "reasonableness" standard of scrutiny advanced in  Carnival Cruise 
Lines i s  not toothless and can lead to invalidating a clause i n  a particu­
lar case. Cf Lemoine v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. , 854 F. Supp. 447 
(E.D. La. 1 994) (forum selection clause l ike that in Carnival Cruise 
Lines case not enforced, since plaintiff presented evidence that she had 
no notice of the clause) ; Prows v. Pinpoint Retail Sys. , Inc. , 868 P.2d 
809 (Utah 1 993) (forum selection clause not enforced due to unreason­
ableness, based on, inter alia, parties being from Utah and Canada but 
clause designated New York as forum) .  
I s  the  present case one of those? The contractual aspects of th i s  case 
are very s imilar to those in Carnival Cruise Lines. In both cases the 
clauses are found in form contracts prepared by the defendant, though 
the papers were sent to and s igned by the plaintiffs in advance of the 
trips . The more difficult inquiry is whether the choice of the Vermont 
forum was unfair and, relatedly, whether Plaintiff here has an adequate 
alternative forum in that state. At first blush, Vermont in this case does 
not seem as reasonable a forum as does Florida in Carnival Cruise 
Lines. In the latter, Florida was a principal place of business for the 
defendant. Here, New York is the home base for the defendant, and i t  
only does business in  Vermont ( Vermont. of course, is  near New York) .  
The record does not tell us if Vermont law or courts have some special 
expertise with regard to ski l i t igation .  Perhaps defendant chose Vermont, 
in part, because of favorable Vermont law; the choice of law clause 
might confirm thi s  suspicion. Certainly, Vermont is not devoid of inter­
est in thi s  case. 
S imi larly, the record tel ls  us l ittle about whether Plaintiff can lit igate 
thi s  matter in Vermont. A similar issue was addressed in Carnival 
Cruise Lines. As I read the opinions and record in that case, though it  
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was (and is )  widely assumed that Ms .  Shute (from the state of Wash­
i ngton) would have enormous difficulty in l itigating her personal inj ury 
action in  Florida, specific persuasive facts to that effect were not tru ly  
advanced by Ms .  Shute nor made by the  trial court .  Here, we might 
assume that Plaintiff, now a quadriplegic ,  would have u nderstandable 
problems in l i tigating thi s  matter other than in the home state of Geor­
gia. The record is quite bare on these points, however, and given mod­
ern modes of transportation and communication, and the l i ke l ihood that 
Plainti ff would only need to travel to Vermont once (for the trial , i f  
there i s  one), we should not automatical ly assume that i t  i s  s imply 
impossible for Plaintiff, and Plaintiff' s attorneys ,  to l itigate this  action 
in Vermont. 
S ince, in my view, Plaintiff has not met the burden of demonstrating 
that enforcing the forum selection c lause would be unreasonable ,  the 
district j udge correctly enforced the clause. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, I respectful ly dissent from the maj ority of 
my colleagues on this en bane Court. Given my conclusions,  I find it 
unnecessary to reach defendant' s apparent alternative argument that 
there is no personal jurisdiction over it in Georgia. 
Case Two : Extraterritorial Application of 
United States Law Against United States 
and Alien Defendants (Sherman Act) 
INTRODUCTION* 
One does not have to go back very far i n  United States Supreme 
Court j urisprudence, to arrive at a time when it  was fel t  that each sov­
ereign had control of i ts own territory, but l acked the prerogative (or 
power) to exercise authority in the territory of another. 1 This same 
principle of territorial exclusivity is recognized, and generall y  fol lowed, 
in international rel ations.2 If such principles were not observed, often 
* Thomas C. Fischer: Professor of Law, New England School of Law; A .B .  
1 960, University of  Cincinnat i ;  J .D .  1 965, Georgetown University Law Center. 
l .  See, e.g. ,  Penno_ver v. Neff, 95 U.S .  7 1 4 ( 1 878) .  
2 .  Restatement (Third) of the  Fore ign Relations Law of the  Uni ted States § 40 1 
( 1 986) (discussing "l imitations," under general i n ternational law, on a state' s  "(a) 
jurisdiction to prescribe" (make its laws applicable) ;  "(b) jurisdiction to adjudicate" 
(exercise j udicial authority); and ·'(c) j urisdiction to enforce" (compel compliance or 
punish non-compl iance)). Obviously, if the concept of "state sovereignty" is to have 
any force in in ternational law, the abi l i ty of one state to interfere in the legal regime 
of another i s  very l im ited. See id. at § 402 which states that 
[s ]ubject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to: 
( 1  ) ( a) conduct that, wholly or i n  substant ial  part ,  takes place within its terri­
tory ; (b) the status of persons, or in terests in things, present wi th in i ts terri­
tory ; (c) conduct outside its territory that has or is in tended to have sub­
stantial effect within its territory ; 
(2 ) the act ivit ies, in terests, status, or relat ions of its nationals outside as wel l  
as within i ts  territory ; and 
( 3 )  certa in conduct outside its terri tory by persons not its nationals that is 
d irected against the security of the state or against  a l imi ted c lass of other 
state interests. 
ld. See id. at § 403 ( stating that even when a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction 
exists, a state should not do so where, considering all relevant factors, it would be 
unreasonable) ;  see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. ,  499 U .S .  244 ( 1 99 1 )  (holding 
that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1 964 does not apply extraterritoria l ly ,  unless 
Congress c learly states such an i ntent i n  the statute. The Court held that there was 
a presumption against the extraterritorial application of Uni ted States law which 
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there would be great tension, and uncertainty about cross-border con­
duct. 
Thus it was that the first t ime the extraterritorial appl icat ion of 
Uni ted States antitrust law was considered by the Supreme Court, it was 
held to be confined to United States territory ,3 notwi thstanding the lan­
guage of the statute:' As the quantity of cross-border business transac­
tions i ncreased, however, i t  became c lear that entities could take actions 
beyond our borders that had serious economic and legal consequences 
here. 
American j udicial precedents evolved with this trend. I n  due course, 
they al lowed United States courts to exercise j urisdiction over absent 
parties (that had some "minimum contacts" with the state in question5) 
and to apply local substantive law to non-local behavior that c aused 
serious legal or economic "effects" in the state.6 At least, that was the 
case whenever the contacts with this country were not so attenuated that 
it would be inappropriate for United States courts to exerc ise  j udicial 
power7, or when the application of our law would "surprise" the for­
eign defendant. 8 
United States courts were not alone in reaching this conclusion.  The 
European Court of Justice, cons idering the scope of application of Euro­
pean Community competition law9 in the " Wood Pulp" case, 1 0 also 
found that acts taken beyond its borders could be actionable there . 1 1 
"serves to protect against unintended c lashes between our laws and those of other 
nations which could result  in international discord.") .  
3 .  American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. ,  2 1 3  U.S .  347 ( 1 909) .  
4 .  The Sherman Act ,  15 U.S .C. � l ( 1 988) ,  proscribes "[e]very contract, combi­
nation in  the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in  restraint of trade or com­
merce among the several states, or ll'ith foreign nations . . . .  " !d. (emphasis added) .  
5 .  International Shoe v .  Washington , 326 U.S. 3 1 0  ( 1 945) .  
6 .  United States v .  Aluminum Co. of Am. , 1 48 F .2d 4 1 6  (2d Cir .  1 945)  (Hand, 
J., sitting by designation for the United S tates Supreme Court) [hereinafter A lcoa ] .  
7 .  See e.g. , As  a h i  Metal Indus. Co. v .  Superior Court, 480 U .S .  1 02 ( 1 987) ;  In 
re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at  Bhopal, India, 809 F.2d 1 95 (2d Cir. 
1 987) .  
8 .  See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick 28 1 U.S .  397 ( 1 930) .  Compare Phillips Petroleum 
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S .  797 ( 1 985) ll'ith Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U .S .  302 
( 1 98 1  ) .  
9 .  Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community [EEC Treaty] arts .  85-
90, especia l ly arts. 85-86. 
10. Cases 89/85 ,  1 04/85 ,  1 1 4/85, 1 1 6- 1 1 7/85, 1 25- 1 29/85 ,  Ahlstrom v .  Commis­
sion, ( Wood Pulp) 1 988 E.C.R. 5 1 93 ,  4 C .M.L .R .  90 1 ( 1 988) .  
I I .  The European Court of Justice held that article 85 of the EEC Treaty applied 
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However, the Court consciously chose a more l imited basis (one based 
on territorialism) ,  than that adopted by United States courts in Alcoa 
and subsequent cases . 1 2 
In  both s i tuations, the court in  question exerc ised j urisdiction and 
applied domestic law, but not without considering the competing i nter­
ests of other sovereigns. Rather, each court, after balanc ing those inter­
ests, convinced itself that i t  would be impossible to effectuate the legis­
lat ive policy of the state i t  served without exercising j udicial authority 
and apply ing its law to the foreign acts .  
Consequently,  this exercise of legis lative and j udicial authority may 
be thought l imited to a narrow range of cases, in which the state' s  legal 
interest is equal to or greater than that of competing sovereigns, and 
where it could easi ly be frustrated if the extra-state behavior were not 
punished. 1 3  Hence this extra-terri torial policy does not have a wide 
appl ication. If it did, the polit ical , economic, and legal chaos of which I 
to agreements abroad between non-EEC producers, if they were meant to be executed 
m the European Community .  Ahlstrom, 1 988 E.C.R.  at 5242-43 . 
1 2 . In the Wood Pulp case, the European Court of Justice rejected a test s imi lar 
to the American "effects" test proposed by Advocate General Darmon .  Ahlstrom, 
1 988 E.C.R.  at 5243 . See Opinion of' Advocate General Darmon, 1 988 E.C.R.  52 1 4  
( 1 988)  (proposing that an "effects" test be used) .  By contrast, i n  Alcoa, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circui t  held that the Sherman Act covered 
extraterritorial agreements that both were intended to affect American imports/exports 
and, in fact ,  did affect them. Alcoa , 1 48 F.2d at 444 (Hand, J . ,  sitt ing by designation 
for the Supreme Court) .  
1 3 . The Sherman Act probably is  the best example o f  a Uni ted States statute that 
was meant to apply extraterritorial ly to fore ign acts. See generally 1 5  U.S .C. § l -36  
( 1 988) ;  Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of A m. ,  549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir .  1 976 )  (hold­
ing that, in  determining whether the Sherman Act applies extraterritoria l ly ,  courts 
should ascertain whether the al leged restra int  affected or was in tended to affect the 
United States ' s  foreign commerce , and whether the extraterritorial assertion of United 
States j urisdiction would comport with principles of in ternational comity and fairness) .  
See Russe l l  J .  Wei ntraub, The Ettruterritoriu/ Application of Antitrust and Securities 
Laws: An !nquil}' into rhe Utilitv tif u " Choice of Law "  Approach , 70 Tex .  L .  
Rev. 1 799 ( 1 992) ,  for a brief, readable examination of the  extraterritorial appl ication 
of United States law.  See also Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A . ,  87 1 
F.2d 252, 263 (2d Cir . ) ,  modtjied, 890 F2d 569 (2d Cir. ) ,  cert. den ied, 492 U.S .  
939 ( 1 989) (holding that  the anti-fraud prov i s ions of  the Security and Exchange Act 
of 1 934, I 5 U.S .C .  § 78 ( 1 988) ,  apply whenever a predominantly foreign, fraudulent 
transaction has substant ial  effects within the United S tates. The court noted, howev­
er, that "[i ] t is a settled principle of i nternat ional and our domestic law that a court 
may abstain from exercis ing enforcement juri sdiction when the extratenitorial effect of 
a part icular remedy is so disproportionate to harm within the United S tates as to 
offend principles of comity. ' ' ) ;  Sreele v. Buiui 'U Wmch Co. ,  344 U .S .  280 ( 1 952) .  But 
see supra note 2. 
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spoke above would surely result .  
Thus, the Uni ted States Supreme Court recogn ized as early as the 
Sabbatino case ( 1 964), that i t  l acked the authority (and probab ly  the 
power) to interfere with certain foreign acts, legal where taken, although 
those acts v iolated United S tates law . 14 Except in  the rare c ircumstanc­
es c i ted above, this makes good sense. 
We want foreign governments to respect our territory, pol icies and 
prerogatives after al l .  They are not l ikely to do so if we do not respect 
theirs. That is, if our nation and its businessmen are to get along in a 
world increas ingly dominated by cross-border transactions, then we 
must, in appropriate s ituations, accommodate competing foreign inter­
ests, policy and law. Reciprocally, we expect them to accommodate 
ours. 
S ince the Sabbatino decision, the United States Supreme Court and 
other federal courts have exhibited, in my opinion, an increased sensi­
t ivity to the confl icts that arise in cross-border activity . That sensit ivity 
i s  reflected in case dicta that states that United States courts w i l l  not al­
ways have enough interest in  foreign matters to take j urisdiction of 
them, or to apply United States law . 1 5  
I have always felt that the American judiciary ' s  acceptance of this 
international real i ty was long overdue. The interdependence of world 
governments and businesses is a fact of l ife today. It is insufferably 
arrogant to think that there i s  an American tribunal or legal rule to deal 
1 4. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U .S .  398 ( 1 964). But see the 
"Hickenlooper Amendment," 22 U .S .  C .  § 2370(e)(2) ( 1 988) .  The Hicken looper 
Amendment provides that a Uni ted States court cannot refuse to decide a case on the 
ground of  the federal act of state doctrine ,  when a party asserts a c la im of t i t le or 
right to property confiscated or taken by the act of a foreign state. "Hicke nlooper 
Amendment," 22 U.S .C.  § 2370(e)(2) ( ! 988) .  But the Hickenlooper Amendment does 
not apply " in  any case in which an act of a foreign state is not contrary to interna­
tional law;" or " in  any case with respect to which the President determines that 
appl ication of the act of state doctrine is  requ ired . . .  by the foreign pol icy interests 
of the United Stales . . . ." ' 'Hickenlooper Amendment," 22 U.S .C .  § 2 370(e)(2) 
( 1 988) ;  see also Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v .  Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 
( 1 976) .  
1 5 . An exhaustive l is t  of such cases wi l l  not  be attempted. Some i l lustrat ive ones, 
beyond those previously mentioned, are : Helicopteros Nacionales de Cuba. S.A. v. 
Hall 466 U .S .  408 ( 1 984); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. , 407 U . S .  1 ( 1 972) ;  
Lauritzen v .  Larsen ,  345 U.S . 57 1 ( 1 953 ) ;  Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum 
Corp. , 595 F.2d 1 287 (3d Cir. 1 979) ; Ciprari v. Servicos Aereos Cruzeiro, S.A . ,  359 
F.2d 855 (2d Cir .  1 966) ; Tramontana v .  S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio 
Grandense, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1 965 ) .  
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with every situation, regardless of its i nternational contacts . In today ' s 
legal and economic environment, the reality i s  quite otherwi se. We 
Americans simply have been slow to recognize i t . 1 6 
A more-sensitive international posture was taken by our executive 
branch in the 1 980s, as well .  Its "guidelines" concerning foreign be­
havior actionable under the Sherman Act, said that : "the . . .  Act [did] 
not reach the activities of United S tates or foreign firms in foreign 
markets i f  those activities [had] no direct, substantial and reasonably 
foreseeable effect on U. S. interstate commerce . . . .  " 1 7  Moreover, 
even if the Justice Department found that foreign acts produced such an 
"effect" on United States commerce, it stil l  was to inquire whether the 
conduct abroad was "encouraged or promoted by the law and policy of 
[the] foreign sovereign". Hence, the Department was to weigh a series  
of six comity "factors," in  order to balance the interests of the United 
States and the foreign government 1 8 •  A similar sensitivity to competing 
1 6. A good, recent example is  the Consolidated Gold Fields, 87 1 F.2d 252, 263 
(2d Cir .) ,  modified, 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir .) ,  cert. denied, 492 U.S. 939 ( 1 989) . I n  i t ,  
a United S tates court exercised jurisdiction, and enjoined a securities offering, s imply  
because i t  did not  meet the  standards of our  Securities and Exchange Act .  The goal 
was to protect a mere 2.5 percent of the i nvestor group who were Americans. Upon 
reconsideration (at the urging of the Securities and Exchange Commission), the court 
modified its decree; for its action went far beyond any i nterest our government had, 
relative to other sovereigns, in exerc ising Uni ted S tates authority or applying United 
S tates l aw to this s ituation. 
1 7 .  Department of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guide lines for I nternational 
Operat ions § 4 ( 1 988) ,  reprinted in 4 Trade Regulation Reporter 9[ 1 3 1 09 . 1 0  ( 1 988) .  
Cf Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v .  Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. , 473 U.S.  6 1 4  ( 1 985) .  
1 8 . Department of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidel ines for I n ternational 
Operations § 5, n . l 70 ( 1 988) ,  reprinted in 4 Trade Regulation Reporter <j[ 1 3 1 09. 1 0  
( 1 988) .  There s ix comity factors are: 
( I )  the relative signi ficance, to the viol ation al leged, of conduct within the 
Uni ted States as compared to conduct abroad; 
(2) the nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the conduct; 
(3)  the presence or absence of a purpose to affect United States consumers 
or competitors; 
(4) the relative significance and foreseeabi l i ty of the effects of the conduct 
on the Uni ted States as compared to the effects abroad; 
(5) the existence of reasonable expectations that would be furthered or de­
feated by the action; and 
(6) the degree of confl ict with foreign law or articulated foreign economic 
policies .  
ld. See generally Robert C. Reuland, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. ,  Comitv. and rhe 
Extraterritorial Reach of United States Antitrust Laws, 29 Tex. In t '  I L.J .  1 59 ( 1 994 ) .  
582  N EW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol .  29 : 577 
sovereign prerogatives is reflected in  an anti-trust agreement negotiated 
between the United States and the European Community i n  1 99 1 .  In it ,  
both part ies pledge to cooperate in  international antitrust matters, and to 
defer to one another in appropriate c ircumstances. 1 9 
The Department of Justice "Guidelines" fol low prior Congressional 
legis lation (the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (Ff AlA) of 
1 982) ,  that effectively codifies the "effects" test regarding United S tates 
antitrust j uri sdiction, then generally appl ied by United States courts.20 
Its purpose was "to exempt from the Sherman Act export transactions 
that did not inj ure the U .S .  economy" . 2 1 
One final example of our awareness of the interdependency of world 
nations is our zeal to complete the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), including a World Trade Organization (WTO) that 
should help to resolve i nternational trade disputes.22 The l atter may 
involve some modest ioss of United States sovereignty . In return for it, 
however, we wi l l  enjoy more stable i nternational business relations.23 
Thus, the pre-Hartford Fire state of the law was founded principal ly on 
a balancing of United States versus foreign i nterests . 24 
1 9. Agreement Between the Govern ment of the Uni ted States of America and the 
Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Appl ication of their Compe­
t i t ion Laws, Sept. 23, 1 99 1  [ here inafter US/EC Commission Agreement] .  In this 
Agreement there is  a l ist  of interests to be balanced before deciding whether the 
Uni ted S tates or the European Community should proceed i n  a matter of  i n terest to 
one or both, or whether they should collaborate. !d. at l l - 1 2 . Although the agree­
ment was struck down by the European Court of Justice in C-327/9 1 ,  French Repub­
lic v. Commission of rhe European Communities, Aug. ,  9, 1 994, it worked quite 
satisfactorily while in force, and is  l ikely to be renegotiated. Monthly Bu l let in of 
European Union Economic and Financial News, EJC Annuls EU-US Antitrust Accord, 
Eurecom vol .  6, no. 8 (Sept . 1 994 ) .  The European Court of Just ice voided the 
agreement for reasons of lack of negOliat ing competence, but i t  is  expected that the 
competent Community inst i tut ion wil l  negotiate an agreement to replace i t .  
20. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1 982, l S U.S.C. § 6(a)  ( 1 988) .  
2 1 .  Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v .  California, 1 1 3 S .  Ct .  289 1 ,  2909 n . 23  ( 1 993 )  (cit­
ing H.R. Rep .  No. 97-686, 97th Cong. ,  2d Sess. at 2-3, 9- 1 0  ( 1 982)) .  
22 .  See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Mu lt i lateral 
Trade Negotiations (GAIT),  Agreement Establ ish ing the Mult i lateral Trade Organ iza­
tion (now the World Trade Organization) ,  Office of the Trade Representative, part I I ,  
1 - 14 (Version of  I S , Dec. 1 993) .  ISBN 0- 1 6-043037-2.  
23.  See id. (part icularly Art icles IX and X); Ambassador and Deputy United 
S tates Trade Representative Rufus Yerxa, Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, 1 994 WL 266468 (F .D .C .H . )  (Jun. 1 4, ! 994 ). 
24. See Laker Ainvays Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World A irlines, 7 3 1 F.2d 909 
( D.C.  Cir. 1 984) .  Cf Manningron Mills, 595 F.2d at 1 287;  Timber!ane, 549 F.2d at 
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You wi l l  appreciate from the foregoing that the issues confronting 
United States courts, when they are asked to adj udicate cases with 
substantial foreign elements, are : first, whether or not to exercise j uris­
diction over a foreign entity (not generally subject to jurisdiction in this 
country) ;25 and, second, whether domestic law ought to be applied to 
the act(s) in  question.26 
In Sherman Act l i tigation, however, one can safely assume that a 
United S tates court would not exerci se j urisdiction (that i s ,  would dis­
miss the case), if it did not propose to apply United States law. We are 
told that this question turns on a "reasonableness" standard;27 but 
whether this is an absolute l imit (the exercise of jurisdiction is unrea­
sonable), or a discretionary one (it  would be unreasonable to apply  our 
substantive law to the acts in  question) i s  unclear. What is c lear is that 
more than one sovereign could meet this test, exercise jurisdiction, and 
apply its law to regulate cross-border transactions .  
That being so, I should think i t  more important than ever to be 
conscious of the competing interests of various states and their regulato­
ry regimes. Hence, the United States Supreme Court majority decision 
in  Hartford Fire28 is difficult for me to fathom. Whi le the j udgement 
may be entirely correct on the merits, the majority ' s  reasoning seems 
insensitive and backward-looking. 
In the Hartford case, it appears that Uni ted States and B ri tish busi­
ness collaborators intended to evade United States law and pol icy . Their 
actions abroad (and in the United States as wel l )  ei ther were intended 
to, or foreseeably would. have a substantial anti-competitive "effect" on 
the American insurance market. Consequently, United States courts were 
ful ly  competent to exercise jurisdiction over the foreign actors, and to 
apply the Sherman Act to their behavior.29 That outcome should have 
surprised no one, the defendants included. 
597. 
25 .  See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 1 02 ;  Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 408 . 
26. Whi le it i s  commonplace for courts to apply domestic law to the cases before 
them, that is not invariably true. See Lauritzen. 345 U.S .  at 57 1 ;  Shultz. v. Boy 
Scouts of Am. ,  Inc. , 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y.  Ct. App. 1 985) .  But see Babcock v. 
Jackson, 1 9 1  N .E.2d 279 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1 963) ;  Kilherg v. Northeast A irlines, Inc. , 
1 72  N .E.2d 526 (N.Y.  Ct. App. 1 96 1 ) . 
27.  Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United S tates § 
4 1 5 (3 )  ( 1 986) ;  see also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United S tates §§ 40 1 ,  402(3) ,  403 ( 1 986) ;  Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1 287 ;  
Timber/ane, 549 F .2d at  597 .  
28. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 1 1 3 S .  Ct. 289 1 ( 1 993) .  
29 .  See id. at  2895-99. 
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What is surpnsmg, however, i s  that the Court appears to forego any 
interest-balancing, when deciding whether or not to exerci se j urisdiction. 
Rather, Mr. Justice Souter, writing for a bare majority , said that 1j a 
United States court could exercise personal j urisdiction over the defen­
dants (one assumes this is a test of constitutional permissibi li ty) ,  then it 
should  do so, and apply American l aw, if "their conduct . . .  produced 
[a] substantial effect" in the Uni ted States . 30 This  despite the fact that 
the legis lation involved would al low the court to "employ notions of 
[ international ]  comity. . . . "3 1 You wi l l  search Justice Souter' s opinion 
i n  vain for any material degree of i nterest-weighing, although the sub­
ject is c learly raised by the defendants . 32 It might be inferred from 
Justice Souter ' s dicta, therefore, that "balancing" the interests of the 
United States against those of foreign states is a polit ical matter; one 
for the executive and not the courts. 33 This  is an oft-repeated j udicial 
maxim, but I am not certain i t  fits the s ituation. 
It has always seemed to me that it is the quintessential function of 
courts to balance competing interests. This is especial ly  so w hen the 
legislative scheme is not a model of clarity (e .g . ,  the Sherman Act) and, 
if appl ied aggressively and l i terall y ,  c learly would do more harm than 
good to international commerce. 3� Indeed, it is often the legislature ' s  
30. /d. at 2909- 1 0. 
3 1 .  Justice Souter stated that "[ w ]hen it enacted the Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act of 1 982 . . .  Congress expressed no view on the question whether 
a court with Sherman Act j urisdiction should ever dec l ine to exercise such jurisdic­
tion on grounds of in ternational comity." !d. at 29 10 .  
32 .  /d. a t  2909. 
33 .  See Hartford Fire, 1 1 3 S. Ct .  at 2909- 1 0  & nn .23 ,  24 (c i t ing Mannington 
Mills, 595 F.2d at 1 294 with approva l ) :  Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1 294- l 2<J8.  
34. A wel l-establi shed United States antitmst l i tigator writes: 
Many foreign governments have rejected the U.S .  assertion of 'extra­
territorial '  j urisdiction as unauthorized by international law. As America 's  
economic power has decl ined, its a l l ies have become increasing crit ical of the 
appl ication of U .S .  concepts of market organization and competit ion to activ i ­
t ies  outside the United States . . . .  To compl icate matters further, the Euro­
pean Community and several countries have begun  actively to enforce their 
own competition laws, which, in some circumstances, may impose penalties 
on conduct by U.S. companies that is  permitted by U.S. law. 
Joseph P. Griffin ,  " United States Antirrusr Laws and Transna rionul Business 
Transacrions: An lnrroduction, " 2 1  The International Lawyer 307 , 308-309 ( 1 987) 
This article is  an excellent, short primer on the problems of reconci l ing United St�t tcs  
and foreign competition laws,  albeit from a business perspective. See ulso. Comll l i s ­
s ion of the European Communi t ies, General Overview of EC/US Relorions ( 8 ru-.;sc l s .  
26 May 1 995).  part icularly Part E .  
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and/or executive ' s  inabi l i ty to agree to a single view of a regulatory 
scheme, that precipitates the court ' s  involvement in the first place. 
Moreover, courts sometimes reject the balance that the executive branch 
urges upon them .15 One might argue that the executive made this "bal­
ancing" j udgement when i t  initiated an enforcement action . B ut most 
Sherman Act suits are brought by private parties . Moreover, the execu­
t ive branch has indicated in its own guidel ines that balancing be 
done.36 
But  i f  Justice Souter would allocate responsibi l ity between govern­
mental branches, he al lows virtual ly no opening for it. If United States 
courts exercise jurisdiction whenever the Constitution permits it; and, 
whenever they do, they apply United States law, then the international 
sensit ivity developed in prior cases is lost .  Hartford Fire seems l ike an 
inflexible, opportunist ic rul ing;  not one wel l-suited to our times. 
Given the enhanced international i nterdependency of our economy in 
recent years, one would expect a more sensitive approach to have been 
taken; even i f, in the end, the court chose United States law. To al low 
no weighing whatever, unless foreign law required the offending be­
havior, seems to invite foreign nations to structure their l aws to con­
front ours. (The Hartford Fire dicta did suggest that a balancing of 
i nterests would be attempted if the foreign conduct was required-not 
just permitted-by the foreign sovereign.)17 
35 .  See, e.g. , Consolidated Gold Fields, 87 1 F.2d at 252, which involved a 
relatively small United States interest. The executive branch, in the person of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, urged the judiciary not to be too heavy-handed 
in applying Uni ted States law. !d. at 263 . In the end, they were successfuL be­
cause the i njunction imposed by the court ,  covering a large body of non-United 
S tates activity, was overzealous i n  its attempted protection of the United States 
in terest at stake . Consolidared Gold Fields, 890 F.2d at 569. But even Consolidared 
Gold Fields i nvolved some weighing and balancing. 
36. Department of Justice, Anti trust Enforcement Guidelines for International 
Operations § 5 ( 1 988 ) ,  reprinted in 4 Trade Regulation Reporter 9! 1 3 1 09 .  I 0 ( 1 988) .  
Accord U.S ./E .C.  Commission Agreement art . V I .  
37 .  Justice Souter 's majority al lows an  exception to  the Hartford Fire pri nciple 
when "there i s  . . .  a true confl ict between domestic and fore ign law [so that the 
business enti ty might not be able to obey both] ."  Hartford Fire, 1 1 3 S. Ct. at 29 1 0  
(cit ing Societe Narionale lndusrrie/le Aerospatiale v. United Stares Dist. Court, 482 
U.S. 522, 555 ( 1 987) (B lackman, J . ,  concurring in part and dissenting i n  part ) ) ;  see 
also, Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the Uni ted States � 
4 1 5(2)-(3) ( 1 986). Of course, to suggest that a basis for Uni ted States court j urisdic­
t ion exists, does not mean that i t  must be exercised, and Uni ted States law imposed. 
Perhaps Justice Souter considered this policy-weighing judgement subsumed in  the 
Department of Justice ' s  decision to prosecute. However, the Brit ish government went 
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The passage of "c lawback" legis lation by a number of nations i ndicates 
that at l east some foreign states w i l l  accept this invitation and adopt 
statutes that put their law on a coll ision course with ours.38 
Not to be outdone, the executive branch has proposed that the 1 988 
anti-trust guidelines be discarded, and a new, rather more heavy-handed, 
set be adopted. 39 
to considerable lengths and expense in Hortford Fire to defend the acts of i ts i nsur­
ers . Hartford Fire, 1 1 3 S. Ct. at 29 1 0: see Reuland, supra, at 1 70-73 .  
38 .  One commentator suggests that ' ' [m]ore than fifteen 'blocking statutes' de­
signed to impede or thwart the extraterritorial application of the U .S .  ant i trust laws 
have been enacted by some of America· s c losest al l ies, inc luding Austra l ia ,  Canada, 
England, France, Switzerland, and West Germany ." Gri ffin, supra, at  308-09 . A 
c lassic example of a foreign "clawback" statute i s  the Foreign Proceedings ( Prohibi­
tion of Cer1ain Evidence) Act, 1 976, Aust l .  Acts No. 1 2 1 ,  amended by Foreign Pro­
ceedings (Prohibit ion of Cer1ain Evidence) Amendment Act. 1 976, Aust l . ,  Acts No. 
202, rep laced by Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act, 1 9 84, Austl .  Acts 
No. 3. Barry E. Hawk, United States, Common Market and International A ntitrust: 
A Comparative Guide, vol .  I at 7 1 8 . 1 (2d ed. 1 993 ): see also Pen ny Zagal i s ,  Hart­
ford Fire Insurance Co. v. Califomia: Reassessing the Application of the McCarran­
F erguson Act to Foreign Reinsurers, 27 Cornel l  In t '  I L.J .  24 1 ,  267-68 ( 1 994 ) . See 
generally Terry Calvan i ,  Long Arm 4 U.S. Regulations, Financial Times,  Oct .  25 ,  
1 994 at 16 (Mr. Calvani  i s  a former commissioner of the United S tates Federal 
Trade Commission). 
39 .  Department of Justice, Request for Comments on Draft Anti trust Enforcement 
Guidelines for I nternational Operations, 59  FR 528 1 0  (Oct. 1 9, 1 994) .  The draft 
guidelines extend Uni ted S tates jurisdiction to ' ·anti -competit ive conduct. wherever 
occumng, that restrains U.S .  e.\ports . . [or where] the U.S .  Gove rn ment is a 
purchaser, or substantial ly jimds the purchase, of goods or services for consumption 
or use abroad." /d. at 528 1 7  (emphasis  added) .  The 1 994 Draft Guidel i nes were 
not warmly received by the United Kingdom, which is not l ikely to be alone in i ts 
hosti le  response. Robert Rice, Guidelines Meet a Cold Front, Financial Times, 
March 7, 1 995 at 1 2 . But see International Anti trust Enforcement Assistance Act of 
1 994, 1 5  U .S .C .  §§ 620 1 - 1 2  ( 1 994) (aiming to promote international cooperation in 
extraterritorial antitrust enforcement ) ;  see also Assistant Attorney General Anne K. 
B ingaman, Testimony to the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law, 
United States House of Representatives Commirtee on the J udiciary, 1 994 WL 4 1 3408 
(F.D .C.H. )  (Aug. 8 ,  1 994) [hereinafter Bingaman testimony] .  Ms. B ingaman, noted 
for her aggressive stance on i nternational antitrust enforcement, welcomed the statute 
stating that i t  "wi l l  al low us to get the evidence we need to enforce our anti trust 
laws in today ' s  global economy . . .  through expanded international anti trust coop­
eration." Bingaman testimony, supra, at 7. Bingaman further stated that "the bi l l  
speci fica l ly directs the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commiss ion to in­
c lude i n  their  consideration any proprietary interest the foreign government involved 
may have that could benefi t  from or be affected by the assi stance the U . S .  agenc ie s  
have been asked to provide ."  Bingaman tl:'stimonv. supra, at 7 .  Despite t h e  Dcp� 1 rt ·  
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It hardly needs be said that what America considers to be anti-com­
petitive behavior is probably the most capitalistic view taken anywhere 
i n  the world. Almost any other country (for example, the European 
Union) would tolerate a greater degree of col laboration between compa­
nies, and between business and government. To enforce our v iew con­
cerning such relationships whenever we have the power do so, threatens 
to do enormous damage to our professed desire to improve i nternational 
business relations. 
We must bear in mind, of course, that the facts in our hypothetical 
are not identical to those in Hartford Fire. In our case, a l l  anti -competi­
tive acts took place abroad. As observed above, that may not be dispos­
itive of the matter, however. It also may be implicit in the Hartford 
holding that the appl ication of U nited States regulatory l aw to foreign 
conduct is l imited to a few sectors where this practice is essential to 
enforcement. 
I t  is against this backdrop that our di stingui shed panel of confl ict  of 
laws and international l aw experts w i l l  tel l  us what they believe was at 
stake in Hartford Fire, and in our hypothetical case. 
* * * 
FACTS 
Primary Insurers are U nited States insurance compames which de­
sired to effect changes in comprehensive general l iabi l ity (CGL) insur­
ance i ssued via standard policies in the United States .  London is one of 
the maj or markets for reinsurance or excess coverage that American 
insurance companies would  wish to buy in relation to CGL policies 
i ssued in the United States .  Count X of the complaint al l eges that Pri­
mary Insurers conspired with Key Actors (primari ly Brit ish insurance 
companies, but also some other brokers involved in the London insur­
ance market), persuading them to boycott (not reinsure or issue excess 
coverage against) any pol icies which did not contain the form l anguage 
which Primary Insurers desired. The desired form language would  de­
crease Primary Insurers ' s  and Key Actors ' s  ult imate l iabi l ity by decreas­
ing coverage avai lable for environmental disasters and toxic torts . The 
l anguage places a cap on the legal defense costs provided by CGL 
i nsurance, and shortens the effective coverage period of CGL insurance. 
ment of  Justice ' s  apparent wi l l ingness to take uni lateral action in  their  I <J94 Draft 
Guidelines, it s t i l l  seems to recognize the need for cooperation and sol ic i tude for the 
sovereigns' interests. 
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Count X refers only to meetings among Key Actors and between Pri­
mary Insurers and Key Actors .  These meetings took place outside the 
United S tates and related to the actions of neither reinsuring nor provid­
ing excess insurance through the London market. 
Assuming extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act, the allegations 
stated would constitute a violation of the Act by both American compa­
nies, under the boycott exception to the McCarran-Ferguson antitrust 
exemption for i nsurance companies, and foreign companies. Neither the 
London actions of Primary Insurers nor of Key Actors would v iolate 
any Uni ted Kingdom law. It is the B rit ish government' s  posit ion that 
the London insurance market is effectively and exclusively regulated by 
its own system of laws, and that any application of United S tates law 
to these facts, especially against Key Actors, would constitute i mproper 
i nterference with United Kingdom government and regulatory processes. 
Primary Insurers and Key Actors moved to dismiss the Count X c laims 
against them, on the ground that the Sherman Act does not reach their 
actions .  The trial court granted Key Actors ' s  motion to dismiss Count 
X,  denied Primary Insurers ' s  motion to dismiss Count X, and cert ified 
interlocutory appeal on the Count X i ssue. The lower appellate court 
found that the Sherman Act applied to the actions of both sets of de­
fendants and denied the motions to dismiss Count X. 
As members of the United States Supreme Court, rev1ew these ex­
traterritoriality i ssues. 
May and should the Sherman Act, with regard to the actions which 
took place outside the United States, be appl ied extraterritoria l ly  against 
Primary Insurers? Against Key Actors? 
* * * 
BURBANK, J . * : (affi rming) 
Our cases construing the applicabi l ity of the Sherman Act to extra­
territorial conduct are not a model of consistency, and we welcome this 
opportunity to put our house in order .  
When we last v isited this question, i n  a strikingly s imilar case, the 
Court was closely divided as to the result and the appropriate analytical 
approach. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California ,  1 1 3 S .  Ct .  289 1 
* Robert G. Ful l er, Jr . ,  Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania .  
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( 1 993) .  Because we believe that analytical clarity i s  essential not only 
to a wise resolution of the i ssues before us but to a resolution that re­
spects the proper role of federal courts, we take some pains in charting 
our decisional path . 
The complaint in  this case seeks recovery directly under the 
Sherman Act, and the claims it states are neither immaterial nor frivo­
lous in the sense of those words intended by this Court in  Bell v. 
Hood, 327 U.S .  678 ( 1 946) . 1 There is ,  therefore, subject matter jurisdic­
tion under 28 U.S .C .  §§ 1 33 1  and 1 337  ( 1 988) .  Congress is, of course, 
free to enact more specific j urisdictional statutes and in doing so to 
make relevant to the question of subject matter jurisdiction matters that, 
under our long-standing interpretation of § 1 33 1 ,  are properly consid­
ered as part of the merits. If 1 5  U.S .C .  § 1 5  ( 1 988) ,  is properly regard­
ed as a j urisdictional provision, it nonetheless furnishes no basis  for 
treating the question of territorial scope as an aspect of subject matter 
juri sdiction. There is, however, evidence in the Jegislati ve history of the 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1 982  (FT AlA) of an 
intent to do something similar .  See H.R. Rep. No. 686, 97th Cong. ,  2d 
Sess. 1 3  ( 1 982) .  We do not decide that question, however, because the 
FT AlA is  not involved in this case and those who drafted the legis­
lative h istory of the FT AlA may have been misled by decisions of this 
and other federal courts that lost sight of both the rule announced in 
Bell and the reasons for it . See Comment, Sherman Act "Jurisdiction " 
in Hospital Staff Exclusion Cases, 1 32 U.  Pa. L. Rev .  1 2 1  ( 1 983) .  
Part of the appeal of a dismissal for lack of subject matter j urisdic­
tion may repose in the capacity of the concept to induce belief that the 
decision was inevitable, or at least c learly attributable to congressional 
choices. Moreover, if a court considers matters that implicate the territo­
rial scope of federal Jaw as part of the jurisdictional inquiry, it is hard 
to see how that court cou ld properly decline to exerci se the jurisdiction 
l .  
Jurisdiction, therefore, i s  not defeated . . . by the possib i l i ty that the 
averments might fai l  to state a cause of action on which peti t ioners could 
actuall y  recover. For i t  is well settled that the fai lure to state a proper cause 
of action cal ls  for a judgment on the merits and not for a di smissal for want 
of jurisdiction . . . .  The previously carved out exceptions are that a suit  may 
sometimes be dismissed for want of j urisdiction where the al leged c laim 
under the Constitution or federal statutes c learly appears to be immaterial and 
made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim 
i s  whol ly  insubstantial and frivolous. 
Bell v .  Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 ( 1 946) .  
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Congress has conferred. That was the di lemma confronting the majority 
in the Hartford Fire case, under the influence of the FTAIA, if not of 
its legis lative hi story. 
Having determined that the Ff AlA does not control this case and 
that there is subject matter jurisdiction under the standards set forth i n  
Bell, we are required t o  explore what Justice Scalia identified a s  a 
problem of legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction. See Hartford Fire, 
1 1 3 S .  Ct. at 29 1 8  (Scalia, J . ,  dissenting with respect to Part I I ) .  To say 
that the Sherman Act simultaneously exercises prescriptive juri sd iction 
and grants subject matter jurisdiction, even if true, hardly settles the 
question whether the two are congruent. But see Hartford Fire, 1 1 3 S .  
Ct. at 2909 n .22.  
The problem of legislative jurisdiction can arise in domestic state 
law cases when the choice of law normally  avai lable to a court i s  con­
strained by federal constitutional l imits .  I t  can ari se in federal l aw cases 
because, although the Supremacy Clause dictates a choice of pert inent 
federal law, the Constitution also l imits the lawmaking power of the 
federal government. 
When either federal constitutional or self- imposed limits foreclose 
the application of a state' s  law, the case can often be decided on the 
merits under the law of another state . A deci sion that federal law does 
not apply also imports, as we have discussed, a deci sion on the merits, 
but i t  often does not usher in  the appl ication of the law of another 
j urisdiction. That is because, although (supplemental ) subj ect  matter 
jurisdiction may exist to apply state or foreign law,  see 28 U . S .C .  § 
1 367 (Supp. I I  1 990), often federal law i s  the only law under which a 
plainti ff seeks or can seek rel ief. 
Although different in important respects, interstate choice of law and 
determinations about the extraterritorial appl ication of federal law share 
one salient characterist ic .  They are usually unconstrained by textually 
expl ici t  signs of legislative self-restraint. See Stephen B. B urbank, The 
World in Our Courts, 89 Mich.  L .  Rev . 1 456, 1 460 ( 1 99 1 )  (book re­
view) .  Honestly v iewed, state choice of law decisions are typically not 
judicial attempts to carry out actual legislative intent so much as they 
are attempts to confect rational solutions of problems to which legis­
latures rarely give attention . See Lea B ri lmayer. lnrcrcsr A nalysis ond 
the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 Mich. L. Rev .  392 ( 1 980) .  The same 
is true of the decisions of this Court with respect to extraterr i t or ia l i ty .  
with the "rational solution" in each case being inll ucnccd hy the  felt  
necessities, including the jurisprudential cl imate, of the t i mes .  
To say that our decisions on extraterritoriality ha ve heni � t  pn )duct  
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of the times in which they were decided is ,  more or less,  to admit that 
they are hard to defend as consistent. That is true of our decis ions 
interpreting the Sherman Act. The i nfluence of domestic choice of l aw 
thinking on those decisions i s  hard to miss,  see B urbank, supra, at 
1460-6 1 ,  and, as Justice Scal ia has observed, it i s  equal ly hard to ex­
plain what happened to the presumption against extraterritorial app l ica­
tion. See Hartford Fire, 1 1 3 S .  Ct. at 29 1 8- 1 9 (Scalia,  J . ,  d issenting 
with respect to Part II). It i s  t ime to c larify the proper role that both 
choice of law analysis and presumptions play in determining the ex­
traterritorial appl ication of federal statutes .  
Even if  we were competent to identify the interests of another sov­
ereign nation, it is not cons istent with our proper function as a federal 
court interpreting an act of Congress to attempt to weigh those interests 
against the interests of the United States .  A presumption against the 
i nterpretation or application of federal l aw so as to bring the Uni ted 
States in violation of international l aw is entirely appropriate . "Interna­
tional comity" is not, however, international law, and few people  other 
than those who drafted the relevant sections of the Restatement (Third) 
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United S tates ( 1 986) ,  bel ieve that 
section 403 states rules of customary international law.  See Burbank, 
supra, at 1 464-65 . Certainly ,  the European Court of Justice cannot 
bel ieve such a thing, having brought the European Union ' s  approach to 
antitrust l aw closely in accord with that taken in  Hartford Fire. See 
Case 89/95 ,  Ahlstrom v. Commission,  1 988 E.C.R. 5 1 93 ,  4 C .M.L.R. 
90 1 ( 1 988) .  Although federal common l awmaking and statutory interpre­
tation are di fferent in degree rather than in kind-particularly when the 
statute i s  the Sherman Act-federal courts do not have the freedom in  
implementing congressional choices through statutory interpretation that 
they have when making federal choices through federal common l aw .  
Congress might grant that freedom, but when foreign relations could be 
affected, we require more than an ambiguous sentence in a committee 
report on another statute. Cf Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Act of State and 
Department of State: First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de 
Cuba, 66 Am. J .  Int ' l  L. 795 ( 1 972). 
On the facts a l leged in thi s  case, the purposes of the Sherman Act 
would be served by its appl ication to the domestic and foreign defen­
dants a like.  In choice of law parlance, the United States is an i nterested 
state. The same would be true i f  the FT AlA ' s  requirement of "a direct, 
substantia l ,  and reasonably foreseeable effect" were appl icable (and 
deemed a requirement on the merits) .  The complaint a l leges such an 
effect. In the absence of some specific indication of congressional wi l l  
to  forebear or  of an appl icable general interpretative rule, there i s  no 
592 NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol . 29 :577  
legitimate basis upon which we may decl ine to enforce the statute. 
For much of our hi story, there have been two "general interpretative 
rules" to which the courts could appeal to avoid the potential antago­
nisms or embarrassments that extraterritorial application of United States 
law might entai l .  Those rules, of course, are the presumption against the 
extraterritorial appl ication of statutes and the presumption against statu­
tory violation of international law. Together with traditional territorial 
choice of law rules-and more than one of these devices might be 
involved in the same case-they were long adequate to the task. 
Today , traditional territorial choice of l aw rules may not be wholly 
obsolete, but they are hardly available to us as a plausible surrogate for 
congressional i ntent. Considering the place of the United S tates i n  the 
world economy, one might say the same about the presumption against 
extraterritorial application. See Jonathan R. Turley, " When in Rome ": 
Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriali­
ty, 84 Nw. U .  L. Rev .  598 ( 1 990). Perhaps for that reason,  this pre­
sumption has long ceased to operate in connection with the S herman 
Act. Thus, even if we were persuaded to adopt in  its stead a presump­
tion in favor of extraterritorial appl ication , this would not be the occa­
sion to do so. Perhaps we should reconsider the presumption in an 
appropriate case, but we only recently affirmed its vitality . EEOC v. 
A rabian Am. Oil Co. , 499 U .S .  244 ( 1 99 1  ) . Moreover, it i s  less impor­
tant what the content of such an interpretative rule is than that it be 
clear, c learly understood by Congress, and consistently applied by the 
federal courts . 
Acknowledging our own inconsistency in applying the presumption 
against extraterritoriality in the past , we believe that it i s  the better part 
of valor to strive to improve in the future. We, therefore, leave it to 
Congress to clearly signal when it has determined that the potential 
costs of either unilateral regulation or unreciprocated forbearance are 
outweighed by the potential benefits of enforcing otherwise applicable 
United States Jaw. This,  in  any event, seems to us a better approach to 
statutory interpretation than one which relies on "international comity ," 
which is  neither clear nor clearly understood by Congress, and which, 
in  the view of many informed observers, i s  consistent only in permi tting 
federal courts to apply United States Jaw. See, e.g. , Harold G. Maier, 
Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 3 1  Am. J .  Comp. L .  
579 ( 1 983) .  
All of this is not to  say that statutory interpretation is  the best ap­
proach to the problem. It would be far better for Congress to provide 
more specific guidance in the text of the antitrust laws, and i t  should 
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start by c lar ifying the scope of the FTAIA and the relationship of the 
standards it contains to other provisions of those laws .  Moreover, rec­
ognizing that even the most thoughtful rewrite of the antitrust l aws 
could not anticipate al l  of the nuances arising from the i nterplay of 
domestic compet i t ion  pol icy and foreign relations, Congress may wish 
to reconsider the re lationship between public and private enforcement 
when it is  proposed to apply the antitrust laws extraterritorial ly .  Recip­
rocal forbearance is impossible so long as public l aw is in private 
hands, and progress w i l l  not be made so long as we ins ist  on j urispru­
dentia l  notions-whether about the pub l ic/private dichotomy or the 
proper role of couns-that are uncongenial to other countries with 
whom we desire cooper arion. The Executive Branch has made progress 
in  this area on which Congress might build. See, e.g. , Agreement be­
tween the Govern ment  of the United States of America and the Com­
mission of the European Communities regarding the Appl ication of their  
Competi t ion Laws, Sept. 23, 1 99 1 ,  30  I .L .M.  1 487.  Arrayed against the 
competence and resources of both the Executive Branch and Congress 
in  foreign relations, both a judic ia l ly created presumption against extra­
territorial application and judic i al ly  interpreted norms of international 
comity are feeble tools  indeed. 
The presumption against interpreting or applying a federal statute so 
as to bring it in violation of international Jaw is, as we have indicated, 
by no means obsolete . It remains a vital ly important means to bridge 
the gap between this country ' s  essential ly dual i st traditions and monist 
aspirations for an international l egal order. Except in the case of treaties 
or ius cogens, however, it too is a feeble tool, and we would honor 
neither our tradit ions nor those aspirations by projecting home-made 
choice of J aw mov ies onto a world screen. Nothing in i nternational law 
prevents the appl icat ion of the Sherman Act to the facts al leged in thi s 
case. The decis ion be l ow i s  therefore 
Affirmed. 
* * * 
COX, J . * : (affirming) 
Affirmed. The Sherman Act should be appl ied to the actions of 
Primary Insurers and Key Actors , even though these actions took place 
wholly outside the United States and were in conformity with l ocal Jaw. 
I largely agree with the opin ions of Justices SCHARF and 
'" Stanley E .  Cox:  Assistant Professor of  Law, New England School of Law . 
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WEINTRAUB . I write separately to i ndicate minor points of potential 
disagreement from their posit ions, and to further emphasize that the 
current Court presumption against extraterritoriality outs ide of the 
Shennan Act context is wrongheaded and should be abandoned. 
Both Justices WEINTRAUB and SCHARF properly acknowledge the 
unworkableness of any balancing or weighing approach for determining 
whether United Sates law should be applied extraterritorial ly .  United 
States j udges merely pretend to balance United S tates i nterests agai nst 
foreign interests ;  it would be more honest and helpful to hold that we 
only have authority to evaluate whether our own interests are strongly 
implicated. As a matter of fundamental jurisdictional power and legiti­
macy,  we have no authority to "neutrally" decide whether Uni ted States 
interests predomi nate over foreign interests. We are not an i nternational 
court of justice, but rather an appellate court of a single sovereign . To 
the extent that our decisions are constrained by "international law," the 
content of that international law is not dictated to us from an outward 
source, but is something which we fashion or recognize ourselves ( i. e. , 
the law of our foreign relations versus international law in  a more ab­
stract or universal sense) .  Both Justice WEINTRAUB ' s  strong presump­
tion of extraterritorial ity and Justice SCHARF' s unilateral approach, 
with the possibility of a sovereign compulsion defense, properly inquire 
into the extent of our own interest and properly reach the same re­
sult-application of United S tates law is proper whenever our regulatory 
interests are legitimately impli cated. 
I further agree with Justice SILBERMAN that Justice MAIER's  
attempt to carve out a regulatory or  quasi-criminal enclave, where a 
unilateral approach can operate unimpeded, does not adequately address 
the problem in  this or related types of cases. Private p laintiffs , in 
addition to state department prosecutors, are entitled to remedies under 
the Sherman Act. Even when private plaintiffs sue fore igners under 
other statutes, which have no quasi-criminal cast or state department 
involvement, United States regulatory interests are s imilarly implicated. 
The absence of a sovereign party does not el iminate the source of regu­
lation . Plaintiffs who seek application of United S tates laws,  in Ameri­
can courts, are asking that our nation ' s  regulatory and enforcement 
power be applied to regulate conduct via a court judgment .  
Accordingly, the question we should ask i n  any suit ,  regardless of 
who brings it ,  is whether the conduct at i ssue was meant to trigger 
application of American law. Contrary to the implications in Justice 
SCHARF' s opinion, I would not automatically foreclose appl ication of 
our own Jaw even in s i tuations where actions abroad are "compelled," 
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at least to the extent compul sion is determined according to another 
sovereign ' s  law. Our law may be meant to apply without defenses; 
whatever defenses are meant to apply are governed by U ni ted States 
law, rather than dictated by the actions of other sovereigns. 
This uni lateral approach does not support the application of United 
States law without an initial determination that there is enough effect in  
the United States for us  legitimately to  regulate. Justice WEINTRAUB 
addressed this concern of overreaching in condemni ng the appl ication of 
securities law to a whole transaction that only s lightly affects United 
States i nterests .  A more unilateral approach allows regulation of conduct 
only partial ly aimed at the Uni ted States ,  regardless of the effects of 
such regulation on defendant' s  activities elsewhere . If  there is a signifi­
cant harmful effect in  the United S tates, there is presumably a need to 
regulate that portion of the conduct, regardless of how this might cause 
the defendant to change its whole method of operations. Otherwise, the 
net result is  the immunization of foreign manufacturers from product 
l iabi lity suits because the majority of their products are sold overseas, 
although they knowingly direct a small portion of h armful products to 
particular local plaintiffs. This is a tort resul t  Justice WEINTRAUB 
elsewhere disapproves .  See WEINTRAUB, infra, at 664. 
The i nstant l i tigation is an easy case for extraterritorial  appl ication 
of United States law .  To determine whether United States law is trig­
gered by any particular actions abroad is partly a matter of statutory 
construction and part ly a matter of judicial application. The statutory 
interpretation part of our analysis ,  in the instant case, i ndicates that 
Congress intended to prohibit conduct of the type alleged here. Con­
gress has expressed no l imit regarding the geographical reach of the law 
that was meant to apply .  1 Judicial application of the Sherman Act to 
actions abroad, having substantial effect in the United States (apparently 
actions directed towards parties in the United States,  according to 
plaintiffs ' allegations), would be a reasonable exercise of our govern­
mental regulatory power. Accordingly, the judgment should be affirmed. 
I additionally emphasize that we should, at the first avai lable oppor­
tunity , abandon the nearly irrebuttable presumption against extraterritori­
ality which we foolishly adopted in  EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. , 499 
U.S .  244 ( 1 99 1 )  [hereinafter A ramco] . Although not directly at issue in  
I .  Even i f  Congress expressly l imits geographical reach, there are situations 
where such a l imitation is arguably unconstitutional. Where s imilarly situated persons 
are treated dissimi larly, or other constitutional rights are infringed by immunizing 
conduct abroad, we should at least consider whether even Congress ' s  express intent 
should be declared inval id .  
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this case, since the Sherman Act previously has been construed to have 
clear extraterritorial reach, the presumption against extraterritoriality wi l l  
only cause future additional mischief. Cf Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
California , 1 1 3 S .  Ct. 289 1 ,  29 1 8  ( 1 993) (Scal ia, J . ,  dissenting) ( indicat­
ing that, were the matter not governed by precedent, the territorial  reach 
of the Sherman Act would be worth reconsidering under A ramco ) . A 
presumption that United States laws are meant to apply extraterri torially 
when defendants i ntend and do have effects clearly within the United 
States ' s  regulatory sphere of interest is a more sensible construction of 
legislative i ntent, and is a prudent exercise of federal common law 
discretion. 
In the instant case, especial ly  as applied to the actions of Primary 
Insurers, a presumption of extraterritoriality prevents insurers from mov­
ing offshore, aiming their actions back at their horne country, and then 
claiming lack of jurisdictional reach.  I did not agree with this Court ' s  
immunization of  United States tortfeasors for their wrongfu l  actions in  
either Saudi Arabia  (Aramco) or Antarctica (see Smith v .  United States, 
1 1 3 S .  Ct. 1 1 78  ( 1 993)) .  We should reverse the trend, begun in 
Aramco, of providing safe harbors for wrongdoing.  
* * * 
KRAMER, J .  * : (affirming) 
In this case we consider the applicability of the Sherman Act, 1 5  
U .S .C .  § 1 ,  to an alleged conspiracy formed in  England between vari­
ous American i nsurance companies ("Primary Insurers") and their Brit­
ish counterparts ("Key Actors") .  The court of appeals ruled that both 
sets of defendants could be held l iable under the Act. We affirm. 
I .  
Comprehensive general l iabi lity ("CGL") insurance i s  sold in the 
United States under a standardized agreement drafted by the Insurance 
Services Office (ISO), an association of approximately 1 ,400 domestic 
property and casualty insurers. Primary Insurers sought changes in the 
terms of this  agreement that would decrease their l iability for environ­
mental disasters and toxic torts. In particular, they wanted to shorten the 
effective term of coverage of any CGL insurance agreement and to 
* Larry Kramer: Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. 
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impose a cap on their responsibi l i ty for l itigation costs. When they 
fai led to convince the ISO to make these changes, Primary Insurers 
contacted Key Actors and persuaded them to use their market power to 
produce the desired results. 
Key Actors control a s ignificant portion of the London insurance 
market, a major source of reinsurance and excess insurance coverage. 
At meetings held in England, Key Actors agreed with Primary Insurers 
to refuse to sell reinsurance or provide excess coverage to any company 
whose insurance form did not include the terms sought by Primary 
Insurers . It is conceded by al l  parties that this agreement consti tutes a 
restraint of trade with in  the meaning of the Sherman Act and, further, 
that it cal l s  for a boycott under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 1 5  U .S .C .  
§ 1 1 0 1 .  Primary Insurers and Key Actors nonetheless moved to  dismiss 
the plaintiffs ' complaint on the ground that American law does not 
apply to an agreement made and executed entirely in England. They are 
supported in this position by the B rit ish government, which has fi led a 
brief amicus curiae arguing that the conduct at i ssue does not violate 
any law of the United Kingdom and that the appl ication of United 
States law would constitute "improper i nterference with United Kingdom 
government and regulatory processes." 
II .  
Before turning to the problem of whether the Sherman Act reaches 
conduct outside the United States ,  we briefly discuss the question of 
subject-matter jurisdiction. For reasons that are unclear, a number of 
courts and commentators have confused the question of whether a par­
ticular law appl ies to foreign conduct-a question of the merits that 
asks whether the party relying on a law states a claim or defense-with 
the question of whether the court has subject-matter j urisdiction. See, 
e.g. , Steele v. Bulova Watch, 344 U.S .  280, 282 ( 1 952) ; Boureslan v. 
Aramco, 653 F. Supp. 629 (S .D .  Tex .  1 987),  aff'd, 499 U .S .  244 
( 1 99 1 ) ;  Gary Born & David Westin, International Civil Litigation in 
United States Courts 6 1 6  (2d ed. 1 992) ;  Note, Extraterritorial Applica­
tion of United States Laws, 28 Stan .  L. Rev .  1 005 ( 1 978 ) .  Indeed, Jus­
tice Souter made this mistake in his opinion for the Court in  Hartford 
Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 1 1 3 S .  Ct. 289 1 ,  2909 n .22 ( 1 993) ,  though 
ultimately i t  did not affect the disposition of the case. Perhaps the con­
fusion arises from the fact that extraterritorial app lication in i nternation­
al cases is often described as a question of "prescriptive juri sdiction" 
and use of the word ju risdiction misleads . Certainly, no one makes the 
same mistake in domestic choice of law cases, where the question of 
applying forum law rather than deferring to another state' s  law is every-
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where understood as a question on the merits that has nothing to do 
with the court ' s  subject-matter jurisdiction (and hence is waivable). 
Be that as i t  may, there i s  s imply no question about subject-matter 
j urisdiction here. The plaintiffs have filed an action seeking damages 
under the Sherman Act. As such, there is j urisdiction under 28 U .S .C.  
§ 1 33 1 ,  which gives federal courts "original j urisdiction of al l  c i  vi i  ac­
tions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the Uni ted 
States ."  See Hartford Fire, 1 1 3 S. Ct. at 29 1 7- 1 8  (Scalia,  J . ,  d issenting). 
The defendants maintain that the Sherman Act does not reach this 
far-that the Act does not render their conduct unlawful because i t  
applies only to conduct occurring i n  the United States .  I f  so, the 
plaintiffs ' complaint would fai l  because they could not establ ish an 
essential element of their claim (conduct w ithin the United S tates) ,  and 
the proper course would be to dismiss u nder Federal Rule  of Civi l  
Procedure 1 2(b)(6). See Romero v .  International Terminal Operating 
Co. , 358  U .S .  354, 359 ( 1 959) ;  Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U .S .  5 7 1 ,  575 
( 1 953) . 1 
III . 
We turn, therefore, to the argument that the plaintiffs may not re­
cover under the Sherman Act because the conduct, alleged to constitute 
a consp1racy ,  took place outside the United States. 
A. 
That we need to discuss this question at all may seem surpnsmg 
given our recent decision in  Hartford Fire, supra, holding the S herman 
Act applicable on facts virtually identical to these. But the narrow ma­
jority opinion in  that case is questionable in several respects, and these 
have convinced us to revis i t  the i ssue in order further to c larify the law. 
First, the majority opinion in Hartford Fire failed adequately to deal 
with our almost contemporaneous deci sion in EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil  
Co. ,  499 U.S .  244 ( 1 99 1 )  [hereinafter Aramco ] ,  which held '"that legis-
I .  The plaintiffs might s t i l l  be able to l i tigate i n  federal court if they could 
state a claim under the law of another nation and the parties are diverse or the court 
retains supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U .S .C .  § 1 367 . I n  many cases, however, 
such a claim would be based on a foreign penal, tax, or regulatory law, and our 
courts do not enforce these types of foreign law. See, e.g. , Huntington v. A tril/, 1 46 
U .S .  657 ( 1 892); The Antelope, 23 U .S .  ( 1 0  Wheat. )  66, 1 23 ( 1 825 ) .  The continuing 
viab i l i ty of this l imitation i s  dubious, but we need not reach that question i n  l ight of 
our hold ing that these plaintiffs state a claim under the Sherman Act .  
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l ation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply 
only within the territorial jurisdi ction of the United States ." '  !d. at 248 
(quoting Foley Bros. v. Fi!ardo, 336 U.S .  28 1 ,  285 ( 1 949)) .  S ince noth­
ing in the language (or, for that matter, the legis lative h istory) of the 
Sherman Act indicates an intent to regulate conduct abroad, one might 
have expected the Court to find the Sherman Act inappl icable to a 
conspiracy that, l ike the conspiracies alleged in Hartford Fire and i n  
this case, consists entirely o f  conduct outside the United States .  This i s  
particularly true i f  one recal l s  that the presumption against  extraterri tori­
ality was first articulated in a case brought under the Sherman Act. See 
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. , 2 1 3  U.S . 357 ( 1 909) . Yet 
not only did the Hartford Fire Court allow plaintiffs to sue based on 
al legations of conduct that took place entirely outside the United States, 
but i t  did so without even mentioning, much less attempting to dist in­
guish, A ramco. Hence, we revisit  these dec is ions to c lar ify the apparent 
contlict between them.2 
Second, the Hartford Fire majority ' s  explanation of extraterritorial i ty 
i s  quest ionable and confusing. Justice Souter says the Sherman Act 
appl ies presumptively whenever there are effects within the United 
2 .  Justice Scalia discussed EEOC v .  Arabian Am. Oil Co . . 499 U.S. 244 ( 1 99 1 )  
[hereinafter A ramco] .  i n  his dissent, concluding (with obvious disappointment) that, 
whi le one might have expected Aramco to control the outcome, "it i s  now wel l  
establ ished that the Sherman Act appl ies extraterritorial ly ." Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
California, 1 1 3 S. Ct. 289 1 ,  29 1 8- 1 9  (Scal ia,  J . ,  dissenting) (cit ing Matmshira Elec. 
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S .  574, 582 n .6 ( 1 985 ) ;  Continenwl Ore 
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Co. ,  370 U.S .  690, 704 ( 1 962);  and United Stures 
v. Aluminum Co. of Am. . 1 48 F.2d 4 1 6  (2d Cir. 1 945) [hereinafter A lcoa ] ) .  In fact ,  
none of the cases Just ice Scalia cites supports so broad a concl usion. The reference 
in Marsushita is a dictum that c ites only Conrinental Ore, and Continental Ore holds 
merely that the Sherman Act applies if some culpable acts were committed in  the 
United States even i f  some were committed abroad. It does not, in  other words, 
abandon the tenitorial requirement or hold that the Sherman Act reaches conduct that 
took p lace whol ly outside the United S tates and only had effects within i t .  (Other 
decis ions reaching the same conc lusion include United States v. Sisal Sales Corp. , 
274 U .S .  268 ( 1 927) :  Thomsen v. Cayser. 243 U.S .  66 ( 1 9 1 7) ;  and United States v. 
Pacijic & A rcric Ry. , 228 U .S .  87 ( 1 9 1 3 ) ) .  As for Alcoa, it is only a court of 
appeals decision. and whi le the case was referred to the Second Circuit because the 
Supreme Court was unable to muster a quorum, that does not enhance its 
precedential effect. Hence, prior to Hartford Fire, there was no Supreme Court 
authority holding the Sherman Act applicable on the basis of effects alone ( though 
there was considerable lower court authority as wel l  as an interpretation to this effect 
from the Justice Department) .  The unexplained adoption of such a posit ion in Hart­
ford Fire, corning c lose on the heels of Aramco ' s  strong presumption against ex trater­
ritorial i ty, thus gives rise to an apparent contlict .  
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States . He then reserves the question whether thi s  presumption can ever 
be overcome based on comity. According to Justice Souter, such consid­
erat ions "would not counsel" against the appl ication of Uni ted S tates 
l aw unless there was a "true confl ict," and a true confl ic t  exists only i f  
foreign law requires something United States l aw forbids (or vice-versa) . 
Hartford Fire, 1 1 3 S .  Ct. at 29 1 0. 
However one thinks such problems ought to be resolved, this rea­
soning is obviously flawed . To begin with, Justice Souter bases h is  
analys is  on the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rel at ions Law of the 
United States § 403 ( 1 986),  but as Justice Scal ia  poi nts out in dissent, 
Hartford Fire, 1 1 3 S. Ct. at 2922 (Scal ia J . ,  dissenting), J ustice Souter 
misreads the provision. Justice Souter ' s  argument i s ,  moreover, i nconsis­
tent w ith the conventional understanding of "true confl ict ," which re­
qui res only that the l aws of different states or nations regu late the same 
conduct di fferently .  F ina l ly ,  and most importantly ,  Justice Souter' s ap­
proach l eads to the appl ication of United States law in s ituations where 
it advances United States interests only marginal ly whi le interfering 
with the regulatory objectives of other nations. Not only i s  this wrong 
as a matter of principle,  but as we have seen i n  recent years, it can be 
expected to trigger aggressive responses from other nations that w i l l  
subvert United States i nterests in  cases o f  more immediate o r  s ignificant 
concern . See, e. g. , G.  Born & D. Westin, supra, at 600-03 (discussing 
England ' s  "blocki ng statute," which prevents recovery of treble damages 
and authorizes Brit ish offic ia ls  to forbid compl iance with United States 
discovery orders) .  For this reason too, we think recons ideration of the 
Hartford Fire problem is  appropriate . 3 
3 .  Justice WEINTRAUB offers an a l temative reading of Justice Souter' s Hartford 
Fire opinion to make i t  more palatable. We should, he tel l s  us, · ·credit Jus tice Souter 
wi th being able to read section 403" and interpret his opinion "as sayi ng that under 
any form of comity �malysis, the facts of Hartford Fire just ified application of the 
Sherman Act, the only possible defense was that the defendants were required by the 
United Kingdom to act as they did, and there was no evidence of compuls ion." 
WEINTRAUB, infra, at 6 1 7- 1 8 .  Bu t  this saves Justice Souter the embarrassment of  
misreading sect ion 403 only by having h im make an equally embarrass ing comity 
argument. For even i f  one thinks (as I do) that comity analysis favors the appl ication 
of Uni ted S tates l aw i n  both this case and Hurij(Jrd Fire, Just ice S ILBERMAN' s  
opinion makes c lear that there are strong arguments on the other s ide.  In  any event ,  
Justice WEINTRAUB ' s  rewrite of Just ice Souter ' s  opinion is not true to the original .  
Read in  context, i t  i s  perfect ly  c lear that Justice Souter was saying that  no confl ict  
exis ts i f  a party can comply with the law of both nat ions ,  and that without such a 
conflict there is ··no need . . .  to address other considerations that might i nform a 
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B .  
We turn , then, to the problem o f  determining the scope o f  the 
Sherman Act in multinational cases ( i. e. ,  cases whose facts include 
some contact or connection with a foreign nation) .  And we beg in with 
an elementary proposition: that this is ,  first and foremost, a problem of 
statutory i nterpretation. Congress enacted a law that gives i nj ured parties 
a right to seek relief; our task is to interpret this law in order to deter­
mine the c ircumstances that must exist for a party to obtain that relief. 
The appropriate territorial connection i s  simply one aspect of this inqui­
ry-an element of the claim to be determined, l ike any other element, 
by reference to the statute. Just as the plaintiff must plead a "contract" 
that is "in restraint of trade," so too must the plaintiff plead an appro­
priate connection to the United States .  Unfortunately ,  whi le Congress 
was clear about some terms, it was less c lear about others, including 
extraterritorial appl ication. Indeed, as with most state and federal legisla­
tion, there i s  no mention of terri torial scope in either the statute ' s  lan­
guage or its legislative history . We are consequently faced with a famil­
iar problem of statutory construction-uncontemplated c ircumstanc­
es-that cal ls upon us to fil l  a gap in the statute' s coverage.4 
decis ion to refrai n  from the exerc i se o!' j urisdiction on grounds of i nternational comi­
ty." Hartford Fire, 1 1 3 S .  Ct. at 29 1 0 .  
4 .  To say this i s  a problem o f  statutory construc tion does not make m y  ap­
proach "uni lateral" as opposed to "mult i lateral . "  The d ist inction between un i lateral and 
mult i lateral approaches turns on whether the forum analyzes the problem in terms of 
forum interests only or views i t  from a mult istate or multi national perspective. Treat­
ing the problem as one of statutory i nterpretation, in contrast ,  ret1ects separation of 
powers concerns and has no bearing on this choice of perspectives. The scope of a 
law, in terms of i ts territorial reach as much as anything else, is determined by 
Congress. Our task is to make sense of what Congress did, whether it was done 
from a un i lateral or mul ti lateral perspective. That task would be simple, for example, 
if the Sherman Act stated clearly that i t  applies whenever an  agreement is made in 
the United States or whenever an agreement has effects in  the United States or 
whatever. For unless Congress acted unconsti tutional ly,  the Court i s  bound to respect 
a clear statutory directive. That Congress has not said anyth ing changes the kind of 
statutory construction problem we face, but not the fact that i t  is such a problem. 
Having said this much, I should add that I think the debate over "uni l:.lteral" 
and ' ·mult i lateral" approaches i s  a waste of time, because any sensible approach wi l l  
incorporate e lements of both. To start, the analysis must necessari ly include an in i tia l  
inquiry that i s  uni lateral-whether the forum has any interest in applying i ts law at 
a l l-because it makes no sense to start worrying about balancing forum and foreign 
i nterests without some reason first to think that forum law applies. After that, the 
dist inction between "uni lateral" and ' "mult i lateral" approaches ceases to matter, be­
cause even a state determi ned to advance only its own i nterests wi l l  want to take the 
interests of other states or nations i nto account. In theory, such a state wil l  defer to 
602 NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol .  29 :577 
( 1 )  
Some approaches to fil l ing this gap can be rejected out of hand. The 
sort of "plain l anguage" interpretation that has recently become popular 
in certain c ircles ,  for example, i s  obvious ly  inappropriate here . After al l ,  
the text of the Sherman Act contains n o  territorial l imitations whatever; 
its plain l anguage declares "every contract" in restraint of trade to be 
i l legal .  1 5  U .S .C .  § 1 .  Read l iteral ly ,  this would make U nited States 
law universa l ly  applicable-even to agreements between foreign parties 
with no connection to the United States-a preposterous resul t .  
Of course, Congress could not make United States l aw universally 
appl icable even if  i t  wanted to, because (as in every area) Congress ' s  
power i s  l imited by the Constitution . The most sign i ficant constraint in  
th is  regard i s  probably  the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
though other prov isions might also come into play .  In addition, Con­
gress is further restrained by the wel l -establ ished princip le  that "an act 
of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if 
any other possible construction remains ." Murray v. The Schooner 
Charming Betsy, 6 U .S .  (2 Cranch) 64, 1 1 8 ( 1 804). Whi le  not a binding 
restriction as such, this canon of construction tel l s  us  not to read an Act 
of Congress to exceed the l imits of international l aw unless the legis la­
ture has indicated explic it ly i n  the language of the statute that this i s  
what i t  wants .  
Hence, a second possible construction would be to assume that the 
Sherman Act reaches as far as permitted by the Constitution and in­
ternational l aw (whichever is more restrictive) .  But thi s  is scarcely bet­
ter than interpreting the statute ' s  reach to be universal ,  because the 
l imits imposed by the Constitution and international law are quite mod­
est. See Lea Bri lmu.yer & Charles Norchi ,  Federal Extraterritoriality 
and Fifth A mendment Due Process, 1 05 Harv . L. Rev . 1 2 1 7  ( 1 992); 
Matthias Herdegan, Book Review, 39 Am. 1 .  Comp. L .  207 , 209- 1 0  
( 1 99 1  ) . These l imits are designed to impose only minima l  restraints 
whi le leaving government room to act in a wide variety of potential 
circumstances .  As such, there is no a priori reason to expect such cau­
tious restrictions to serve appropriately  in the context of a particular 
other states only to the mirwnum extent necessary . But inasmuch as a choice-of-law 
regime based on cooperation and reciprocity will advance the interests of every state 
better than one based on shortsighted pursui t  of sel f  in terest, set: Larry Kramer, 
Return of the Rt:nvoi, 66 N.Y .U .  L. Rev. 979, 1 0 1 5-28 ( 1 99 1 ) , the best uni lateral 
regime should c losely resemble the best mult i lateral one. Hence, there is no real 
choice to be made in pragmatic terms. 
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statu te . 
A third possibil ity i s  to use a case-by-case balancing test such as 
that proposed in section 403 of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign 
Relat ions Law of the United States ( 1 986) . 5 This is the practice in anti­
trust cases in the lower courts ,  see, e. g . ,  Mannington Mills, Inc. v. 
Congu!eum Corp. , 595 F.2d 1 287 ,  1 297-98 (3d Cir. 1 979) ;  Timberlane 
Lumber Co. v .  Bank of Am. , 549 F.2d 597 , 608- 1 5  (9th Cir .  1 976), 
where it has been endorsed by the Justice Department. See U.S .  Dept. 
of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations 
( 1 988) .  Indeed, this Court itself adopted such a balancing approach for 
questions of extraterritorial discovery in Societe Nationale Industrielle 
Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S .  522 ( 1 987) .  
Nonetheless, l ike a l l  my col leagues, I think case-by-case balancing is  
a bad idea. It seems attractive enough in concept-what could be better, 
after al l ,  than an approach that enables the court to take al l  relevant 
considerations into account and tailor them to the particular s itua­
tion ?-but balancing of this sort tends not to work very wel l  in prac­
tice. The considerations being weighed are always imprecise enough to 
permit several answers and to dictate none. As a result ,  there is no 
greater certainty about the correctness of particular outcomes- on ly  
more uncertainty about what those outcome;; are l ikely to  be .  When i t  
comes to  choice-of- law, these problems are exacerbated by the  incom­
mensurable nature of the factors being balanced and by the fact that the 
stakes often depend on outcomes in many cases rather than on the 
disposition of any particular case. In the final analysis ,  multi-factored 
balancing l eads to the worst sort of intuitive decisionmaking;  rather than 
being guided by the test, judges simply manipulate the considerations to 
j ustify a result already reached by intuition. This may explain why 
judges l ike this kind of approach, but i t  is a good reason to reject it . 
A fourth approach is the one embraced by this Court in A ramco: a 
presumption that federal statutes appl y  only to conduct in  the United 
States .  Aramco says that such a presumption protects "against unintend­
ed clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could 
result in international discord." Aramco, 1 1 1  S. Ct. at 1 230 (citations 
omitted) .  This may, in fact, sometimes be true-though a territorial pre-
5. The drafters of the Restatement appear to believe thm the "reasonableness" 
requirement  embodied in section 403 ' s balancing test reflects l imits  required by 
i nternational law. If  so, as Justice B URBANK points out, they are about the only 
ones who be l ieve this. The l imits of international law more closely resemble the 
b:1ses ident ified in  section 402 of the Restmement. Section 403 then provides a 
d iscret ionary overlay. a method for exercis ing restraint  within those l imi ts .  
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sumption does nothing about clashes that arise because foreign  nations 
would apply their laws to conduct in the United States . More i mportant, 
even if restricting American law to conduct in the United States does 
avoid some conflicts, it does so in a manner that is often arbitrary, 
since the underlying objectives of many laws are not related to (or 
solely concerned with) where the conduct took place. The arguments 
here shouid already be familiar, for while much of modern confl icts 
theory remains unsettled, if  anything is establ ished, it is that across-the­
board territoria lity is a poor system for resolving confl icts . (Thi s  is a 
point that I ,  l ike many others , have explored elsewhere . )  See Larry 
Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of A merican 
Law, 1 99 1  S up .  Ct. Rev .  1 79, 207- 1 3 ) .  Rather than repeat the argu­
ments here, suffice it to say that A ramco was a mistake-a step back to 
an outmoded j urisprudence that was abandoned long ago, and for good 
reason, in every other area where it  once was used.6 Aramco should be 
overruled; at the very least, its presumption should not be extended. 
(2) 
I prefer to determine the extraterritorial scope of the S herman Act i n  
the same manner a s  I would decide any problem of  statutory construc­
tion-by asking what is the most reasonable interpretation i n  l ight of 
the purposes Congress sought to achieve. Obviously, this cal ls  for an 
exercise of practical j udgment. But Congress left us with a problem, 
and any decision we make wi l l  affect parties acting in the world outside 
the courtroom.  That being so, it would be irresponsible to do less than 
6. The presumption against extraterritorial i ty was part of a 1 9th Century system 
for regulating intersovereign rel ations in  which territorial i ty was thought to define the 
permi ssible scope of authority on a broad range of i ssues. inc luding publ ic and 
private international law, personal j urisdiction, choice of law, and recognit ion of 
judgments. By mid-20th Century ,  the notion that sovereignty is defined exclusively in 
territorial terms had come to be seen as i ncreasingly implausible. In  area after area, 
territoriality was replaced by a broader understanding that n:cognizes other grounds 
for exercising j urisdiction.  These developments were retlected in th is  Court ' s  later 
cases on the extraterritorial applicat ion of federal statutes, none of which rel ied upon, 
or even discussed, a presumption against extraterritorial i ty. See, e.g. , Romero v. Inter­
national Terminal Operating Co. , 358  U .S .  354 ( 1 959) ;  Laurit:.:en v. Larsen, 345 U.S .  
57 1 ( 1 953) ;  Steele v .  Bulova Watch Co. ,  344 U .S .  280 ( 1 952) ;  Vermilya-Brown Co. 
v. Connell, 335  U .S .  377 ( 1 948) .  But  none of these decis ions contained the sort of 
unequivocal declaration needed to Jay the presumption to rest ,  and A ramco thus 
presented the Court with i ts first opportunity in  many years to complete the process 
of modernizat ion .  Instead, the Court ignored these dec is ions (except for Steele, which 
was dist inguished on unpersuasi ve grounds) ,  and sl id back to the 1 9th Century .  
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try to make the best sense we can of the statute. If we are wrong, 
Congress can always clarify its wil l  by overrul ing our decision.7 
The obj ective of the Sherman Act i s  not in  dispute, and the Court i s  
unanimous i n  reading the Act to protect American markets, or ,  more 
accurately perhaps, to ensure a proper level and type of competition 
within those markets. I t  fol lows that the Sherman Act applies to con­
duct that affects competition in United States markets and that this  is 
true, as a prima facie matter at least, regardless of where the conduct i s  
committed or  takes place. I say a s  a prima facie matter, because i t  does 
not fol low that j ust because the Sherman Act applies to conduct that 
affects competition in United States markets that it appl ies to all such 
conduct. The reasons for this are spelled out in Justice S ILBERMAN ' s  
opinion : conduct that affects competition i n  United States markets may 
take place or affect markets in other countries and thus i mplicate for­
eign regu latory interests as well .  
We could, of  course, s imply ignore those i nterests and apply the 
Sherman Act to any conduct that affects our markets (or, to put a s light 
gloss on the rule, apply the Act to conduct that has more than a de 
minimis effect on United States markets) .  This ,  as I understand it ,  i s  the 
position of Justices SCHARF and COX (though Justice SCHARF would 
allow a defense of sovereign compulsion) .  According to them, courts 
are not i nstitutionally equipped to evaluate the interests of foreign na­
tions because they lack the resources and perspective to perform the 
task adequately, and because it is an "inherently pol itical"  function that 
should be left to Congress or the President . 
I would not agree with these propositions even were we talking 
about the sort of open-ended, case-by-case balancing approach that both 
justices seem to presuppose. Courts engage in balancing all the time, 
and have been doing so without causing undue harm in myriad contexts 
for a good many years now (there are other reasons, discussed above, 
for rejecting balancing in this particular context) . Moreover, courts 
routinely decide cases in which they apply foreign law, though misap­
pl ication is as or more l ikely to cause the harms feared by Justices 
SCHARF and COX. Final ly ,  notwithstanding the l ip-service paid to the 
act-of-state doctrine, courts routinely j udge the validity of acts of for-
7 .  Legislative overru l ing is not necessarily easy and certainly i s  not costless: the 
press of other business must be put aside, inertia must be overcome, and private 
interest groups may be able to b lock legislation (for as we know, it is easier to 
block legislation than to enact i t ) .  This is  precisely why we have a responsibi l i ty to 
give statutes their most reasonable i nterpretation rather than avoiding the problem and 
endorsing a solution we know is undesirable. 
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eign governments . See Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal  States: 
Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 Colum. L .  
Rev . 1 907 ( 1 992) . There may be room for a "political question" doc­
trine, and certainly it is important for courts to proceed with caution in 
controversial areas. But the c laim that such considerations are important 
with regard to choice-of-law is an outmoded shibboleth, the product of 
an earlier era when courts  were sti l l  stinging from the effects of 
Lochner and j udges and scholars of the "legal process" school  adopted 
an overly cautious view of their task (best exemplified by the j urispru­
dence of Fel ix Frankfurter or, in choice-of-law, of Brainerd Currie) .  Too 
much time has passed, and we have too much contrary experience, to 
adhere to such quaint notions any longer. 
More important, we are not talking about a process of open-ended 
balancing of United States and foreign interests anyway. We are talking 
about the possibi l i ty of reading a specific l imitation into a particular 
statute i n  order to avoid needless confl icts with the laws of other na­
tions .  I am confident that had Congress addressed this question, i t  
would not  have written the Act i n  a way that totally  ignores foreign 
interests .  Not only would such a step be inconsistent with our recog­
nized obligation to respect the interests of co-equal sovereigns,  it would 
also, ultimately,  undermine United States interests by provoking retalia­
tory action. See supra, at 600. 
That sti l l  leaves the problem of deciding what kind of l imitation to 
impose. Justice SILBERMAN interprets the Sherman Act to apply to 
conduct abroad only if, in addition to affecting United S tates markets, 
the conduct is i l legal in  most foreign countries .8 But this construction i s  
8 .  Even under this test, the Sherman Act would reach the conduct at i ssue here, 
because there is  a consensus in the i ntern ational community that agreements l ike that 
a l leged by the plaint iffs' are i l legal .  See Eleanor Fox , Competit ion Law and the 
Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competit ion and Trade, 4 Pac. Rim.  L. 
& Pol ' y  J .  ( forthcoming 1 995) .  I n  this connection, i t  i s  worth noting that Justice 
S ILBERMAN' s rel iance on the fact that the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts domes­
tic insurers from ant itrust l i ab i l ity in  deference to state regu lation is  misp laced, since 
the conduct a l leged here constitutes a "boycott" that states cannot exempt. See 1 5  
U.S .C .  § 1 1  03(b) .  But I would not make much of the McCarran-Ferguson Act any­
way, because a l lowing states to displace federal antitrust law does not pose the same 
risks to federal objectives. This is so for at least two reasons: First ,  state regulation 
is  a product of the same basic legal culture and hence less l ikely  to d iverge from 
federal goals too much. Second, i f  a state exempts conduct that s ignificantly threatens 
national in terests, Congress can preempt it. Neither of these conditions is true of 
foreign regul ation-which could explain why the McCarran-Ferguson Act was l imi ted 
to states in the first p lace, but which does, in any event, suggest that we proceed 
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both too restrictive and beside the point, because it l imits United S tates 
law in a way that bears no relation to the l ikely strength of either Unit­
ed States or foreign i nterests, and does so based on the practice of na­
tions other than those whose interests are actual ly affected. 
I would read the Sherman Act to apply to conduct abroad i f: (a) the 
conduct has substantial effects on competition in the United States, and 
(b) the conduct is either (i) intended to affect competition in the United 
States or ( i i )  has its primary effects here. I believe that such a test 
would make the Sherman Act applicable in cases where Uni ted States 
interests are strongest relative to those of other nations. This is particu­
larly true because the Sherman Act governs practices that are i ntention­
al, and foreign defendants wi l l  often be able to segregate their act ivity 
to comply with United States law when acting in  United States markets 
without having to forego options avai lable under foreign law when 
acting in non-United States markets.9 
This test obviously does not accommodate United States and foreign 
interests perfectly. To the extent that foreign companies must act differ­
ently when operating i n  United States markets, they wi l l  undoubtedly 
lose some advantages that foreign law might provide. But there i s  no 
perfect accommodation, because these are genuine cont1 icts of interest 
and someone' s interests must necessarily  be subordinated. Nonetheless,  I 
believe that the interpretation proposed here offers the most reasonable 
accommodation-one that applies United States law in cases where 
United States interests are l ikely to be significant and minimizes the 
extent of any interference by requiring foreign companies to modify 
only those practices d irected toward United States markets .  Moreover, i t  
does so by offeri ng a relatively straightforward rule that i s  easy to 
understand and apply and that does not create the kind of confusion and 
uncertainty associated with ad-hoc balancing. 
A final note : the interpretation offered here i s  applicable only to the 
Sherman Act. Unl ike Justice WEINTRAUB , who says that all United 
States laws should be read to apply to "conduct abroad [that] produces 
substantial and foreseeable effects here . . .  ," WEINTRAUB , infra, at 
6 1 6, I have not attempted to articulate a general rule .  My reasoning 
may have force in the context of analogous statutes ,  but i t  i s  crucial to 
examine each l aw on its own terms .  The reason i s  simple, but impor­
tant: because different laws have different purposes, any general pre-
cautiously before extending a simi l ar exemption to foreign nat ions.  
9 .  Even u nder thi s i n terpretation, i t  remains true that the Sherman Act should 
not apply in a part icular case if this would v io late ei ther the Constitution or  i nterna­
t ional  law.  See supra, at.  60 1 .  Such cases should, however, be extraordinari ly rare. 
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scription-whether it be a presumption against extraterritorial i ty or for 
effects-wil l  lead to i nappropriate results .  Nor is  a broad rule needed. 
Each statute governs its own domain,  and while these occasionally 
overlap, we are comfortable interpreting laws independently in every 
other context. We do not, for example, require a single rule to deter­
mine the required mental state or the kind of injury that must  be al­
leged, and I see no reason to treat extraterritorial  scope differently .  The 
interpretive gloss put on each statute should, of course, be as clear as 
possible, but i t  i s  not important that every statute have the same gloss. 
IV. 
Applying thi s  test to the facts alleged here, the plaintiffs have stated 
a valid claim against both sets of defendants . They a llege that Primary 
Insurers and Key Actors entered a conspiracy that was aimed solely and 
exclusively at United States markets and whose anticompetitive effects 
were felt  entirely within the U nited States. U nder such circumstances, it 
i s  hard to understand why U nited States law should not apply .  If the 
defendants stood in England and lobbed explosives into the United 
States ,  we would not hesitate to apply our law to make them pay for 
the injury that resulted-even i f  England made such conduct legal or 
chose not to prosecute it .  That scenario i s  indistinguishable from this 
one except that the injuries al leged here are economic, and surely that 
does not make a difference. 
The j udgment of the court below should be affirmed. 
* * * 
MAIER, J . * : (affirming) I. 
I affirm the decision of the court of appeals. Under the c ircumstanc­
es of this case, the Sherman Act is properly applied to the conduct of 
the London reinsurers . 
I divide this opinion into three parts .  The first distinguishes deci ­
sions about jurisdiction to prescribe in regulatory cases from choice of 
law decis ions in  non-regulatory cases .  The second part describes the 
relationship between the international legal system' s  l imitations on a 
* Harold G. Maier: Professor of L1w and holder of the David Danie ls  A l len 
Distinguished Chair i n  Law, Vanderbi l t  Uni versity School of Law. Professor Maier' s 
research was supported by a summer research grant from Vanderb i l t  Un iversity 
School of Law. 
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nation-state' s  exercise of prescriptive j urisdiction and a United S tates 
court ' s  determination of congress ional i ntent with respect to a statute ' s  
territorial scope. The third section describes the principle of i nternational 
comity and distinguishes those considerations from both the policies that 
inform determinations of domestic legis lative intent and those reflected 
in the jurisdictional l imi tations of customary international law. 
II .  B I LATERAL AND UNILATERAL CHOICE OF LAW DISTINGUISHED 
Determining whether United States regulatory statutes apply to for­
eign-situs conduct requires an analysis  different from that employed in 
ordinary bi lateral choice of law cases. In  bi lateral cases, the court must 
decide whether to apply the local law of a foreign country or that of 
the United States (or some subdivision thereof) in the case at bar. 
In such cases, the forum court identifies legal standards that are 
appropriate guides for its decis ion in the light of the relationships 
among the parties, their conduct, and the bodies politic w ith which 
these elements have contacts .  The forum' s selection i s  guided by its 
own choice of law rules in the l ight of the policies that those rules 
reflect. To the extent that those rules indicate that foreign legal norms 
should govern with respect to a particular i ssue, the court ,  subject to a 
l imited number of exceptions, wil l  apply those foreign rules, rather than 
its own. 
Regulatory cases, on the other hand, usual ly require unilateral choice 
of law deci sions. In those cases, a United States court does not choose 
between the regulatory standards of the United States and those of 
foreign countries to find applicable law . 1  In such cases the substantive 
content of a foreign nation' s  law is irrelevant with respect to the j uris­
dictional i ssue, except to the extent that the existence of foreign inter­
ests might make the appl ication of the forum' s statute unreasonable .2 
Even in that event, if  i t  i s  c lear that Congress intended the statute to 
apply to a case like that at bar, the court has no choice but to apply 
the statutory rule. 3 
Thus ,  i n  unilateral choice of law cases, once judicial j urisdiction is 
1 .  Harold G .  Maier, Resolving Extraterritorial Conflicts, or " There and Back 
Again, " 25 Va. J. In t ' l L. 7, 24 ( 1 984) [here inafter There and Back Again ] ;  Henry J .  
Steiner & Detlev F. Vagts, Transnational Legal Problems 932-34 (2d ed .  1 976) .  
2 .  Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the Uni ted States § 
403( I )-(2) ( 1 986) .  
3 .  Laker v. Belgian, Sabena Airlines, ALI, Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of 
L.1w § 6( I )  and cmt. b ( 1 969);  E l l iot E .  Cheatham & Wil l is  L. M. Reese, Choice of 
Applicohle Law, 52 Colum. L. Rev .  959, 96 1 ( 1 952) .  
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established, the court asks only if the l aw of the forum governs the 
case before it .4 The key question is ,  has the forum decided to exercise 
prescriptive j urisdiction to apply its regulations under the facts of the 
case at bar? If the answer is "yes," the forum court decides the case 
under its own regulatory law . 5 If the answer is  "no," forum law does 
not properly govem and the case is dismissed.6 
The policies supporting this approach are sound. Most modern regu­
latory statutes are so intimately connected with the economic,  social and 
political structures, and policies of the nation that promulgates them that 
their accurate application by a decision maker foreign to the promulgat­
ing state is often extremely difficult, if not outright impossible.7 This 
intimate connection between regulatory norms and society ' s  economic, 
social and political mores, informed the traditional rule that one nation 
4. See Harold G .  Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Inter­
section Berrveen Public and Private International Law, 76 Amer. J. In t ' l L. 280,  290 
( 1 982) [hereinafter Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads] .  
5. This Court has made tentative efforts to develop constitutional l im i tations on 
the exerci se of prescriptive jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause, Home Ins. Co. 
v. Dick, 28 1 U .S .  397 ( 1 930); and the Full Fai th and Credit Clause, First Nat '/ Bank 
of Chicago v. United A irlines, 342 U . S .  396 ( 1 952 ) :  Hughes v. Fetter, 34 1 U.S .  609 
( 1 95 I ) : Bradford Elec. Light v. Clapper, 286 U .S .  1 45 ( 1932), by requiring that a 
forum' s  exercise of prescriptive j urisdict ion be l imited to s i tuations i n  which the 
forum has some minimum reasonable contacts  with the parties o r  the cause of action. 
Such j urisdictional l imitations have never been very strict .  See Ca rrol v.  Lnnz.a, 349 
U .S .  408 ( 1 955) ;  Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm 'n, 306 U.S .  
48-93 ( 1 939) ;  Alaska Packers Assoc. v .  fndustria! Accident Comm 'n of Culifornia,  
294 U.S .  532  ( 1 935 ) .  Such restrictions were e:;scmt ia l ly wiped out i n  Wells v. 
Simonds Abrasive Co. , 345 U.S .  5 1 4 ( 1 95 3 )  with respe.:t to the Ful l  Faith and Credit 
Clause and in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 4.:1-9 U . S .  302 ( 1 98 1  ) ,  with respect to the 
Due Process Clause. See Sun Oil v. Wortman, 486 U . S .  7 1 7  ( 1 988) .  But see Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U .S .  797 ( 1 985) .  For fun her commentary on this 
Court ' s  fai lure to develop l imitations on prescriptive j urisdiction. see H arold G. Maier 
& Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifving Theon· for Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of 
Law, 39 Am. J .  Comp. L .  249, 280-88 ( 1 99 1  ) .  
6 .  Steiner & Vagts, supra, at 932-34. 
7 .  See Maier, supra, There and Back Again, at 289. Cf David Lord Hacking, 
The Increasing Extraterritorial Impact of U.S. Lull's: A Cause for Concern Amongst 
Friends of America, 1 Nw. J. Int '  l L. & Bus .  1 ( l 979) .  Conflicts over regulatory 
policy are especial l y  prevalent with respect to statutes deal ing with restraints of trade. 
For example, the origins of the Sherman Act reflect just as much a desire to protect 
Un ited S tates democracy and free enterprise from interference by private concentra­
tions of economic power as a desire to protect consumers from art ificial l y  high prices 
or shoddy merchandise. See generallv Mark S. Masse ! ,  Competition and Monopoly, 
1 6-20 ( 1 962) .  
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will  not enforce the criminal laws of another. Most of the i nternational 
l imitations on jurisdiction to prescribe were originally derived from 
situations involving the extraterritorial application of cri minal statutes. 8 
This close connection among regulatory rules, general social atti ­
tudes,  and political mores of the body politic whose law they represent 
does not exist with the same intimacy or intensity with respect to most 
ordi nary non-regulatory private law rules.9 See, e.g. , Romero v. Interna­
tional Terminal Operating Co. ,  358  U.S .  354, 384 ( 1 959) ,  rejecting the 
place of injury rule in a Jones Act case in favor of an analysis empha­
sizing recognition of the legitimate interests of foreign nations .  10 There­
fore, any effort by this forum to select between applying our own regu­
lations and those of a foreign state would at best be counter-productive. 
III . CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
Because regulatory legislation reflects direct governmental policy 
interests ,  this Court must be specially cognizant of the public interna­
tional legal l imitations on national authority to assert legislative control 
over activities that take place outside the United States ' s  borders . Con­
sideration of these l imitations is not required because this Court must 
(or even may) give preference to international legal norms over those 
contained in controlling congressional acts .  The Paquette Habana, 1 75 
U.S .  677, 700 ( 1 900) . United States courts must obey a clear command 
of Congress,  even if  that command violates international law. 1 1  But, 
8 .  See Harvard Research in  In ternational Law (Under the Auspices of the Facul­
ty of the Harvard Law School) ,  Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J .  Int ' l  
L .  435,  445 (Supp. 1 935 ) .  
9 .  Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at  a Crossroads, supra, at 3 1 7 . 
1 0. I n  Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S .  57 1 ( 1 953) ,  this Court refused to revtew an 
award made under Danish law to a Danish seaman injured in  Havana Harbor on 
board a ship of Danish registry when it concluded that the Jones Act did not apply 
to grant him an additional remedy. Claims under Danish law were administratively 
determined solely on the fact of i njury and the extent of l iab i l i ty, not with respect to 
the possible negl igence of the defendant  ship owner. !d. at 575-76.  Cf Hellenic 
Lines. Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S .  306 ( 1 970), where this Court applied the Jones Act 
to a m aritime inj ury on board a Greek ship in the port of  New Orleans on the 
grounds that the compensatory policies of the Jones Act were i ntended to apply to 
such a tort. 
I I . See. e.g. , Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World A irlines, 73 1 F.2d 909, 
949 (D .C.  Cir. 1 984). The court stated: 
The desirabi l i ty of applying ambiguous legislation to a part icu lar transaction 
may imply the presence or absence of legi s lat ive i ntent. However, once a 
dec ision is made that the polit ical branches i ntended to rely on a legit imate 
base of prescriptive jurisdiction to regulate activities affecting foreign com-
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absent clear congressional direction to the contrary, this Court wil l  
presume that the political branches i ntended to act within the confines 
of the jurisdictional limits of i nternational law. United States v. A lumi­
num Co. of Am. , 1 48 F.2d 4 1 6, 443 (2d Cir. 1 945) [hereinafter 
Alcoa] . 1 2  See EEOC v. A rabian Am. Oil Co. , 499 U.S .  244, 248-55 
( 1 99 1 ) . 
International legal l imitations on the authority of a nat ion-state to 
apply  its regulatory rules to activities or parties located outside its bor­
ders derive from principles of territorial sovereignty and the relationship 
between those princi pies and a nation state ' s  right to protect its territo­
ry . 1 3  Those principles necessarily  reflect a state ' s  right to p rotect its 
population by prohibiting acts that occur i n  other states when those acts 
have effects within the forum' s territory that the forum s tate reprehends. 
Limitations on a nation' s right to protect itself in  this manner will not 
be presumed. 
In the case of the S.S. "Lotus, " the Permanent Court of I nternational 
Justice wrote : 
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that S tates 
may not extend the application of their laws and the j urisdiction of 
their courts to persons, property and acts outside their  territory, it 
leaves them in this respect a w ide measure of discretion which is only 
l imited in  certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, 
every State remains free to adopt the principles which i t  regards as best 
and most suitable.
1 4 
Those l imitations are found in  customary international law,  evidenced 
by state practice from which community consent to the l imitations can 
be inferred . See Art. 38 (2),  Statute of the I .C.J .  
Under our tripartite federal governmental structure, i t  would be 
highly inappropriate for the judicial branch to place the United S tates in  
violation of its international legal obl igations when such a result had 
merce within the domestic forum,  the desirab i l i ty of the law IS no l onger an 
i ssue for the courts. 
!d. at 949. 
1 2 . In this case, Judge Learned H and sat by designation for the Supreme Court 
of the United S tates because the Court was unable to mount a quorum.  
1 3 . See generally Harold G .  Maier, The Principles of Sovereignty, Sovereign 
Equality, and National Self-Determination, in International Law and International 
Security 24 1 (Paul B. S tephan I I I  & Bori s M. Kl imenko eds . ,  1 99 1 ) . 
1 4. The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk. ) ,  1 927 P .C . I .J .  (ser. A) No. 1 0, at 1 9  (Sept. 7 ) ;  
see North Sea  Continental Shelf, 1 969 I .C . J .  3 ,  44-45 ;  Barcelona Traction Light & 
Power Co. Ltd. , 1 970 I .C.J .  4, 40, 46-47 . 
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not been intended by the political branches who hold direct commis­
sions to regulate and conduct this country ' s  i nternational affairs. A lcoa, 
1 48 F.2d at 443 ; McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de 
Honduras, 372 U.S .  1 0, 2 1  ( 1 957) .  
Furthermore, a j udicial assertion of congressional i ntent to apply a 
United States regulation to extraterritorial events might raise an infer­
ence that the United S tates courts believed that international l aw con­
doned such a result or that the courts had found that Congress had 
disregarded international law entirely .  Such an assertion i n  the context 
of the demand-response-accommodation process that characterizes cus­
tomary in ternational law formation 1 5  would necessaril y  have l aw-creat­
ing effects in the i nternational community that the political branches 
may neither have contemplated, i ntended nor welcomed. See McCulloch, 
372 U.S .  at 2 1  ( 1 963) ;  Benz v. Campania Naviera Hildago, 353  U.S .  
1 38 ( 1 957 ) ;  A lcoa, 1 48 F.2d a t  443 . 
In l ight of the above, cases raising the question of congressional 
intent concerning the appl icabil i ty of United States federal regulatory 
statutes to foreign events or parties are appropriately  divided into three 
categories :  
1 .  Where Congress has made i t  clear that i t  intends the legis lation i n  
question to  apply  to  foreign activities l ike those in the case a t  bar, the 
courts must fol low the congressional command unless to do so would 
be otherwi se unconstitutional under the United States Consti tution. 
2 .  Where Congress has made it c lear that it does not intend the 
regulatory statute to apply to foreign activities l ike those in the case at 
bar, the courts may not apply  the statute and must dismiss the case. 
The courts have no commission to substitute their own views for those 
of the Congress. 1 6 
3 .  Where the language of a regulatory statute i s  so broad that i t  
might encompass activities outside the forum state but there is  no addi ­
tional affirmative evidence that Congress actually  intended to  give i t  
such broad extraterritorial scope, the courts wi l l  presume that the statute 
is intended to apply within the l imitations established by international 
law. 
The Sherman Antitrust Act fall s  into the third category . 1 7 Its broad 
l anguage i s  c learly sufficient to encompass the activities of the London­
based insurance companies in this case. 1 8 Thus, we must now deter-
1 5 . See Myers McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International unv 
of the Sea, 49 Am. J. I n t ' l  L .  356, 357 ( 1 955) .  
1 6 . See, e.g. , United States v .  Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996. 1 002 (5 th Cir .  1 977 ) .  
1 7 . See Alcoa, 1 48 F .2d a t  443 (2d Cir. 1 945 )  (Hand, J . ) .  
1 8 . The  Sherman Act  prohibits "every contract, combinat ion . . or consp1racy, 
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mine whether the Sherman Act is  properly appl ied to the actiVIties of 
the British reinsurance companies carried out principally in England. 
Sections 40 1 through 403 and section 4 1 5  of the American Law 
Institute ' s  Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States ( 1 986),  provide a useful analytical framework under which 
the case at bar is properly j udged. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 
1 1 3 S .  Ct. 289 1 ( 1 993) .  Here, the question is whether the standards of 
the Sherman Act properly apply to test the validity of the actions by 
British i nsurers who are alleged to have used their combi ned economic 
power to wring concessions from American insurance firms doing busi­
ness i n  the United States. 
Under section 402( 1 )(c) ,  a nation may prescribe rules of law to 
regulate "conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have 
substantial effect within its territory ."  !d. Under section 403 ( 1 ) , even a 
j urisdiction that meets the test of section 402 may not be exerci sed if  
such exercise would be otherwise unreasonable i n  light of a series of 
factors contained in section 403(2) . 
Taken together, these two provisions make ultimate good sense. 
Lacking any true central enforcement mechanism, the i nternational legal 
system necessari ly  depends upon i ts abi lity to reflect the long-term self­
interests of the nations that are its component parts .  International com­
munity recognition that a given course of conduct adversely  affects the 
welfare of community members necessari ly supports the existence of a 
rule of law prohibiting such conduct. Customary international law i s  
necessarily evidenced, in  part, by  s tate practice from which community 
consent can be i nferred. 1 9 
I t  can safely be presumed that, despite the apparent validity of a 
given state action under one accepted standard of international law, that 
action would be prohibited if it were carried out in an unreasonable 
manner. That is the message of sections 403( 1 )  and 403 (2) of the Re­
statement (Third) .  Put another way, no action can be legal under con­
sensual community standards when that action is determined, in a par­
ticular case, to be unreasonable under those same community stan­
dards .20 
i n  restraint of trade . . . among the several states, or with foreign nat ions .  . . ." I S  
U .S .C .  § I ( 1 988) .  Read l i teral ly ,  this language would prohibi t  any such agreements 
anywhere in  the world as long as each had some minimal effect on Uni ted States 
international trade. 
1 9 . See Art. 38(2), Statute of the I .C .J .  
20. See Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdicrion ar a Crossroads, supra, at 30 1 .  Cf 
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This reasonableness test i s  not comparative ;  i t  i s ,  i n  a sense, abso­
lute. In other words ,  the acts or assertions of more than one nation may 
meet the test of reasonableness on the same facts .  See Laker A irways v. 
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 73 1 F.2d 909, 952 n . 1 69 (D.C.  Cir. 
1 984) . � 1  When this is  so, concurrent jurisdiction exists . In the event 
that two or more states having such concurrent jurisdiction prescribe 
confl icti ng courses of conduct, the state having the lesser interests 
should, but need not, defer to the other if the latter' s i nterest is clearly 
greater. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States § 403(3)  ( 1 986) . 22 
Section 403(3) does not purport to be a legal requirement and Unit­
ed States courts have not treated it as such. It i s ,  rather, a policy guide 
to decision. The subsection embodies the principle of international comi­
ty: that a nation will give that effect to the laws of other nations that it 
would have them give to its own in the same or similar circumstanc­
es .23 That comity princ iple reflects the wise counsel of Mr. Justice Rob­
ert Jackson when in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S .  57 1 ( 1 953) ,  he 
wrote: 
[ I ]n deal ing with international commerce we cannot be unmindful of 
the necessity for mutual forbearance if retal i at ions are to be avoided; 
nor should we forget that any contact which we hold sufficient to war­
rant appl ication of our law to a foreign transaction wi l l  logical ly be as 
strong a warrant for a fore ign country to apply its law to an American 
trans action. 
!d. at 5 82 .  
This "enl ightened self-interest" principle of reciprocal expectation i s  a 
fundamental guide to determin ing the reach of United States antitrust 
laws (and other statutes) in transnational regulatory cases. 24 
In  l ight of the principles above, the results in the case at bar present 
l ittle difficulty. The alleged conspiracy between Key Actors and Primary 
Myres S .  McDougal, et a l . ,  Law and Public Order in Space 748 ( 1 963) .  
2 1 .  Accord Letter from Judge Malcolm Wi lkey to Professor Loui s  Henkin, Chief 
Reporter to the Restatement (Third )  of  the Fore ign Relations Law of the United 
States. explaining the Laker case, in Maier, " There and Back Again, " supra , at 43-
48 .  
22 .  For a review of th is  section ' s  draft ing history and a discussion of i ts  conver­
sion from one of mandatory intent to one of hortatory i ntent, see Harold G. Maier, 
83 Am. J. Int ' l L. 676, 678 ( 1 989) (reviewing The ExrrarerriTOrial Application of Na­
tional Lmvs (Dieter Lange & Gary Born eds. ,  1 987) ) .  
23 .  Harold G .  Maier, Remarks, lnrernatiuna/ Comiry and U.S. Federal Common 
Law, 1 990 Proc. Am. Soc . In t '  l L. 339, 340. 
24. Karl M. Meessen, A n titrusT Jurisdicrion Under Cusromarv !nrenwrional Law, 
78 Am. J. In t ' l L. 783, 800 ( 1 984j .  
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Insurers i s  c learly intended to have sufficient  effect within the territory 
of the U nited States to meet the requirements of section 402 . If such an 
effect is intended, the burden of proof shifts to the parties charged to 
demonstrate that no such effect has in fact occurred. See A lcoa, 1 48 
F.2d at 4 1 6 .25 
In l ight of the additional considerations noted in  section 403(2) ,  the 
appl ication of the Sherman Act to thi s  alleged contract is not unreason­
able. Both the U nited States and the U nited Kingdom have a legitimate 
basis for applying their domestic regulations .  The nationality principle 
of section 402 confers j urisdiction on Great Britain to prescribe rules 
governing the conduct of its own nationals .  Furthermore, the agreement 
in question wil l  have some effects in  British territory as well as in the 
United States .  Given these c ircumstances ,  and contrary to the conclusion 
reached by my brother WEINTRAUB, I do not find i t  unreasonable 
under the standards in  section 403 (2) for the B rit ish to exercise j urisdic­
tion to prescribe.  
But  the facts in  the case at bar do not reveal that Great B ritain has,  
in  fact ,  promulgated any confl icting legi s lation that would be appl icable 
in thi s  case. The mere absence of legislation is not an exercise of con­
flicting concurrent j urisdiction l ike that described in section 403(3 ) .  
Consequently ,  the principle of reciprocal regard, generally  called the 
principle of comity, embodied in section 403(3) ,  does not indicate the 
need for United States courts even to consider refusing to apply the 
Sherman Act to the facts of the case at bar. Absent such a confl ict ,  the 
l iteral language of the Sherman Act c learly encompasses thi s case.  
I affirm the court of appeals .  
* * * 
WEINTRAUB , J . * : (affi rming) 
Affirmed. The Sherman Act should apply to the actions of the Lon­
don reinsurers . Before deciding to apply U nited States law to conduct 
abroad that causes effects in the United States ,  the Restatement (Third) 
25 .  Judge Learned Hand, s i t t ing by designation for the United States S upreme 
Court who could not muster a quorum .  
* Russel l J .  Weintraub: Professor of  Law and  holder of the John B .  Connal ly 
Chair  in  Civi l  Jurisprudence, University of Texas at Austin School of La 'A .  Author of 
Commentmy on the Conjlict of Lmvs (3d ed. 1 986 with 1 99 1  supp . ) ;  International 
Litigation and Arbitration ( 1 994 ). 
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of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 403 (2) ( 1 986), 
counsels a delicate weighing of at least eight factors , i ncluding a com­
parison of the United States ' s  interest in forbidding the activity and the 
interest of the foreign country in permitting the activ ity. I do not agree. 
The concerns stated in  section 403 are the stuff of diplomatic negotia­
tions or the wise exercise of di scretion by the Department of Justice i n  
deciding whether to prosecute. The section 403 l i st i s  too amorphous 
and multidi rectional for a court to apply cogently to resolve l itigation. 
The problem of extraterritorial  application of Uni ted States public 
law is better approached by a presumption that our law applies whenev­
er conduct abroad produces substantial and foreseeable effects here that 
it is the purpose of our law to avoid .  The presumption would be rebut­
ted when the effects here are s l ight when compared with the reasonable 
interest of the foreign country in permitting the conduct centered there. 
An example would be Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A . , 
87 1 F .2d 252 (2d Cir .) ,  modified, 890 F .2d 569 (2d Cir . ) ,  cert. denied, 
492 U .S .  939 ( 1 989), in which the Second Circuit, I suggest unwisely, 
enjoined worldwide a tender offer even though only 2.5 percent of the 
target company ' s  shareholders were Americans .  
This presumption, in  favor of application of United States public law 
when effects are foreseeably caused here by conduct abroad, i s  a better 
approach than an attempt to "balance" i rreconcilable sovereign i nterests. 
The presumption produces results that are more predictable and, in the 
end, less insulting to friendly foreign countries . Even a nodding ac­
quaintance with reality indicates that United States law wi l l  be applied 
under the "weighing" test whenever i t  would be applied under the pre­
sumption. At least, however, the presumption does not say to the for­
eign country, "our interests are greater than yours . "  
If, as  seems l ikely, the section 403(2) factors are intended as  a 
statement of considerations that would rebut a presumption in  favor of 
apply ing our public law to actions abroad that foreseeably cause sub­
stantial effects here, I do not find the section 403 list as he! pful as the 
simpler test stated above. Section 403 attempts to span the gap between 
choice of the most reasonably applicable law and unilateral determi­
nation of the territorial reach of forum law. It fai ls .  
Even i f  a court were to indulge in  appl ication of the Restatement ' s  
multi-factor test, appl ication of the Sherman Act i s  justified o n  these 
facts. Section 4 1 5  applies the reasonableness test of section 403(2) to 
the specifi c  topic of antitrust law. Under section 4 1 5(2) ,  conduct outside 
the United States is subject to our law "if a princ ipal purpose of the 
conduct or agreement is to interfere with the commerce of the United 
States, and the agreement or conduct has some effect on that com-
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merce." !d. "Some effect" would be an understatement on the facts of 
this case. Comment (a) to section 4 1 5  states that " [a]ny exercise of 
jurisdiction under this section is subject to the requirement of reason­
ableness ." !d. That requirement is also met. 
Justice Souter ' s  opinion under the remarkably similar c ircumstances 
of Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 1 1 3 S. Ct. 289 1 ( 1 993) ,  has 
been condemned for requiring a "sovereign compulsion" defense as a 
condition precedent to applying the comity analysis of section 403(2) . 
This i s  a possible meaning of a cryptic passage in his opinion.  I think 
i t  more reasonable, however, to credit Justice Souter with being able to 
read section 403, which he cites, and as saying that under any form of 
comity analysis ,  the facts of Hartford Fire justified application of the 
Sherman Act, the only possible defense was that the defendants were 
required by the United Kingdom to act as they did, and there w as no 
evidence of compulsion. Although in our case the acts with in the Unit­
ed States that were present in Hartford Fire are absent, I would echo 
the sentiments that I have attributed to Justice Souter. Even if  I were to 
apply  a comity analysis ,  the effects intentionally caused here are beyond 
the pale of what any self-respecting sovereign would permit  without 
c laiming the right to impose the sanctions of its law. 
It  is unlikely that the test I propose would produce different results 
from the purely unilateral approach of Justice SCHARF. The reason that 
I prefer a presumption in favor of applying our public law and do not 
say that this presumption can never be rebutted, is that "never" is a 
long time. Justice SILBERMAN notes that the English authorities regu­
late the activity of the English insurers and suggests that we should 
defer to them, just as the McCarron-Ferguson Act defers to state regula­
tion of insurance. 1 5  U .S .C .  § 1 0 1 2(a) ( 1 988)  (subject to an exception 
for "boycott, coercion, or intimidation," id. at § 1 0 1 3 (b ) ) .  The 
McCarron-Ferguson Act' s exception of the business of insurance i s  
based on the belief that state regulation wi l l  adequately protect the 
public from anticompetitive insurance practices. 1 5  U .S .C .  § 1 0  1 2(b) 
( 1 988 ) .  English regulation does not provide thi s  protection i f, as the 
English insurers contended, their conduct was privi leged under English 
law. Hartford Fire, 1 1 3 S. Ct. at 29 1 0. 
* * * 
SCHARF, J .  * : (concurring i n  the judgment) 
* M ichael P. Scharf: Assistant Professor of Law, New England School of Law; 
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I concur i n  the j udgment of the maJonty, but write separately be­
cause I do not agree with the comparative i nterest balancing analysis 
embraced to varying degrees by some of my colleagues, most notably 
Justices MAIER and WEINTRAUB . 
For two decades now, the extraterritorial appl ication of United States 
law has purportedly been governed by a comparative-interest balancing 
test. Under this test, a United S tates court i s  to determine whether the 
application of United States law to persons and conduct abroad is ap­
propriate by balanc ing several factors, inc luding the competing interests 
of the foreign State i nvolved, the nationality of the parties, and the 
degree to which there is an actual confl ict with foreign law or policy . 
See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. , 595 F.2d 1 287 (3rd 
Cir .  1 979) ;  Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. , 549 F.2d 597 (9th 
Cir. 1 976) ; Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States § 40 ( 1 965) ;  Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States § 403 ( 1 986) .  The Supreme Court specifically 
endorsed the comparative i nterest balancing approach of the Restatement 
(Third) in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States 
Dist. Court, 482 U .S .  522 ( 1 987) . 
Application of comparative-interest balancing by the lower courts, 
however, has resulted in confused, ad hoc decision making. See Michael 
P. Scharf, Beyond the Rhetoric of Comparative Interest Balancing, 50 
Law & Contemp. Probs .  95 ,  1 0 1  ( 1 987) .  In  opposing the Court ' s sup­
port of the Restatement ' s  comparative-interest balancing formula in  
Aerospatiale, Justice Blackmun stated, " I  dissent . . .  because I cannot 
endorse the Court ' s  case-by-case inquiry . . .  and its fai lure to provide 
lower courts with any meaningfu l  guidance for carrying out that inqui­
ry ."  A erospatiale, 482 U .S .  at 548. In addition to the problem of vague­
ness, there are several other difficulties inherent in the comparative­
interest balancing approach, namely :  ( 1 )  domestic courts lack the institu­
tional resources and expertise to assess and evaluate the substantive 
pol icies or interests of foreign states ; (2) domestic courts are incapable 
of s i tting as international tribunals and evenhandedly balancing foreign 
and domestic interests ;  (3) the balancing of disparate interests of two 
J .D . ,  Duke University School of Law. From 1 989 to 1 993,  Professor Scharf served as 
Attorney-Adviser i n  the Office of the Legal Adviser, Uni ted S tates Department of 
State. In  that capac ity, he partic ipated in negotiations for a Mutual  Legal Assistance 
Treaty between the United States and Uni ted Kingdom as a means of address ing 
United Kingdom concerns about the un i l ateral extraterritoria l  appl icat ion o f  United 
States laws. 
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For this reason, i t  has long been recognized that the S herman Act ap­
plies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact 
produce some substantial effect i n  the United States.  See Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp . ,  475 U.S .  574, 582 n .6  ( 1 986);  
United States v .  Aluminum Co. of Am. , 1 48 F.2d 4 1 6  (2d Cir .  1 945) .  
Comparative-interest balancing was added to this "effects test" under 
the theory that Congress would not have intended for the Sherman Act 
to apply extraterritorially where the United States interest in the Act ' s  
extraterri torial application i s  outweighed by  a foreign S tate ' s  i nterest 
against its extraterritorial application. In l ight of the defic iencies inher­
ent in comparative-interest balancing, a better approach would be for 
courts simply to undertake a unilateral assessment of the strength of the 
United S tates interest in the extraterritorial application of its law. In 
antitrust cases, United States inLerests of a constitutional magnitude are 
implicated. Such cases "are as important to the preservation of our free 
enterprise system as the Bi l l  of Rights i s  to the protection of our funda­
mental personal freedoms." In re Uranium Antitrust Litig . ,  480 F. Supp. 
1 1 38 ,  1 1 54 (N.D. I l l .  1 979). Therefore, the United States i nterest would 
be sufficient in any antitrust case such as the case at bar in  which the 
foreign conduct produces a substantial and foreseeable effect in the 
United States .  No balancing of foreign i nterests would be required. 
This would not, however, foreclose foreign defendants from asserting 
the defense of foreign sovereign compulsion when their conduct abroad 
which contravenes United States l aw is compelled by a foreign sover­
eign. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United S tates § 44 1 ( 1 986). Under the United States Department of 
Justice, Anti trust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations 33 
( 1 988) ,  the government has announced that i t  "wil l  not prosecute 
anticompetitive conduct that has been compelled by a foreign sover­
eign." !d. Courts should correspondingly recognize the defense of for­
eign sovereign compulsion in cases brought by private parties.  Recog­
nizing such a defense does not require comparative-interest balancing, 
but rather merely a finding that: ( l )  there is an actual conflict between 
the law of the State in which the defendant is located and United States 
law, (2) the defendant did not in bad faith court the foreign legal im­
pediments in order to avoid compl iance with United States law, and (3)  
the defendant would be subject to severe penalties if  forced to act in  
contravention of the local law.  This defense would  not be avai lable in  
the case at bar since the United Kingdom has not promulgated any con­
flicting legis lation that would impose a penalty on defendants if  they 
acted in compliance with the Sherman Act. By focusing on whether 
there exists a "true conflict," the Court in Hartford Fire in effect con-
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States i s  an i nherently political , rather than j udicial, function, and 
therefore contravenes the principles underlying the pol it ical question 
doctrine as enumerated in Baker v. Carr, 369 U .S .  1 86 ( 1 962);  and (4) 
the comparative-interest balancing approach has not furthered the i nter­
ests of international comity since, in the vast majority of cases, U nited 
States courts refuse to defer to foreign interests .  
Perhaps i n  recognition of these deficiencies, Justice WEINTRAUB in 
this case, and the majority in the recent case of Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 
v. California, 1 1 3 S .  Ct. 289 1 ( 1 993) ,  each depart to some extent from 
the traditional formulations of the comparative-interest balancing test. 
Justice WEINTRAUB advocates an alternative test whereby courts 
would apply a presumption that United States law applies abroad when 
foreign conduct produces a substantial and foreseeable effect  i n  the 
United States which can be rebutted by a finding that the effects are 
slight compared with the reasonable interest of the foreign country i n  
permitting the conduct. Under Justice WEINTRAUB ' s  appmach, howev­
er, a court would still find itself in the troublesome position of having 
to assess the i nterests of a foreign State and weigh those interests 
against the interests of the United States .  
The Court i n  Hartford Fire modifies the traditional comparative­
interest balancing formulation by changing the "degree of conflict with 
foreign law or policy" from one factor among many to be considered 
which must be established before a court may consider the competing 
interests of the foreign state. !d. While the holding in Hartford Fire 
will effectively reduce the number of cases in which courts have to 
balance foreign interests , comparative-interest balancing wi l l  st i l l  be nec­
essary whenever there is a "true contlict ." 
These approaches amount to no more than tinkering on the margins 
when what i s  needed is  the imposition of a new conceptual framework 
with guiding rules. It i s  time we reject comparat ive-interest balancing 
altogether as a bankrupt method of determining the extraterritorial appli­
cation of United States law. 
Ultimately , the question is  whether Congress intended the particular 
statute i n  question to have extraterritorial effect. If the statute i s  ::.;ilent 
as to its extraterritorial reach, congressional i ntent to apply the statute 
extraterritoria l ly  can nevertheless be inferred by the statute ' s  legislative 
history or the statutory scheme. In this regard, a narrow construction of 
the Sherman Act would frustrate the Act ' s purpose by allowing persons 
engaged in anticompetitive activities directed at the United States to 
escape the Act ' s bite simply by locating their operations abroad. Cf 
United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1 506, 1 5 1 7  (S .D .  Fla .  1 990) . 
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fuses this defense with the doctrine of comity . 
Under the uni lateral interest analysis approach advocated m this 
opinion, the court of appeals decis ion i s  affirmed. 
* * * 
SILBERMAN, J . * : (dissenting) 
Reversed. I write separately  in d issent because I believe my col­
leagues have fai led to provide the appropriate principles and guidance 
for deciding choice of l aw i ssues in "public"/"regulatory" transnational 
cases . The majority-with a mix of rationales-has once again advanced 
American regulatory policies without due consideration of competing 
interests of other nations in the context of the international and world 
market of insurance. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 1 1 3 S .  
Ct. 289 1 ( 1 993) .  
Justices WEINTRAUB ,  MAIER, BURBANK, and SCHARF-to 
varying degrees-all adopt a uni lateral choice of law approach to the 
issue of the extraterritoria l  appl ication of the American antitrust laws.  In 
effect, their inquiry goes only so far as to determine whether or not 
American interests are furthered by the application of the S herman Act 
in  this case; i f  the answer to that question i s  "yes," no further interest 
balancing or weighing of the competing interests of other nations is re-
. d I qUire . 
Justice MAIER, in  particular ,  has a lengthy explanation about why 
the comparative-interest and balancing approaches of traditional choice 
of law methodology-used to decide both domestic and international 
private bilateral cases-is inappropriate in resolving regulatory transna­
tional cases, such as the instant matter. 
I disagree with that basic premise. Formal categorizations of public 
and private l aw have begun to blur, and even i f  there i s  yet no unified 
field, domestic confl ict  of laws principles have much to offer i n  think­
ing about legislative jurisdiction in the transnational area. Professor 
Andreas Lowenfeld, the archi tect of the general sections on legi s lative 
j urisdiction ( § §  40 1 -403) in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rela­
tions Law of the United States ( 1 986), has made precisely this argu-
* Linda J .  S i lberman: Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; 
B .A .  University of  Michigan, 1 965 ; J .D .  University of M ichigan, 1 968 .  
1 .  The majority does appear to accept_ the long-standing principle that  Congress 
did not i ntend extraterritorial application of a law when such application would 
violate in ternational law. 
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ment. In his  1 979 Hague Lectures, Public Law in the International 
Arena: Conflict of Laws, International Law, and Some Suggestions for 
Their Interaction, 1 63 Recuei l  des Cours 3 1 1 ( 1 979-II), Professor 
Lowenfeld urged a confl ict of laws approach of interest balancing to de­
cide transnational cases when more than one state has an i nterest in  
having its law applied. The Restatement (Third) of  the  Foreign Rela­
tions Laws of the United States ( 1 986), building upon prior j udicial 
decisions, see Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. , 549 F.2d 597 
(9th Cir. 1 976) ;  Mannington Mills, Inc. v.  Congoleum Corp. , 595 F.2d 
1 287 (3d Cir. 1 979), reflects just such a methodology. Section 402 
identifies the relevant bases for jurisdiction to prescribe; section 403( 1 )  
imposes a standard of reasonableness upon such prescriptive j urisdiction 
and section 403(2) sets forth a number of factors for assessing whether 
regulation under the circumstances is reasonable, taking into account the 
interests of other states ;  and section 403(3)  urges a principle of defer­
ence when another state has a greater interest. 
Though I endorse the underlying phi losophy of the Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations-that the United States should exercise its 
legislative jurisdiction in moderation with an eye toward the interests of 
other states-the Restatement ' s somewhat overlapping provisions and its 
failure to offer more precise guidel ines has led to some basic misunder­
standings. See Hartford Fire, 1 1 3 S .  Ct. at 289 1 .  Moreover, as Justice 
WEINTRAUB writes, the list of factors i s  "too amorphous and mul­
tidirectional" to guide courts m making a particular decision . 
WEINTRAUB , supra, at 6 1 6. 
To some degree, I share these criticisms of the Restatement (Thirct ) .  
The rule of "reasonableness" to which the Restatement consistently 
looks, has been a muddled and confusing principle in other areas where 
it has been tried, such as adjudicatory juri sdiction, see Asahi Metal 
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U .S .  1 02 ( 1 987), and discovery under 
the Hague Evidence Convention , see Societe Nationale Industrielle 
Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U .S .  522 ( 1 987) .  I do 
not believe it offers any greater util ity for resolving confl icts of legi sla­
tive jurisdiction. 
The solution, however, is not to throw out the baby with the 
bathwater. Rather, courts-as they have done in  resolving other types of 
"true conflicts" in  the domestic context-should attempt to formulate 
principles of preference for resolving important clashes of policy. Cf 
David Cavers, The Choice of Law Process 1 20-38 ( 1 965) .  Both the 
United States and the United Kingdom have important policies at stake 
in the instant case. The agreement between Primary Insurers and Key 
Actors has a direct impact upon the United States insurance market and 
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the purposes underlying the United States antitrust laws is furthered by 
their application to these English defendants .  However, there is no justi­
fication for the United States to pursue its interest "Currie- l ike"2 with­
out attention to the legitimate concerns of other p layers in the i nterna­
tional community . The British regulatory scheme-largely a system of 
self regulation but with superintendence-was designed to assure sol­
vency and thus the rel iability and security of the London reinsurance 
market. 3 Certainly those pol icies, whether or not they should  ult imately 
trump, are enti tled to serious consideration in any deci sion about the 
reach of the American antitrust laws. Indeed, it is i nteresting that the 
Sherman Act exempts domestic insurers from federal antitrust  regulation 
to the extent that insurance is  regulated by state law, see McCarran­
Ferguson Act, 1 5  U.S .C.  § 1 0 1 2  ( 1 988 ), and yet my colleagues in the 
majority pay l ittle attention to the British regulatory scheme in deter­
mining the reach of the Act. 
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, correctly understood, 
provides a start for deciding the instant case. As Justice Souter points 
out in  Hartford Fire, the conduct of the defendants does have a sub­
stantial impact on the avai labil i ty of American purchasers to obtain 
certain types of insurance in the United States ,  thus implicating Ameri­
can regulatory i nterests . B ut the conflict w ith the British regulatory 
scheme and framework cannot be dismissed. In Hartford Fire, Justice 
Scalia took account of the British regulatory interests and concluded 
that appl ication of the American antitrust laws would be "unreasonable" 
under section 403(2) of the Restatement. Justice Souter acknowledged 
the British interests but rejected the need to weigh the competing inter­
ests in the absence of clear "compulsion," i. e. , the situation w here the 
l aw of one state directly requires that which is prohibited in another. 
Justice Souter, it appears , misconstrued the broad interest balancing 
envisioned by the Restatement (Third) and prior cases . See Andreas F.  
Lowenfeld, Conflict, Balancing of Interests, and the Exercise of Juris­
diction to Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 
Am. J .  Int' l L. 42 ( 1 995) ;  see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Liti­
gation and the Quest for Reasonableness (Hague Academy General  
2 .  See Brainerd Currie, Notes on  Methods and Objectives in  the Conflict of 
Laws, in Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws 1 77 ,  1 84 ( 1 963) ("I f  the coun 
finds that the forum state has an i nterest in the appl ication of its pol icy, it should 
apply the Jaw of the forum . . . .  ") .  
3 .  For a descri ption o f  the rise and fall o f  Lloyd ' s, see Adam Raphae l ,  Ultimote 
Risk ( 1 994). 
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Course on Private International Law), 245 Recueil des Cours 49-58 
( 1 994-1) .  Perhaps Justice Scalia, too, went awry in another direction by 
fai l ing to acknowledge two "reasonable" but conflicting c lashes of poli­
cy in Hartford Fire, and thereby avoided any interpretation of section 
403(3) .  
But  i t  i s  under section 403 (3) of the Restatement where courts 
should identify principles of preference-or principles of deference as 
they might be referred to in the international context-for resolving 
transnational confl icts of jurisdiction to prescribe. Territorial and rela­
tional tie-breakers, such as those advocated by Professor David Cavers, 
see Cavers, supra, at 1 20-3 8, may be more difficult to arrive at than i n  
domestic cases. However, a similar approach identifying particular crite­
ria can also help to resolve true transnational legislative confl icts . First, 
the strength of the competing policies can be evaluated within the 
framework of the international community. In the present case, the need 
for uniformity in the international insurance market is critical, and given 
the absence of any international consensus about the i l legality of the ar­
rangements, the regulatory norms at the location of the market-here, 
England-should trump. Second, the detai l with which the regulatory 
pol icy is crafted may be evidence of how strongly particular state in­
terests are being pursued . The history of Parliament' s superintendence of 
the regulatory framework applicable to the Lloyd' s insurance market, 
and the Department of Trade and Industry ' s  authority over the i nsurance 
industry appears to be a more detai led scheme of regulation than 
Congress ' s  more general antitrust legislation, particularly when Congress 
has expressed no intention of an extraterritorial reach and the statute 
offers exemptions when alternative regulatory mechanisms are in effect. 
Final ly ,  territorial principles may sti l l  play a role, and it may be j ustifi­
able to view the instant transactions as involving American i nsurers 
bringing their product-primary insurance-to the reinsurance market i n  
London . 
Application of the above criteria point to the application of United 
Kingdom and not American law to the English defendants in this ac­
tion. Therefore, I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals .  

Case Three: Personal Jurisdiction 
INTRODUCTION* 
I t  i s  a tenet of modern i nterpretive theory that the cases at the mar­
gins tel l  you a great deal about the core. 1 The personal j urisdiction 
hypothetical ,  in thi s  regard, would make Jacques Derrida very happy , 
i ndeed. Like a well-crafted final exam, the case finds al l  of the major 
seams in  current jurisdictional doctrine: what constitutes specific j uris­
diction? ;  is a stream of commerce theory st i l l  v iable?;  how much con­
tact is required for general j urisdiction?; may contacts with other states 
be considered in evaluating j urisdiction over a foreign defendant? 
The problem ' s  effect on the paneli sts resembles the "Unrecoverable 
System Error - Division by Zero" message that my computer seems to 
generate whenever I try to load some new Windows application.2 While 
the panelists are unanimous in  finding personal j urisdiction on the facts 
presented, all of the opinions but two3 find the need to overrule,  or at 
least l imit, cases at the very core of modern doctrine in order to get 
there. Cumulatively, it seems the panelists would overrule :  International 
Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S .  3 1 0  ( 1 945) ;4 World-Wide Volkswagen v. 
Woodson , 444 U.S .  286 ( 1 980) ;5 Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S .  
604 ( 1 990) ;6 and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U .S .  1 86 ( 1 977) . 7 Indeed, i t  
* Allan R .  Stein: Professor o f  Law, Rutgers School o f  Law-Camden.  
I .  See J .  M .  Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U .  L .  Rev . 275 ( 1 989). 
2 .  For those not having the pleasure of working with Windows, this message, or 
some variant on it ,  means that your computer is not working the way it is supposed 
to, and you probabl y  have just lost the last five pages of work that you spent the 
previous day working on. 
3 .  Onl y  Professors B RUSSACK and MULLENIX find the resolution of the hy­
pothetical u nder existing doctrine relatively comfortable. While Professor 
S ILBERMAN does not expl ici t ly cal l for the reversal of any case, her suggestion for 
legislat ive reform would  be at tension with much of existing doctrine. See 
S ILBERMAN, infra, at 66 1 .  
4. Professor BORCHERS . 
5 .  Professors WEINTRAUB and COX. 
6. Professor MAIER. 
7 .  Professor COX, ( in suggesting that whenever court could apply its own law i t  
may constitutionally  assert jurisdiction) .  
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would be hard to identify any major j urisdictional pronouncement by 
the Supreme Court that would not be undermined by at least one of the 
opinions here. Such a striking pattern should lead all but the most stoi­
cally anti-theoretical observer to ask: what gives, Jacques? 
The answer may simply be that swashbuckling law professors would 
not be content to simply apply  the law as they find it .  Some dramatic 
flair, l ike ovenul ing a major precedent, is de rigueur. (It is remarkable  
how even imaginary power can go to  people' s  heads?) There i s  surely, 
as Professor MULLENIX implies,  some of that going on here. 
Such an account, I think, would be i ncomplete. I want to suggest 
that the panelists' reaction is symptomatic not of a character trait, but 
of a pathology in the law itself. The intriguing questions raised by the 
hypothetical cannot be resolved by extrapolating existing doctrine be­
cause existing doctrine fai l s  to provide a convincing answer to a fun­
damental question : what justifies the assertion of personal j urisdiction 
over a defendant? The responses of the panelists all, in different ways,  
attempt to provide an answer to that question. Without such an answer, 
the questions raised cannot be resolved. 
A. B ACKGROUND 
In this hypothetical , plaintiffs are suing over the death of Innocent 
Victim, who was kil led in an automobile accident allegedly caused by 
defective brake parts manufactured by defendant Brake-0 Corporation i n  
South Korea. Innocent Victim, a citizen of  State Y ,  was kil led i n  State 
Y when the anti- lock brakes on another car, a "Fishfin ,"  allegedly 
failed, causing the accident. 
Brake-0 is a South Korean corporation. Approximately  30% of its 
revenues are derived from the sale of its products in the United States .  
Unlike the defendant i s  Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 
U.S .  1 02 ( 1 987) ,  Brake-0 does have a presence in State Y .  However, 
that presence is not directly related to the product al leged to have 
caused the accident. The Brake-0 personnel located in State Y distribute 
"Brakeman" replacement brake pads. State Y is  a major market for 
those pads . There is  no allegation that the brake pads contributed to the 
accident. As far as we know, this is the only product that B rake-0 
retai ls in the United States. Its other sales are as component parts . H 
8. The facts are ambiguous as to how the component parts find their way to the 
United States .  While 30% of Brake-O's  revenues are said to derive from sales in  the 
United States, i t  i s  unclear whether B rake-0 actual ly ships the bulk of  i ts  products 
directly into the United States, or whether they are purchased abroad and imported 
by a United States manufacturer, as apparently happened to the brake components 
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The brake parts at issue here were sold F.O .B .  South Korea to 
Suregrip, a manufacturer of brakes. The brakes were assembled else­
where in  the United States, and then sold to Fishfin,  also presumably an 
American manufacturer. Brake-0 knew that many of its parts would end 
up as Suregrip brakes in Fishfins ,  large numbers of which are operated 
in State Y. However, the parts were not uniquely designed for Suregrip 
or Fishfins .  
The defective brakes in  question did not, as i t  happens, come to 
State Y through commercial d istribution at a l l .  The driver of the defec­
tive car bought that car out-of-state and brought it ,  upon moving, to 
State Y .  
Plaintiffs i nitially sued Fishfin,  who then impleaded Suregrip and 
Brake-0. Unlike the procedural posture of Asahi, damages were award­
ed against the defendant directly for the benefit of the plaintiffs . 
B .  THE ISSUES RAISED 
The hypothetical manages to elude easy resolution under any estab­
l ished precedent. Unlike Asahi, the defendant has a presence in the 
forum and is defending a claim directly against the inj ured plaintiff. 
Unl ike World- Wide Volkswagen, the victim was a res ident of the forum, 
was not responsible for bringing the product into the forum, and the 
defendant knew exactly where i ts product would end up. Unl ike 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A .  v. Hall, 466 U .S .  408 
( 1 984), the defendant' s contacts were not temporary, and were not l im­
i ted to purchases. 
The proper resolution of the hypothetical depends on a series of 
i ssues that the Supreme Court has consistently avoided. Plaintiffs ' 
c lai ms do not arise out of defendant 's  direct contacts with the forum in  
the sense that i t  was not those contacts that caused plaintiffs' inj uries. 
But the contacts were !lot entirely unrelated either. The sale of replace­
ment brake pads presumably made their brake parts more attractive to 
the United States market, which in turn generated a demand for the re­
placement pads . Is that relationship suffic ient to assert general jurisdic­
tion over B rake-0? 
And what of the indirect contact, the "stream of commerce connec­
tion?" This contact, the use of defendant ' s  defective product in the 
forum, was c learly the source of plaintiffs ' injuries. B ut can it be attrib­
uted to defendant for jurisdictional purposes? Defendant is tw ice re­
moved from that contact . First, these brakes did not come through the 
relevant to the l i t igation. 
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stream of commerce at al l .  Rather, the unilateral action of the other 
driver brought the car into the state. A comparable break in the chain 
of distribution i n  World- Wide Volkswagen was fatal to the stream of 
commerce theory advanced by plaintiffs there. However, un like World­
Wide Volkswagen, the defendant here did ship large quantities of the 
same product to State Y through the stream of commerce. S hould those 
contacts be considered related to plaintiffs ' i nj uries from a product that 
did not come in through that network? Second, even if the non-tortious 
distribution of defendant' s  products in  State Y are considered related to 
plaintiffs ' claims, does the stream of commerce j urisdictional l y  connect 
a defendant to the forum? A split in the Asahi Court prevented a defin­
itive answer to whether Gray & Standard San itary Corp.  v. A merican 
Radiator, 1 76 N.E.2d 76 1 ( I l l .  1 96 1 ) , is stil l  good law after World- Wide 
Volkswagen . The Asahi Court thus failed to tell us whether "mere 
knowledge" of down-stream commercial distribution is a suffic ient  j uris­
dictional predicate, or whether a defendant has to "seek-out" that mar­
ket. That distinction is critical to evaluating the j urisdictional s ignifi ­
cance of  Brake-O' s conduct here. 
As for general j urisdiction, the Supreme Court has provided v i rtually 
no contemporary guidance as to when j urisdiction may be asserted over 
a claim unrelated to defendant' s forum contacts. Brake-0' s presence in 
the forum is certainly more extensive than defendant' s  presence in 
Helicopteros, but that case s imply represents a denial of general j uris­
diction ; other than the Burnham deci sion upholding juri sdiction based 
on service of process alone, there is  no contemporary Supreme Court 
decision upholding a finding of general j urisdiction. 
Finally, as Professor WEINTRAUB notes, the facts of the hypotheti­
cal arguably place it somewhere between an i nstance of "specific" and 
"general jurisdiction ." The case does not appear to "ari se" out of 
defendant' s forum contacts, but the claim certainly has a great deal of 
connection with the forum :  the resident plaintiffs were i nj ured in the 
forum by a product similar to those products brought into the forum by 
a defendant with extensive connections to the forum.  If plaintiffs ' 
c laims are not closely enough related to defendant ' s contacts w ith the 
forum to support specific j urisdiction, is the only alternative to ask 
whether defendant' s  contacts are sufficiently pervasive to support gener­
al jurisdiction? May courts view the relationship between the forum and 
the claim on a continuum, or must they choose between the two polar 
extremes of specific and general jurisdiction? 
C .  THE PANELISTS ' RESPONSE 
As outlined above, these issues do not challenge existing doctrine 
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per se; the major precedents are all  distingui shable. The answer requires 
some clarification of existing law. What is the meaning of specific  and 
general jurisdiction, and what is the relationship between those two 
categories? Why then could not the panelists simply expand upon rather 
than overrule  so much existing case law? 
The explanation, I think, i s  that resolution of these issues requires 
deeper understanding of why jurisdiction is  j ustified than the United 
States Supreme Court has been wil l ing to articulate to date. In order to 
know whether a case is "related" to defendant's contacts for j urisdic­
tional purposes, we need to know why we care about relatedness .  In 
order to know how much affi l iation is  required for purposes of general 
j urisdiction, we need to know why general j urisdiction is fair. Not only 
do the cases not tel l  us ,  but it i s  impossible to even extrapolate the 
answers; the cases yield no consistent conceptual model .  As the panel­
ists demonstrate, almost any vision of j urisdictional legitimacy wi l l  run 
afoul of some precedent. 
For Professor BORCHERS, the answer i s  very different  from the 
other panelists : the assertion of personal j urisdiction requires no special 
constitutional justification. For BORCHERS, constitutional scrutiny of 
j urisdictional i ssues i s  no different from constitutional scrutiny of any 
other exercise of a state' s  police power; it should generall y  be upheld 
unless it is irrational, or deprives a defendant of procedural due pro­
cess, i. e. , an effective opportunity to be heard. He decl ines to import 
into the Due Process Clause any function of allocating j urisdiction 
among sovereigns. Thus,  the wrong turn in Supreme Court doctrine for 
Professor B ORCHERS came very early ,  at least as of International 
Shoe, if not Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S . 7 1 4 ( 1 877) .9 Applying this mini­
mal scrutiny, Professor BORCHERS is  wi ll ing to accept any assertion 
of j urisdiction that serves a rational purpose, including the efficiency of 
consolidating all claims in a single proceeding. 
On the opposite pole are Professors COX, MAIER and BRUSSACK 
who quite explicitly insist upon testing the assertion of juri sdiction 
under a constitutional standard of political legitimacy. What, in  Profes-
9. Professor BORCHERS has elsewhere argued that Pennoyer has been general l y  
misread a s  standing for the  proposi t ion that there is a constitut ional ly enforceable 
standard for measuring the adequacy a state ' s  j urisdictional c la im over a defendant. 
See Patrick J .  Borchers, The Dearh of Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: 
From Pennoyer ro Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1 9  ( 1 990) .  The 
true meani ng of the constitut ional guarantee i n  Pennoyer, Professor BORCHERS 
argues, i s  s imply that a defendant has a procedural opportunity to raise objections to 
jurisdiction ; the constitution does not insure any particular jurisdict ional foundation. 
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sor COX ' s  terms, "empowers . . .  [a state] to meddle i n  our l ives?' '  
COX, infra, at 647. For Professor COX, there is only one constitution­
ally valid reason for asserting j urisdiction : to regulate the underlying 
cause of action. Thus, he would not permit the exercise of j urisdi ction 
in any case where a state would not be justified in applying its substan­
tive law to the case. While he does not here spell-out a comprehensive 
conflicts approach,  a decis ion to apply State Y '  s law here could be 
j ustified by some combination of State Y '  s regulatory interest i n  pro­
tecting its i nhabitants from dangerous products, with the foreseeability 
on defendant' s  part that the product could, in  the normal course of 
commercial distribution, find its way into the forum .  S ince such a the­
ory of j urisdictional legitimacy was implicitly rejected in World- Wide 
Volkswagen, that case must give way. So too must go any theory of 
jurisdiction based on mere affi l iation of the defendant with the forum 
where there is no other forum-interest in the underlying transaction; i n  
other words, the exercise of  general j urisdiction is never legitimate. 
Professor MAIER similarly resists any assertion of jurisdiction not 
j usti fied by a forum interest in  the underlying transaction. For Professor 
MAIER assertions of general j urisdiction are at odds with an u nderlying 
right of defendant to be treated "fairly . "  That fairness right, in Professor 
MAIER' s view should be defined by reference to whether "a case wi l l  
be heard in a forum whose poli tical and social context i s  related to the 
events in the case . . . .  " MAIER, infra, at 656. Where those connec­
tions are absent, a state unfairly brings to bear its values and preferenc­
es on the outcome of the case, even if it were to apply another s tate ' s  
law. A t  bottom, this  position seems quite related to Professor COX ' s  
position: the "unfairness" i s  not so much that the outcome o f  the case 
will be "distorted"-judges bring their  own values and preferences to 
bear on every case-but such influences are " i llegitimate" wi thout a 
regulatory justification. 
Professor B RUSSACK, in contrast to Professor COX, accepts the 
theoretical constraint of World- Wide Vo lkswagen-that a state ' s  pol itical 
legitimacy is  conferred by the defendant through forum contacts that 
evince some form of consent or social contract. A mere regulatory 
interest is insufficient. But, Professor BRUSSACK asserts there is no 
requi rement that such "purposeful availment" be found in the same acts 
giving rise to defendant ' s  claim. Professor BRUSSACK would take 
i ssue with the notion that "specific" j uri sdiction measures the relation­
ship between a defendant ' s  contacts and a plaintiff' s claim. Thus, for 
Professor BRUSSACK, this is a relatively easy case : the resident 
plaintiffs ' injuries in  the forum bring the case under the "spec ific j uri s­
diction" rubric ,  and defendant ' s  contacts, related or not, provide pur-
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poseful availment. 
A s imilar approach is  evident in Professor SILB ERMAN' s  opm10n: 
"Brake-0' s high volume of sales should provide sufficient contacts 
when the claim ari ses out of an injury in the state , and the defendant 
engages in additional activity that takes advantage of the forum state ' s  
market." S ILBERMAN, infra, at 663 . Like Professor B RUSSACK, she 
does not appear to insist that plaintiff' s claim be related to defendant' s  
activities i n  the forum.  I t  i s  sufficient that the claim ari ses i n  a forum 
in which defendant has purposely availed itself. While not critical to 
this case, she finds it anomalous that a foreign defendant c an do mas­
sive amounts of business cumulatively in the United S tates, but might 
avoid j urisdiction because its contacts with any particular state are in­
sufficient. 10 At least for foreign defendants , Professor SILB ERMAN 
rejects the  notion that j urisdictional legitimacy must be  established on a 
state-by-state basis .  She urges, as a matter of legislative reform, that 
foreign defendants be subject to suit in any country where their product 
causes i nj ury, and in which the product ' s  import was foreseeable. Ven­
ue, in such cases would be based in the place of inj ury. Her test re­
quires a fairly narrow construction of World- Wide Volkswagen . In that 
case, the Court rejected the notion that mere foreseeability of a 
product' s entry i nto a state justi fied the assertion of j urisdiction over a 
defendant who did not avail itself of that market. Thus,  Professor 
S ILBERMAN puts a great deal of weight on the distinction between the 
stream of commerce and the stream of traffic .  She is prepared to impute 
to a defendant a commercial distributer' s contact with the forum, but 
not the foreseeable actions of other parties outside of the chain of com­
mercial distribution. 
Outright rejection of World- Wide Volkswagen i s  central to Professor 
WEINTRAUB ' s  approach. While Professor WEINTRAUB ' s  theoretical 
foundations are less explicit than Professor COX ' s , the notion of regula­
tory need as a jurisdictional j ustification pervades Professor 
WEINTRAUB ' s  opinion. The spectrum between general and specific 
jurisdiction for Professor WEINTRAUB is  a measure of the state ' s  
regulatory interest in the case: "The more the action arises out of  or  i s  
related to  acts or  consequences in the forum, the less the requirement 
for additional nexus between forum and defendant ."  WEINTRAUB , 
1 0. As professor SILBERMAN points out, the recent amendment to Federal Rule 
of Civ i l  Procedure 4(k)(2) aggregates national contacts only where j urisdiction is 
premised on a federal question. Professor S ILBERMAN urges legis lat ion applying 
such an approach to all claims against  foreign defendants in  both state and federal 
coun. 
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infra, at 665 .  This regulatory need j ustifies j urisdiction whol ly apart 
from defendant ' s  purposeful availment :  "any forum with an interest in 
providing a remedy to the plaintiff should have j urisdiction over the 
defendant, subject to a cogent showing of unfairness." WEINTRAUB, 
infra, at  665 . Of course, depending on Professor WEINTRAU B ' s  under­
standing of "unfairness," he may either be radical ly  reconceptual izing 
jurisdiction on a par with Professor BORCHERS ' s  due process test, or 
simply importing al l  of the Court ' s  purposefu l  availment requ irement 
into the concept of "fairness ." 
Perhaps most comfortable with existing doctrine is Professor 
MULLENIX. Professor MULLENIX finds even the heightened stream 
of commerce standard advocated by Justice O 'Connor satisfied by 
Brake-0' s knowledge that large numbers of its products would "wind 
up in  the state ."  She contrasts this with Asah i ' s position that the corpo­
ration never contemplated that its l imited sales of valves to Cheng Shin 
in Taiwan would subject i t  to lawsuit i n  Californ ia. Impl ic i t  i n  her 
approach is that a defendant should expect to be subject to juri sdiction 
where its products foreseeably cause harm. However, i t  i s  unclear why 
mere knowledge of a product' s u ltimate destination would satisfy Justice 
O 'Connor' s position that "a defendant ' s  awareness that the stream of 
commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not 
convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream i nto an act 
purposefully directed toward the forum State ."  Asahi, 480 U .S .  at 1 1 2 .  
Similarly, Professor MULLENIX ' s  appl ication of World- Wide Volkswag­
en to these facts might be considered opti mist ic .  Professor MULLENIX 
reads that case as accommodating j urisdiction where there i s :  high state 
regulatory interest, low inconvenience to the defendant, effi c ient resolu­
tion in the forum ,  and a "shared interests . . . in furthering fundamental 
substantive policies." MULLENIX , infra, at 659. She thus finds i t  un­
necessary to grapple with the difficult issue of whether a stream of 
commerce connection between the defendant and the forum sati sfies 
World- Wide Volkswagen 's "purposeful availment" requirement. Professor 
MULLENIX conc ludes that "[b ]ecause this case may be resolved under 
the standards set forth in Asahi and World- Wide Volkswagen, it does 
not seem necessary to examine whether the state ' s  assert ion of j uri sdic­
tion i s  supportable under either a theory of general jurisdiction or spe­
cific  j urisdiction." MULLENIX, infra, at 660. S ince Asahi and World­
Wide Volkswagen are general ly understood to be cases about specific  
jurisdiction, she presumably means that specific  j urisdiction is  appropri­
ate here. If so, one might take issue with her claim that she does not 
have to resolve whether the claim is sufficiently related to the j urisdic­
tional contacts to be classified as a case of specific  jurisdiction. 
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* * * 
FACTS 
Brake-0 is a South Korean corporation which makes component 
brake parts,  including brake part kits for anti-lock brake systems. Brake-
0 also manufactures replacement brake pads for do-it-yourselfers, which 
it retails under the "Brakeman" name in the United States . Brake-0 
sell s  its anti-lock brake components and kits to car and brake manufac­
turers throughout the world, as well  as to companies that service or sell 
replacement anti-lock brakes .  Total sales of al l  Brake-0 products in the 
United States amount to about $30,000,000.00 annual ly ,  which repre­
sents approximately 30% of Brake-0' s total sales. 
The l it igation involves an automobile accident. Innocent Victim, a 
State Y resident, was hit in State Y by Driver, also a State Y resident 
(although a recent arrival) , and kil led .  Innocent Victim ' s  Survivors 
sought recovery for wrongfu l  death against Driver, Fishfin  (the manu­
facturer of Driver' s car), and any and all defendants impleaded and 
cross c laimed against (see next paragraph). The complaint pled many 
theories of recovery in the alternative and/or in combination against the 
various defendants, including: allegations that Driver negligently operat­
ed the vehicle; that the vehicle was negl igently constructed; and that the 
vehicle was manufactured in a dangerously defective or unsafe condi­
tion. The accident occurred on wet roads on August 1 8 , 1 992, when 
Driver' s anti-lock brakes locked and Driver swerved into Innocent 
Victim' s car. Assume sufficient evidence to allow each cause of action 
to go to the jury under State Y law. As to Brake-0, there was no alle­
gation that the Brake-0 pad in  the anti-lock system malfunctioned, but 
rather that other physical elements of the Brake-0 system were defec­
tive. 
Survivors initiated suit in November, 1 992.  Although the original 
complaint named only Driver and Fishfin ,  Fishfin quickly impleaded the 
manufacturer of the anti-lock brakes,  Suregrip. Suregrip quickly im­
pleaded the manufacturer of the component parts, Brake-0. Only Brake-
0 has raised the defense of personal jurisdiction. 
The Fishfin vehicle involved in  this accident was manufactured in 
early 1 992 in State M,  and was purchased new by Driver in  State K in 
July, 1 992, before moving to State Y.  Brake-0 sales to Suregrip in 
mid- 1 99 1  through mid- 1 992 (components that went i nto 1 992 models) 
amounted to 7% of total Brake-0 company sales by dollar amount 
($7 ,000,000.00) . Approximately 60% of these Brake-0 components were 
purchased by Suregrip. These same components were used to assemble 
the anti-lock brakes sold to Fishfin and were incorporated into Fishfin 
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vehicles .  State Y, the state where the injuries occurred, is a populous 
state and is one of Brake-O ' s  l arger United States markets ( 1 5 -20%) for 
Brakeman replacement parts .  Brake-0 has some personnel i n  one office 
related to the Brakeman enterprise in State Y and, on occasion, con­
ducts negotiations and routing of other Brake-0 business through its 
State Y office. The parties have stipulated that the Brake-0 parts al­
leged to have malfunctioned were not distributed by B rake-0 to 
Suregrip through State Y; these parts were purchased by S uregrip 
F.O. B .  South Korea and incorporated by Suregrip into anti-lock brakes 
manufactured in States P and Q (both states are at least two time zones 
from State Y). It i s  further stipulated that al l  significant Suregrip/Brake-
0 negotiations involved principals from South Korea rather than any 
State Y personnel .  Brake-0 admits that Suregrip disclosed, in connec­
tion with the negotiations of the B rake-OiSuregrip contract, that most of 
the components it sold to Suregrip would be incorporated into Fishfins. 
The component parts were not, however, uniquely designed for Fishfins 
or for Suregrip .  Although the exact number of Fishfins or other vehicles 
with Brake-0 components i n  State Y is  unknown, Plaintiff S urvivors 
and Fishfin introduced evidence that as many as 20,000 Fishfins  con­
taining Brake-0 anti-lock components as original equipment are in S tate 
Y. Further, perhaps as many o.s 60,000 other vehicle types which con­
tain Brake-0 anti-lock components as original equipment are i n  S tate Y.  
Brakeman pads are estimated to be on at  least 225 ,000 vehicles i n  S tate 
Y .  
The trial judge denied Brake-0' s motion to  dismiss for l ack of 
personal jurisdiction, and scheduled the case for trial .  The j ury awarded 
total damages of $4,000,000.00 to Survivors of Innocent Victim, appor­
tioning 1 0% blame to Driver for negligent operation of the vehicle, and 
30% each to Fishfin, Suregrip, and Brake-0 via strict l iabi l i ty under 
State Y law. The intermediate State Y appellate court affirmed the trial 
court ' s  jadgment despite numerous challenges by each defendant. Brake-
0 sought review of the personal j urisdiction issue before the S tate Y 
Supreme Court. The State Y Supreme Court, after emphasizing that 
State Y personal j urisdiction law reaches as far as due process permits, 
affirmed the intermediate State Y appel late court .  In support of its rul­
ing, the State Y Supreme Court c ited Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.  Superi­
or Court, 480 U .S .  1 02 ( 1 987),  and emphasized that State Y traditional­
ly has asserted j urisdiction over those corporations which do significant 
business within State Y. 
As members of the United States Supreme Court, review the State Y 
Supreme Court opinion. 
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May State Y assert j urisdiction over Brake-0? 
* * * 
BORCHERS, J. * :  (affirming) 
There should be an affirmance. A state may, consi stent with the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, take j urisdict ion 
over the sell er of a product causing i nj ury i n  that state i n  a l awsuit 
arising out of that inj ury. 
This case presents a very c lose question under the minimum contacts 
test as to whether the third-party defendant (Brake-0)-the manufacturer 
of one of the component parts in the product causing i nj ury-is subject 
to juri sdiction. The product causing the inj ury was neither sold nor 
resold in State Y. Under the stream of commerce test, the lack of an 
in-state sale of the product i s  probably fatal to obtaining jurisdiction on 
that theory. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U .S .  
1 02 ( 1 987) ;  World- Wide Volkswagen v .  Woodson, 444 U .S .  286  ( 1 980). 
Perhaps ,  though, the large number of Brake-0 products that are other­
wise sold in State Y is sufficient to allow juri sdiction under the rubric 
of "general j urisdiction." Cf Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A.  
v .  Hall, 466 U.S.  408 ( 1 984) ( large amount of in-state purchases unre­
lated to claim not sufficient to establish personal j urisdiction) .  
The "contacts" debate, however, ought be irrelevant. Cases l ike this 
point out two of the great fai l ings of the minimum contacts test. First, 
i t  i s  maddeningly difficult  to predict which types of activities wi l l  allow 
for j urisdiction, making appel late litigation on this subject a common 
and expensive phenomenon. Second, a case l ike this cries out for one 
forum to resolve al l related disputes .  Yet, by requiring that the "con­
tacts" of each party be evaluated separately, the constitutional aspect of 
personal j urisdiction makes multiple fora necessary in many cases. See, 
e.g. ,  Asahi, 480 U .S .  at 1 02 (indemnity action in products case dis­
missed) ; World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U .S .  at 286 (action against seller 
and retailer in a products case dismissed) . 
The notion that the Due Process Clause operates as a direct restraint 
on state power to assert jurisdiction is an historical accident based, in 
all probabil ity, on a misreading of Pennoyer v. Nef , 95 U .S .  7 1 4 
( 1 877) .  See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of 
Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 
* Patrick J .  Borchers: Professor of Law and Associate Dean, A lbany Law 
School of Union University. 
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U.C. Davis L.  Rev. 1 9  ( 1 990). It i s  time to break the bonds of this  
ancient mistake and consider anew the c ircumstances in  which a state 
crosses the constitutional l ine by taking j urisdiction over private parties.  
The truth of the matter i s  that the Constitution is  rarel y  j eopardized 
by state court assertions of j urisdiction. The Due Process C lause c hecks 
state court jurisdiction in only two c ircumstances. First, a s tate court 
assertion of j uri sdiction might offend substantive due process i f  lacking 
a rational basis .  S imply taking j urisdiction over parties does not by 
itself implicate any recognized fundamental right such as voting or 
speech. Cf Carey v. Brown, 447 U .S .  455 ( 1 980) (state law imposing a 
content-based restriction on speech implicates a "fundamental right" and, 
therefore, must serve a compell ing state goal by  the least restrictive 
means possible). Thus,  state court assertions of jurisdiction require only 
minimal rationality to pass constitutional muster. See, e .g. ,  Williamson v. 
Lee Optical of Okla . ,  Inc. , 348 U .S .  483 ( 1 955)  (state economic reg­
u lation does not violate the Due Process Clause as long as it bears a 
"rational relationship" to a "legitimate" state goal) .  
State Y '  s assertion of jurisdiction passes the rationality test . The 
Survivors c learly have j urisdiction over most of the defendants in S tate 
Y. Therefore , a consequence of dismissing the third-party action against 
Brake-0 is  that a separate action for contribution will have to be pur­
sued in another forum. It is a legitimate goal of S tate Y to protect 
defendants in its courts from having to fight battles on two fronts and 
thereby protect them from added cost and the risk of inconsi stent adj u­
dications. State Y is  the situs of the inj ury, making access to the physi­
cal evidence and the witnesses cheaper and easier for al l  concerned. 
State Y '  s assertion of jurisdiction is, at a minimum, a rational endeavor, 
and thus does not violate substantive due process .  
The other circumstance in which a state court ' s  assertion of j urisdic­
tion might arguably be unconstitutional i s  if  procedural due process 
concerns are implicated. If a defendant could show the chosen forum is 
so inconvenient that, as a practical matter, the defendant is prevented 
from mounting a defense, procedural due process would be offended. 
Cf Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U .S .  3 1 9 ( 1 976) (test for procedural due 
process requires balancing cost of procedure against part ies '  i nterest in 
accurate resolution of the dispute) .  A consumer haled to a distant forum 
on a small di spute might, for instance, be able to show that the choice 
of that forum makes defaulting, rather than defending, the economically 
rational choice. In such a circumstance a state court assertion of j uris­
diction would offend procedural due process .  Cf Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 47 1 U .S .  462, 485 ( 1 985) (Supreme Court shares "broader 
concerns" of lower court that requiring consumers to defend small  dis-
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putes away from home is unfair) ; McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. , 
355 U .S .  220, 223 ( 1 957)  ("When [insurance] c laims were small or 
moderate individual claimants frequently could not afford the cost of 
bringing an action in a foreign forum-thus in effect making the [ in­
surance] company judgment proof.") .  
Plainly,  Brake-O' s  si tuation is  far removed from our hypothetical 
consumer' s situation . Gi ven that the underlying dispute is being litigated 
in State Y, and that the physical evidence is located in  State Y, the 
chosen forum is undoubtedly the cheapest place for a l l  concerned (in­
cluding Brake-0) to l itigate the case. Further, there is no reason to be­
lieve that Brake-0 cannot get competent counsel to represent it in State 
Y. Brake-0 has an office in State Y, and conducts some business from 
it .  An enterprise as large and successfu l  as Brake-0 undoubtedl y  has 
access to legal representation, and has-or can readily find-competent 
counsel to handle matters for it in S tate Y. Indeed, the fact that the 
case went to trial  below belies any suggestion that Brake-0 would be 
unable to defend itself. Therefore, Brake-0 cannot show that procedural 
due process has been offended. 
I would lay down a per se rule that in products l i abil ity cases the 
state of the injury may take j urisdiction over al l defendants in the chain 
of distribution, both on actions against them by the i njured party, and 
on third-party and cross actions between them for contribution and 
indemnity. This case adequately demonstrates why the state of the in­
jury is  a rational forum that does not unconstitutionally disadvantage 
any party .  A per se rule would decrease the i ncentive for appellate 
litigation of the mundane and preliminary matter of j urisdiction, and 
would afford a single forum for the resolution of al l  related disputes . 
This i s  the approach taken by the Brussels Convention, 1 which-in tort 
cases-confers jurisdiction on the state in the European Union in which 
the "harmful event occurred ." See Patrick J .  Borchers, Comparing Per­
sonal Jurisdiction in the United States and the European Community: 
Lessons for American Reform, 40 Am. J. Comp. L. 1 2 1 ,  1 44-45 ( 1 992). 
For these reasons I would affirm. 
l .  Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in  
Civ i l  and Commercia l  Matters, September 27, 1 968, amended by Luxembourg Con­
vention of the Accession to the 1 968 Convention of Denmark, the Republ ic of 
Ireland, and the United Kingdom, October 9 ,  1 978 ,  1 978 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 
304) 77 ,  reprinted in 1 8  l .L .M.  8, 2 1  ( 1 979) .  
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* * * 
BRUSSACK, J. * : (affirming) 
The question we must answer is whether a foreign corporation that 
aggressively markets its products in an American state (doing perhaps 
mill ions of dol lars of business there annual ly) is constitutional l y  im­
mune from the judicial power of the state in a products l iabi l ity  action, 
merely because the particular product involved in the case happened to 
reach the state through the conduct of a consumer. We hold that State 
Y may exercise j urisdiction over Brake-0. 
Brake-0 argues that our jurisdictional due process precedents protect 
it from having to answer in State Y for the deadly consequences of an 
a l leged defect in anti- lock brake components that i t  manufactured, be­
cause the facts support neither specific jurisdiction nor general j urisdic­
tion. '  There is no specific j urisdiction, according to Brake-0,  because 
the brake parts that allegedly malfunctioned did not reach S tate Y 
through Brake-0' s distribution system. Instead, the brake parts entered 
State Y when Driver, in whose automobi le the parts were i nstal led, 
moved to State Y. Brake-0 reminds us of our insistence in World- Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S . 286 ( 1 980), that a company' s  
products are not agents for service of process that subject the company 
to j uri sdiction wherever consumers decide to take them. /d. at 296. 
Moreover, Brake-0 argues ,  there is no general jurisdiction over i t  in 
State Y, because general j ur i sdiction allows a court to exercise j udicial 
power over a defendant in  any lawsuit that anyone wishes to bring 
against the defendant, as if the court were a court of the defendant ' s  
own state or nation. For example, Brake-0 i s  right when i t  protests that 
State Y would not be entitled to exercise jurisdiction over Brake-0 to 
resolve a contract dispute between it and a Japanese automobile manu­
facturer aris ing from Brake-O' s alleged fai lure to supply parts on time 
to a factory in Japan. 
Brake-O' s  argument i s  too c lever. Brake-0 skil lful ly manipulates 
some of the doctrinal detai ls  elaborated in our jurisdictional due process 
precedents without addressing the principles that drive the precedents. 
The principles are principles of political legitimacy . See Robert D .  
Brussack, Political Legitimacy and State Court Jurisdiction: A Critique 
* Stephen D. B russack: Professor of Law. Univers i ty of Georg ia  School of 
Law . 
I .  For a discussion of the dist inct ion between speci fic jurisdiction and general 
juri sdiction, see Arthur  T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to A djudicate: 
A Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv . L. Rev. 1 1 2 1 ,  1 1 36 ( 1 966). 
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of the Public Law Paradigm, 72 Neb. L. Rev . 1 082, 1 083-88 ( 1 993) .  If 
B rake-0 were a corporation chartered under the laws of S tate Y,  with 
its principal place of business in  State Y, there would be no question 
about State Y ' s  authority to resolve this products l iabi l ity dispute. A 
political community may summon its own members to answer in its 
courts .  Because Brake-0 is  a South Korean company, however, State Y 
needs some other j urisdiction for deploying judicial power against 
Brake-0 besides the j ustification that Brake-0 is a de jure member of 
the political community of State Y .  Jurisdictional due process protects 
citizens of other states and nations from the j udicial power of state 
courts when no such alternative j ustification exists. 
The notions of specific jurisdiction and general j urisdiction flow 
from two alternative j ustifications for a state ' s  deployment of j udicial 
power against a political stranger. General jurisdiction recognizes that a 
stranger' s contacts with a state rna y be so extensive that the stranger is  
not real l y  a stranger at a l l .  The stranger may be treated as a de facto 
c itizen, as vulnerable as any de jure citizen to summonses i ssued by the 
state ' s  courts, even in lawsui ts whol ly unrelated to the defendant' s in­
state activities. !d. at 1 093 .  Specific j urisdiction recognizes that a state 
may summon a stranger when the stranger' s conduct engages a legiti­
mate regulatory interest of the state . !d. 
Brake-0 concedes that S tate Y may have a legitimate regulatory 
interest in resolving a dispute arising from a deadly coll ision within its 
borders. But Brake-0 correctly insists that World- Wide Volkswagen and 
other precedents impose an additional requirement for specific  j urisdic­
tion-purposeful availment. We have said that a state court may not 
exerc ise juri sdiction over a nonresident defendant unless the defendant 
purposeful ly has establ ished an affi l iation with the forum state. Hanson 
v. Denckla , 357 U . S .  235,  253 ( 1 958 ) .  It is not enough that some con­
sumer has brought the defendant' s product to the forum state and that 
the product then has caused injury there. The choice to establish an af­
fi liation with the forum state must be the defendant' s own choice. 
Brussack, supra, at 1 094. This requirement reflects a Lockeian, or con­
sent-based, element in  the overall conception of pol itical legitimacy that 
drives our j urisdictional due process precedents .  !d. at 1 095-96. 
Brake-0 made the choice . Although Brake-0' s very extensive mar­
keting in State Y is not enough to subject Brake-0 to general jurisdic­
tion in the state, and although the particular brake parts involved in the 
collision did not reach State Y through Brake-O' s  distribution system, 
Brake-0 decided to do big business in  State Y, and even has an office 
in the state for prosecuting that business. Brake-0 purposeful ly estab­
l i shed an affi l iation with State Y, and because the state also c laims a 
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legitimate regulatory interest in  resolving this dispute, the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not stand in the way . 
Another factor that influences our decision i n  thi s case is  a factor 
not sufficiently emphasized in our j urisdictional due process precedents . 
If  we were to rule i n  B rake-0' s favor, the decision would present the 
plaintiffs with the dilemma of foregoing any c laim against B rake-0 or 
pursuing the c laim in the courts of some other state or nation.  I t  would 
be a di lemma because the courts of South Korea or of some American 
state besides S tate Y might be more alien to the plaintiffs than the 
courts of State Y are to Brake-0. Political boundary l ines matter as 
much, and in the same ways, to plaintiffs as they matter to defendants. 
These plaintiffs, j ust l ike Brake-0, want to have their dispute resolved 
close to home in a forum governed by familiar laws and procedures 
applied by neighbors rather than strangers. There is  no sufficient  reason 
to automatically prefer B rake-0' s place-of-trial interests over the 
plaintiffs ' s imilar interests. State Y is an attractive forum because 
Brake-0 and the plaintiffs both have very substantial relationships  with 
the forum. In fact, there may be no other state or nation with which the 
plaintiffs and B rake-0 both have a substantial relationship. 
* * * 
COX, J .  * :  (affi rming) 
Affirmed. Although this case presents a close call ,  I believe State Y 
may apply its substantive law to plaintiffs '  c lai ms made against Brake-
0. Therefore, Brake-0 is not entitled to have the c laims against  it dis­
missed for lack of j urisdiction. 
I .  JURISDICTION TO APPLY STATE Y LAW 
I agree with my brother WEINTRAUB, and other members of thi s 
Court, that our prior (what we have label led) personal j ur isdiction pre­
cedents resemble more the trail of an inebriated sleepwalker than a path 
headed toward or from any kind of sensible principles. Radical reformu­
lation and clarification of our jurisdiction juri sprudence is  required. We 
should use this case as an opportunity to abandon our absurd ins istence 
that constitutional inquiry for personal jurisdiction is different from how 
we determine constitutionality for (what we have label led) choice of 
law. Once we recognize that there is  but one inquiry-whether a partic­
ular court constitutionally may bind a particular defendant by its 
* Stanley E. Cox : Assistant Professor of Law, New England School of Law . 
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law-our j urisdiction j urisprudence may start to make sense. 
If we would recognize the interrelation of all juri sdiction doctrines 
and abandon compartmentalization into arbitrary categories we would 
stop misleading l i tigants and commentators into thinking: 1 )  that unfair­
ness in one part of the jurisdictional system can be ameliorated by other 
j urisdictional doctrines and 2) that different purposes are served by 
different doctrines. We have so long repeated as mantra that the consti­
tutional concerns regarding personal j urisdiction are distinct from the 
concerns governing choice of l aw, that we have come unthinkingly to 
accept our chantings as truth. When pressed to prove the need for the 
distinction between doctrines, however, we offer no convincing ratio­
nales. In practice we allow choice of law considerations to influence 
our personal jurisdiction determinations more often than our rhetoric 
about absolute distinctions would indicate . See, e.g. , Asahi Metal Indus. 
Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U .S .  1 02 ,  1 1 4- 1 5  ( 1 987) (indicating an 
additional reason for not granting jurisdiction, doubtfulness that Califor­
nia law should govern the transaction) ; Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 47 1 U .S .  462, 48 1 -82 ( 1 985)  (indicating that choice of law 
clause supports assertion of personal jurisdiction) .  
One problem in getting us  to  rethink our j urisdictional analysis i s  
that we have accepted our label s as  truth, and that these conceptual iza­
tions prevent us from seeing across their boundaries to what the labels 
actual ly seek to identify .  In my attempts to persuade my col leagues that 
there is (or at least should be) no distinction between state authority to 
assert personal j urisdiction and state authority to (choose and) apply 
law,  I am compel led to use the different terms "personal j urisdiction" 
and "choice of law ." Some would argue that this terminology itself 
means there is  a distinction ; otherwise, why use different words? Ac­
cordingly,  I beg the i ndulgence of my colleagues to permit me to use 
the term "jurisdiction" to encompass all situations where a court at­
tempts to bind parties by its adjudications . 
If  we ask, in situations where the complaining party wishes to resist 
the court ' s  actual judgment, whether there should be no restrictions on 
the "juri sdiction" of the adjudicating court, I do not think members of 
this Court would deny consti tutional restrictions on state court jurisdic­
tion. What we apparently disagree on, in addition to whether these 
restrictions should be strong or weak, is where and how they should be 
imposed. I suggest we recognize that whatever we constitutionally im­
pose and wherever we impose it, we are p lacing l imits on the state 
court ' s  j urisdiction. We should stop viewing, in a vacuum, the place in 
the proceedings at which the restrictions are imposed. 
Presently,  we claim that the concerns  of choice of l aw can be ad-
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dressed separate from personal j urisdiction. As a practical matter, in the 
modern age, we rarely have reversed state courts for c hoosing the 
wrong law . 1  Our choice of l aw test has been crit icized for p lac ing too 
few restrictions on abi li ty to choose law. Perhaps more significantly,  we 
wi l l  not reverse a lower court even when i t  misapplies the l aw we 
al low it  to choose.2 Creative j udges, as a result, real ize that they have 
de facto power to make whatever law they want most of the t ime.3  
One hypothetical "solution" would be to impose truly meaningfu l  con­
straints at the back end of l i tigation and to deprive courts of j urisdiction 
once i t  becomes c lear that they have formed law i mproperl y  to the 
facts .  Perhaps this is what Justice SILBERMAN meant by her famous 
aphorism that i t  i s  more important to know whether one wil l  be  hanged 
than where. See Linda J .  Si lberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an 
Era, 53 N .Y .U .  L. Rev . 33 ,  88 ( 1 978) .  The test for choice of l aw pur­
portedly could be made more restrictive than the test for personal j uris-
1 .  Compare Allstate Ins. Co. v .  Hague, 449 U.S .  302 ( 1 98 1 )  (finding appl ication 
of M innesota law constitutional  despite arguably  tenuous contacts); see also id. at 323  
(Stevens, 1 . ,  concurring) (" [T]he fact that a choice-of- law decis ion may be un sound as 
a matter of confl icts l aw does not necessari l y  impl icate the federal concerns embod­
ied in the Ful l  Faith and Credit Clause ." )  with Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 
U .S .  797 ( 1 985)  (holding that Kansas had insufficient contacts to apply its l aw to a l l  
e lements of  a c lass act ion) with Sun Oil Co. v .  Wortman, 486 U .S .  7 1 7  ( 1 988) 
(holding Kansas ' s  application of its own statute of l imitations to a l l  e lements of a 
c lass action constitutional ,  and upholding Kansas ' s  novel i nterpretation of other states' 
laws as not reversible) .  
2 .  See Wortman, 486 U.S .  at 730-3 1 ("To constitute a violation of the [Constitu­
tion] i t  i s  not enough that a state court misconstrue the law of another State. Rather, 
our cases make plain that the m isconstruction must contradict  law of the other S tate 
that is  c learly establ ished and that has been brought to the court' s attent ion ." ) ;  see 
also id. at 749 (O' Connor, 1 . ,  concurring in  part and dissenting in part ) :  
Faced with the constitutional obligation to apply the substantive law of an­
other State, a court that does not l ike that law apparently need take on ly 
two steps in  order to avoid applying i t .  First , invent  a lega l  theory so nove l  
or strange that the other State has never had an opportun ity to reject i t ;  
then, on the basis of nothing but unsupported speculation, "predict" that  the 
other State would adopt that theory i f  i t  had the chance. 
!d. at 749 (O' Connor, J. , concurring in part and dissenting in part ) ;  cf Fauntleroy v. 
Lum, 2 1 0  U .S .  230 ( 1 908) (requiring  enforcement in Mississippi of a M issouri j udg­
ment which misconstrued Mississippi l aw) .  
3 .  See, e.g . ,  In re "Agent Orange " Prod. Liab. Litig . ,  580 F. Supp. 690 
(E .D.N.Y.  1 984) (holding-and with a straight face,  mind you-that every state court 
which would have been faced with the issue would have fashioned the same rule ,  
that rule  being that Judge Weinste in  should fashion national consensus law,  which of 
course never existed before he decided to make i t  up, to govern, as a matter of each 
state ' s  law, the consolidated l i t igation which was before him).  
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diction. It may be that this i s  what motivates my brother BORCHERS 
to abandon any l imits on personal juri sdiction. S imi larly,  in oral confer­
ence, Justice REDISH ins isted that the only meaningfu l  constraints on 
personal jurisdiction should involve inconvenience rather than the sover­
e ignty and regulatory interest issues that are associated with choice of 
law.  Such arguments, for weak constraints on personal j urisdiction, do 
not assume no constraints on "jurisdiction." Rather, these arguments 
assume constraints should be l imited to choice of law.  
Neither on practical policy nor sound theoretical grounds can we 
successfu l ly  impose meaningful j urisdictional l imits solely through after­
the-fact choice of l aw review. It i s  no accident that our recent choice of 
law decisions have approved state choices of law. Without endorsing 
the result  in  Allstate Ins. Co. v .  Hague, 449 U.S. 302 ( 1 98 1 ) ,  our post­
Allstate decis ions correctly recognize that the most we can do is i nsist 
that the l aw of the chosen state have some connection to the l itigation,4 
unless we are wil l ing to define for lower courts what is the correct law 
that must be applied to a particular controversy.  
We repudiated vested rights as a constitutionally required system 
sixty years ago in Alaska Packers Assoc. v. Industrial Accident 
Comm 'n,  294 U.S .  5 32 ( 1 935) ,  and we proclaimed there that "prima 
facie every state i s  entitled to enforce in  i t s  own courts i ts own statutes, 
lawful ly enacted."  !d. at 547 . Our Allstate test correctly emphasizes 
neither the method by which law is selected nor the content of the l aw 
selected, but instead demands contacts creating state interests i n  the un­
derlying l i tigation.5 The shape or content of state law in  any case i s  
something w e  have n o  business deciding in  the post-Erie age. 
If we try to enforce meaningful j uri sdictional l i mits through choice 
of law review, we would find ourselves embroiled in controversies 
about the shape and content of state law . We have adopted tests which 
rarely reverse determinations about the content of state law because, 
post-Erie,  we real ize as a part of sound jurisdictional theory that i t  i s  
not our job to second-guess states about the content o f  state law. Our 
choice of law review is l imited to determining only that the state had 
4. See, e.g. ,  Shutts, 472 U .S .  at 823 ("We make no effort to determine for 
ourselves which law must apply to the various transactions involved in this lawsuit ,  
and we reaffirm our observation in  A llstate that in  many si tuat ions a state court may 
be free to apply one of several choices of law." ) .  
S .  See Allstate, 449 U.S .  at 3 1 2- 1 3  (" [F]or a State ' s  substantive law to be 
selected in  a constitutionally permissible manner. that State must  have a significant 
contact or s ignificant aggregation of contacts, creating state i nterests, such that choice 
of its law i s  neither arbitrary nor fundamental ly unfair .") .  
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sufficient connection to the litigation so that, in  l ine with our pro­
nouncement in Alaska Packers, the forum state would be entitled to 
apply its own law in its own courts to the case before it. 
I would ful ly  implement the implications of A laska Packers, Erie 
R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U .S .  64 ( 1 93 8), and International Shoe Corp. v. 
Washington , 326 U .S .  3 1 0  ( 1 945) .  We should recognize that the only 
meaningfu l  restrictions on jurisdiction are imposed when deciding 
whether the court has power to apply  law in the first instance, not after 
the court has decided the law it wishes to apply .  As Shutts and 
Wortman demonstrate, i t  does us l ittle good to proclaim that the court 
may not apply its own law to al l  elements of the lit igation before it, 
when in that same breath we have told the court that it does have j uris­
diction to hear the whole case. Shutts, 472 U .S .  at 823 . In our next 
breath we cannot remove the jurisdiction we have already granted; so 
long as the shape of the l aw which the court has fashioned to fit the 
facts before it  conforms to some state ' s  l aw which has connection to 
the l it igation, who are we to tel l  the court what state law should look 
like. Wortman, 486 U.S . at 73 1 ;  Shutts, 472 U.S . at 823 .  
If  we would recognize that when we approve "jurisdiction" to hear a 
case, we are granting power to that court to fashion law to the facts 
before it, we would end these needless charades about choice of law 
review . If there was a problem in Shutts or Wortman, i t  was that we 
allowed too much j urisdiction to begin with, not that the court abused 
the j urisdiction we allowed it to have. The only issue we have a right 
to review is  whether the court has power to apply  law it believes is 
appropriate to the l itigation before it. When we real ize this truth, we 
can start building a more sensible, unified j urisdiction theory . See gen­
erally Stanley E .  Cox, Razing Conflicts Facades to Build Better Juris­
diction Theory: The Foundation-There is No Law But Forum Law, 28 
Val .  U .  L.  Rev .  1 ( 1 993) (making similar arguments in  greater detai l ) .  
My quarrel with those members of  this Court who believe we 
should impose few constitutional constraints on  personal j urisdiction and 
worry l ater about choice of law is that later i s  always too l ate to fix the 
j urisdictional problem. The real false lore of "law" school i s  not the 
general/specific dichotomy which my brother WEINTRAUB criticizes, 
but that courts and defendants are thought to exist in the abstract rather 
than the particular. This "lore" manifests itself in the twin fal se j urisdic­
tional beliefs that: 1 )  state substantive law exists as an abstract truth 
which any law c lerk can apply to any case, and 2) defendants must be 
ful ly  jurisdictional ly  present somewhere for plaintiffs and courts to find 
them. 
The incorrectness of the first belief bears directly on why we should 
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not approve jurisdiction on any basis other than that the forum wil l  be 
applying its law to the controversy before it .  As my brother MAIER so 
persuasively argues, it is not law books that decide cases, but rather 
judges and juries . The law is what judges and j uries hearing actual 
cases make it to be in response to those cases. An open-ended grant of 
j urisdiction allows enormous forum shopping possib i l i ties which expose 
the defendant to multiple interpretations and/or application of l aw .  The 
forum permitted to take jurisdiction wi l l  decide the l aw of the case, and 
its decision is never the same as another forum's ,  regardless of what 
"book" law it applies .  
The j urisdiction argument i s  more, however, than the luck of the 
draw for judges within the same courthouse or deciding a venires '  
empanel ing. The j udge and j ury hearing a case represent the power of 
the government. When the grant of j urisdiction is  on the basis of con­
venience, presence, or some other non-l i tigation related factor, we are 
pretending that a disinterested state tribunal is nevertheless in a proper 
position to decide the parties ' fate . 
Perhaps we are so used to thinking that "neutral" means "unbiased," 
and that "unbiased" means "good," that a disinterested panel seems a 
good idea. But do we real ly want disinterested courts to exercise their 
power against defendants? What should these forums do with the parties 
under their control? Create better law? I am not sure even my brother 
BORCHERS wishes to authorize courts anywhere in the nation to take 
jurisdiction of any and all cases and create law for any and all contro­
versies. Instead, the question we should ask is why a particular forum 
should be al lowed to hear a particular case. 
Convenience should not create state power to meddle in peoples '  
l ives v ia l it igation. Because my feilow Justices and academics from 
around the country can travel to Boston to attend a conference on juris­
diction does not imply that plaintiffs of any and al l  types should be 
able to l i tigate against us here. What empowers Massachusetts courts 
thus to meddle in our l ives? We should examine the suit that a plaintiff 
brings to determine whether there is  jurisdiction. 
As my brother KRAMER has explained, regarding the choice of law 
inquiry, the question is  whether the plaintiff has brought a suit upon 
which a claim for relief can be granted. See Larry Kramer, Rethinking 
Choice of Lmv, 90 Colum.  L. Rev . 277 ( 1 990) .  The plaintiff brings a 
particular suit, not an abstract assertion. If the plaintiff cannot articulate 
a claim with sufficient specificity, we instruct lower federal courts to 
throw the suit out.6 In deciding whether there is "jurisdiction" to hear a 
6. I do not mean that the plaint iff must plead particular words, but only that the 
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case,  we should inquire what the case is  about. Otherwise, we create 
"super" courts which exist with abstract and undefined power. Our 
government, incl uding our courts ,  should not possess such unl imited and 
undefined powers. 
Thi s  emphasis on l imited sovereignty leads necessari ly to repudiation 
of the second fal se idea about j urisdiction-that defendants must exist 
in  plenary fashion somewhere for plaintiffs and courts to find them. 
This i s  the territorialist view of j urisdiction that we rejected i n  Interna­
tional Shoe. We confirmed in  Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 1 86 ( 1 977) ,  
that the minimum contacts approach to  personal jurisdiction constitutes 
a replacement of, rather than just a supplement to, territoria l  j urisdic­
tion . See, e.g. , Stanley E. Cox, Would that Burnham Had Not Come to 
be Done Insane! A Critique of Recent Supreme Court Personal Jurisdic­
tion Reasoning, An Explanation of Why Transient Presence Jurisdiction 
Is Unconstitutional, and Some Thoughts about Divorce Jurisdiction in a 
Minimum Contacts World, 5 8  Tenn. L .  Rev. 497 , 503-30 ( 1 99 1 ) .  When 
Shaffer invalidated a form of territorial j urisdiction, this demonstrated 
that territorial j urisdiction can in practice be, and as a matter of sound 
j urisdictional theory always is, too inclusive and undiscriminating an 
exerc ise of governmental power. Shaffer, 433 U.S .  at 2 1 2  n . 39 .  
The replacement of territorial ity by a more l imited version of state 
sovereignty means that forums exerc ise l imited, rather than p lenary, 
j urisdiction over parties. A person is  never ful ly  juri sdictional ly present, 
preci sely because no government has (or at least no government should 
be allowed to have) complete control over a person ' s  l ife .  It is  absurd 
to uphold a totalitarian view of governmental power in our court system 
j ust because we previously thought in territorial terms in Pennoyer v. 
Neff, 95 U.S .  7 1 4  ( 1 877) , and never completely recovered from our 
jurisdictional malaise. A person should not be counted present before a 
court in abstract or in  plenary fashion, but only as the particular suit 
gives the forum state legitimacy to intrude on that person ' s  l i fe .  
The mistake in allowing jurisdiction based on presence, convenience, 
or any basis other than l itigation related contacts i s  that a court i s  given 
the authority to decide something about a party without regard to why 
the party is before the court .  Territoriality was wrong because it held 
people captive without regard to what the suits were about. A more 
modern and fair view of jurisdiction is to insist that governments exer­
cise their power against persons only when there is  a legitimate reason 
claim must be based on some spec i fic al legations which implicate some parl i cular 
remedy. 
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for doing so. Thi s  should mean that the only relevant contacts for deter­
mining j urisdiction are the contacts which produced the l it igation.  
If  the practical and theoretical reality i s ,  as argued earl ier, that we 
cannot tel l  courts what law they must apply, then the only meaningful 
control we can exercise is that j urisdiction be granted only to courts 
which we believe could legitimately apply their substantive law to the 
u nderlying controversy.  Jurisdiction means giving the court power to 
fashion Jaw that it believes is most appropriate to the l it igation before 
i t .  We should abandon attempts to have one tribunal do another' s bid­
ding or to consolidate actions to a forum which does not have a right 
to apply its own substantive l aw .  Explaining in suffic ient detail why 
this ins istence on forum law or no law would not create i ntersystem 
j udicial paralysis or insensitive parochialism is subject for different 
opin ions involving different u nderlying facts .  In the instant case, State 
Y applied only its own law to Brake-0. The question before us I S  
whether State Y had j urisdiction to bind Brake-0 by its law.  
Jurisdiction over Brake-0 in State Y was appropriate if State Y 
legitimately could exercise its power to hold Brake-0 l i able i n  its courts 
under S tate Y law for an accident which occuned i n  State Y and result­
ed in  the death of a State Y resident. Survivors claimed that third party 
defendant, Brake-0, manufactured a brake component that malfunctioned 
in S tate Y and caused Innocent Victim ' s  death. A State Y j ury deter­
mined that, u nder State Y law, the brake component was defectively 
manufactured and that B rake-O' s  action (or inaction) contributed to 
plaintiffs ' loss. A j udgment to the tune of a $ 1 ,200,000 was awarded 
against  Brake-0. We must determine whether State Y had a right thus 
to apply its products l iabi l ity law against Brake-0. 
Arguing i n  favor of holding Brake-0 responsible under State Y law 
is  that the defective component which contributed to Innocent Victim ' s  
death i n  State Y made its way to State Y because of actions which 
were entirely foreseeable by Brake-0, since engaged in by those in the 
manufacturing and distribution chain. Designing and marketing these 
(albeit standard) components for profit, Brake-0 should not be able to 
resist  State Y jur i sdiction when its parts go where they are intended and 
cause harm at that location.  Thi s  is not a case where the unilateral acts 
of a plaintiff are substituted for a defendant ' s  purposeful directedness . 
Although component manufacturers are in  a different position from 
manufacturers and di stributors of finished products (which is why I 
consider this a close call) , I conclude they should not be able to hide 
behind the manufacturing/di stribution chain when their products cause 
harm to innocent victims. The state may apply its law agai nst compo­
nent parts manufacturers who are aware that their parts will reach that 
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state in  a way the marketers of the finished products intended. 
Accordingly, I agree with my brother WEINTRAUB ' s  test for 
stream of commerce jurisdiction. A defendant who releases i ts product 
for sale is subj ect to j urisdiction in any state where the product causes 
harm (for suits based on that harm) i f  the product arrives in that state 
via the normal course of commercial distribution or as a resul t  of use 
the manufacturer reasonably should have expected. I further agree that 
World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S .  286  ( 1 980), 
should be overruled to the extent that i t  i s  inconsistent with thi s  test. 
II. "GENERAL" JURISDICTION TO APPLY STATE Y LAW 
I emphasize,  however, that the above l i t igation related contacts are 
the only relevant contacts for determining whether State Y may bind 
Brake-0 by its law .  While the fact that Brake-0 conducts u nrelated 
business in S tate Y may be relevant to defeating Brake-0' s motions for 
forum non conveniens dismissal, or may otherwise show that i t  i s  not 
i nconvenient for Brake-0 to defend suit in  State Y once juri sdiction has 
been establ ished, these unrelated contacts cannot substitute for the l i tiga­
tion rel ated contacts that Brake-0 must have with State Y i n  order for 
j urisdiction to be constitutionally reasonable in the first place.7 
I strongly resist  the attempts by some members of this Court to 
expand notions of "general" jurisdiction into the type of presence based 
test which I thought we had rejected with territoriality when we empha­
sized i n  International Shoe that the question is  not "a litt le more or a 
l i tt le less ." International Shoe, 326 U .S .  at 3 1 9 . If "general" j urisdiction 
is taken to mean that a defendant i s  "present" for all purposes, this type 
of j urisdiction should be found unconsti tutional in a post-territorial , 
l imited sovereignty world .  Because most commentators and courts tend 
to v iew "general" jurisdiction as a substitute for the type of al l-purpose 
j urisdiction which existed under Pennoyer, it would be better to discard 
the terminology. Nevertheless, since the term seems i ngrained in the 
case law to describe situations where the forum adjudicates against a 
defendant whose conduct elsewhere produced consequences elsewhere, I 
emphasize that constitutionally permissible "general" j urisdiction i s  
merely a special appl ication o f  the minimum contacts rule that the 
forum may apply its own law to a defendant ' s  conduct which implicates 
the state ' s  regulatory interests, if that defendant is significantly enough 
7 .  Language in Burger King supports assertions of jurisdiction upon a lesser 
showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required, when purported 
convenience factors are h igh, see Burger King, 47 1 U .S .  at 477,  i s  accordingly 
hereby disapproved. 
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connected to the forum for purposes of the i mmediate l i tigation.8  
In "general" j urisdiction situations, the defendant ' s  contacts are 
j udged to be so extensive with the state, and the defendant so closely 
identified with the state, that i t  i s  fair  for the state to apply  its substan­
t ive law against this defendant wherever the defendant  may act. Such 
powerful regulatory control should be attempted sparingly, and must 
involve some level of voluntary, unique, and open-ended affi l iation by a 
defendant with the forum such that the defendant can expect such open­
ended obligations. 
Contrary to some commentators' territorially influenced assumptions, 
there is no need to retain a non-litigation related form of general juris­
diction as an insurance policy to guarantee that plaintiffs can sue defen­
dants somewhere. Instead, the question must always be "For what pur­
pose are you suing the defendant?" Whoever' s l aws are implicated by 
the defendant' s actions are the forums with constitutionall y  presumptive 
right to hail the defendant before their tribunals .  U nt i l  the defendant 
does somethi ng which violates laws, there is no right to hai l  the defen­
dant before a tribunal anywhere. States which choose to entertain  suits 
based on a theory of "general" jurisdiction should  only do so only 
when they feel comfortable applying their own substantive l aw to the 
conduct of which the plaintiff complains. 
Brake-O' s distribution of Brakeman products in  State Y, with some 
minimal administrative presence in S tate Y rel ated to that and other 
Brake-0 operations, hardly entitles State Y to apply its laws against 
Brake-0 for any and all actions which might occur e lsewhere. State Y 
may not constitutionally assert "general" jurisdiction over Brake-0.  The 
fact that its tribunals always have fel t  comfortable asserting j uri sdiction 
over corporations which do significant business in State Y reveals that 
State Y should rethink and understand how jurisdiction constitutional ly  
should proceed. 
8. Such view of "general" jurisdiction might cause us to rethink our analysis, 
though not necessari ly our holding in Perkins v. Benguet CollSol. Mining Co. , 342 
U.S .  437 ( 1 952) .  Since the l i t igation-rel ated contacts i n  that case occurred before the 
defendant had establ ished systematic and continuous contacts with Ohio, for Ohio to 
assert j uri sdiction over the defendant, under my view of "general j ur isdict ion," means 
that i t  is fair for a forum with which a defendant uniquely, strongly ,  and voluntari ly 
affi l iates, to hold that  defendant responsible under forum Jaw for prior actions e lse­
where. Because I bel ieve a "general" jurisdiction forum may indeed l egi timately exer­
cise such power, I bel ieve any exercise of "general" j uri sdiction must be tight ly  
reined in .  
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* * * 
MAIER, J . * :  (affirming) 
I am happy to concur in the result reached in this case by my 
brothers COX and WEINTRAUB . The cause of action and the defen­
dant are sufficiently related to the forum to j ustify an exerci se of j uris­
diction over the defendant. But their opinions (and others) in this case 
raise the question of whether this forum can exercise what we have 
called "general jurisdiction"-jurisdiction justified by a cont inuing rela­
tionship between the defendant and the forum state unrelated to the 
genesis of thi s  cause of action. 
Because I believe that thi s  Court ' s continuing adherence to the con­
cept of general j urisdiction is incorrect in the l ight of the poli c ies re­
flected i n  the l ine of cases beginning with International Shoe Corp. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S .  3 1 0 ( 1 945),  I feel compelled to address  that issue 
separately. In that context, I would add my specific  disagreement wi th 
my brother WEINTRAUB ' s  conclusion that our cases on this subject 
are unintell igible. In my v iew, they would make perfect good sense, if 
their logic were fol lowed consistently by thi s  Court .  A prel iminary 
review of our most i mportant cases in this l ine wi l l  be helpfu l .  
The principal test to  determine the validity of  the exercise of  j udi­
cial j urisdiction remains, of course, the test articulated by this Court i n  
International Shoe. There, w e  held that whether a state could properly 
exerc ise jurisdiction over a defendant would be determined "according 
to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial j ustice." Inter­
national Shoe, 326 U .S .  at 320. That determ ination would  be made by 
examining "the quality and nature of the activity [within the forum 
state] in relation to the fair and orderly admini stration of the laws 
which i t  was the purpose of the due process clause to i nsure ."  !d. at 
3 1 9 . That conclusion was informed by the recognition that the concept 
of corporate "presence," reflected in the rubric "doing business," was a 
legal fiction. /d. at 3 1 6 . 
Thus, after International Shoe, juri sdiction, based on the physical 
presence of the defendant in  the forum state, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U .S .  
7 1 4, 733  ( 1 877) ,  was  no longer defi nitive with respect to  j urisdiction 
over corporations .  This power theory of j urisdiction became i mpractical 
i n  l ight of the " increasing nationalization of commerce" during the 
* Harold G .  Maier: Professor of Law and holder of the David Danie l s  Al len 
Dist inguished Chair i n  Law, Vanderbi l t  U niversity School of Law. Professor Maier 's  
research was supported by a summer research gran t  from Vanderb i l t  Un iversi ty 
School of Law. 
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Twentieth Century. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. , 355 U.S .  220, 
222-23 ( 1 957) .  Therefore, beginning w ith International Shoe, this Court 
undertook to determine, under the fundamental fairness principle, wheth­
er assertions of j udicial jurisdiction w ith respect to a given set of facts 
i s  due procedure within the meaning of the Due Process Clauses of the 
United States Constitution. U .S .  Const. amends . V and XIV. 
We refined the fair play and substantial justice test by identifying 
various relationships between the defendant and the forum state from 
which the fairness of the exerc ise of j udicial j urisdiction could be in­
ferred .  The test could be met when the cause of action had a suffic ient­
ly reasonable relationship to the forum state making it fair to bring the 
defendant into that j urisdiction, International Shoe, 326 U .S .  at 3 1 7, or 
by the defendant' s purposeful availment of the legal system of the 
forum state . McGee, 355 U .S .  at 220; see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U .S .  
235 ,  253 ( 1 958) .  
Despite the rationale of  International Shoe, thi s  Court mai ntained the 
fiction of corporate "location" within the forum as suffi cient to leg it i ­
mize the exercise of j udicial j urisdiction. Thus, continuous and system­
atic busi ness activity within a state, unrelated to the cause of action, 
remained sufficient to support such j urisdiction. Perkins v. Benguet 
Canso/. Mining Co. , 342 U .S .  437 ,  445 ( 1 952) .  In Shaffer v. Heitner, 
433 U .S .  1 86 ( 1 977) ,  we consolidated multiple categories of j urisdic­
tional characterizations-in personam, in rem, quasi- in-rem-into a 
single test of fairness. We held that thereafter the validity of all asser­
tions of judicial jurisdiction would be determined by examining the 
relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the cause of action 
under the fairness and j ustice test of International Shoe. Shaffer, 433 
U.S . at  207 . But see Burnham v .  Superior Court, 495 U.S .  604, 62 1 -22 
( 1 990) . 1 
Later cases i l lustrate that identification of relevant, significant con­
tacts to determine j udicial j urisdiction i s  only one means of determining 
whether trying the case i n  that forum i s  unfair to the defendant.2 In 
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S .  286 ( 1 980) , l ack of 
1 .  In  Helicopteros Nacionales de  Colombia, S.A .  v .  Hall, 466 U .S .  408 ( 1 984), we 
made i t  c lear that  the avai lab i l i ty of a forum anywhere in  the world would make i t  
unnecessary to consider whether th i s  Court should designate a forum i n  the  United 
States as acceptable sole ly on grounds of necessity. ld. at 4 1 9  n . 1 3 ;  cf Shaffer v. 
Heitner, 433 U.S .  1 86,  1 99 n . l 7  ( 1 977) .  
2 .  The fairness to the plaintiff of the forum selected i s  not  a due process 
concern because it is the plaint iff who chooses the forum in the first p lace. Rush v. 
Savchuk, 444 U.S .  320, 332  ( 1 980) .  
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reasonable foreseeabil ity that the defendant might be hai led into a g iven 
forum was a sign of possible unfairness .  !d. at 295-98 .  More i mportant­
ly ,  we pointed out that even though contacts that would satisfy due 
process concerns in other cases may exist, the special circumstances of 
a case may make the exercise of judicial j urisdiction by that same fo­
rum unfair. 
Even if  the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from 
being forced to l it igate before the tribunals of another State ; even i f  the 
forum State has a strong interest in applying its l aw to the controversy ;  
even i f  the forum S tate i s  the most convenient location for l it igation, 
the Due Process Clause. acting as an instrument of interstate federal­
ism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a 
valid judgment. 
!d. at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U .S .  235 ,  25 1 ( 1 958 ) ) .  
Thus, we  recognized that dueness of  process depended no t  only on  
the defendant' s  relationship with the forum state, but also upon the 
appropriate allocation of decision making authority among the states,  
recognizing a direct relationship between individual l iberty values and 
the policy of local self-government that informs the federal structure. !d. 
Two years later, we noted this relationship specifically i n  Insurance 
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U . S .  694 
( 1 982) :  "The restriction on state sovereign power described i n  World­
Wide Volkswagen Corp . . . .  must be seen as ultimately a function of 
the individual l iberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause . "  !d. 
at 702-03 n . l O . We confirmed that relationship in Keeton v. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc. , 465 U .S .  770 ( 1 984) and Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 47 1 U .S .  462, 472 n . l 3  ( 1 985 ) .3 
In Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U .S .  1 02 ( 1 987) ,  
we weighed the defendant' s burden of appearing in  the forum against 
the forum's  interests in adj udicating the case and noted a direct parallel 
between the values of the federal system that informed our j udgment i n  
World- Wide Volkswagen and the international system values o f  the 
world community that informed our judgment i n  Asahi. Asahi, 480 U .S .  
at 1 1 5 .  
The principal concern in  each o f  these cases i s  fairness to the corpo­
rate defendant whether measured by interest in avoiding undue surprise, 
interest in  reaping the benefits of local self-government reflected in the 
3 .  These "l iberty values" of federalism protected by the Due Process C lause of 
the United States Constitution, Amendments V and XIV, should be dist inguished from 
the "governmental structure" values of federal ism, protected by the Ful l  Faith and 
Credit Clause of the United States Constitut ion, Article IV, section 1 .  See A llstate 
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S.  302, 320-32 ( 1 98 1 )  (Stevens, J . ,  concurring) .  
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federal system, or i nterest in having the case adjudicated in a forum 
with which the defendant and the cause of action have minimal signifi­
cant contacts. The key question in al l  of these due process cases re­
mains whether the defendant wil l  receive fair p lay and substantial jus­
tice through the fair and orderly administration of the laws. This stan­
dard has not changed. It i s  the defendant' s rights that the Due Process 
Clause protects ; and it  protects the general public interest in preserving 
the values of local self-government that inform the federal system when 
it  does so. 
The continued recognition of the concept of general j urisdiction runs  
directly counter to  the proposition that the case against a defendant 
should not be tried in a forum having no relationship to the cause of 
action that is the subject of the suit.4 Any attempt to determine whether 
a given forum meets the "fair play and substantial j ustice" test of Inter­
national  Shoe must reject the fantasy of "corporate presence" in favor 
of the recognition of certain i ncontrovertible real world facts .  It is the 
result in a given case that may be unfair to a defendant, not the words 
that are used to justify that result . If the Due Process Clause is de­
signed to protect a defendant against unfairness, i t  cannot do so unless 
all the attributes of a particular forum that i nfluence the results in a 
case, and therefore, the relationship of the defendant' s acts to that fo­
rum, are taken into account. 
The location of the forum wil l  always i nfluence the outcome of a 
lawsuit tried there. Furthermore, different forums wi l l  influence the 
outcome of a lawsuit differently .  The precise impact of that influence 
on the suit' s outcome may be difficult or even impossible to determine 
in advance; but the fact of i nfluence is  incontrovertible. Thi s  i s  so 
because human beings, not rules of law or mechanical formula, decide 
lawsuits and the acts of human beings are always influenced by the 
environment in which those acts are committed. See Harold G. Maier, 
Baseball and Chicken Salad: A Realistic Look at Choice of Law,  44 
Vand. L. Rev . 827 , 829 ( 1 99 1 ) . This is no less true for j udges than for 
any one else.5 Therefore, the political and social attributes of the forum 
4. I n  Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U .S .  604 ( 1 990), Justice Scal ia concluded 
that presence of a defendant within a forum state had always been sufficient to jus­
t i fy the exercise of j udicial jurisdiction; therefore, such presence necessari l y  met the 
"traditional notions of fair play and substant ia l  justice." !d. at 6 1 9  (Scalia ,  J . ) ;  see 
International Shoe Corp. v. Washington, 326 U .S .  3 1 0, 320 ( 1 945) .  But, at least with 
respect to corporations, International Shoe c learly rejected the "presence'' test and, by 
logic and imp lication, general j uri sdiction as wel l .  See Shaffer. 433 U .S .  at 2 1 6 . 
5 .  "Rules are not self-applying but are wielded by people acting as decision 
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as well  as i ts geographical location wi l l  necessari ly  influence the way in  
which legal norms are interpreted and appl ied. 
The acts of the defendant, not its "corporate personality," create the 
cause of action that the forum wi l l  try . To determine the legal results to 
be attached to those acts in a place unrelated to them is an egregious 
form of unfairness. Thi s  effect cannot be resolved solely by  careful 
choice of law or by application of the principle of forum non conveni­
ens, when the relevant differences that affect the total result  in the case 
may have l ittle to do with either the local l aw rules adopted by the 
court or the convenience of the parties .  
Relevant differences among forums that i nfluence the results in  cases 
include the following: juries or judges may have a propensity to award 
different levels of recovery in s imi lar cases depending upon the pol i tical 
and social setting i n  which the case i s  tried; the requirements of forum 
rules of evidence may be more advantageous to one side than to the 
other; the amount of attorney ' s  fees permitted or awarded may be larger 
or smaller in some forums than in others (this may be especial ly impor­
tant when the only other forum available is in a c ivi l  law country in 
which contingent fees are usual ly  nonexistent and attorneys fees are 
l imited by statute) ;  local attitudes toward particular corporate or individ­
ual defendants may i nfluence the resu l t  in the case; local attitudes to­
ward the type of cause of action may i nfluence the result  in the case; 
and the quality of the bench and bar may vary significantl y  among 
available forums. 
Influences l ike those above are present wherever a case is tr ied. 6 A 
choice among forums chooses among these result-affecting attributes as 
well as among possible choice of law rules or distances to be traveled 
by parties and witnesses. Seeking to take advantage of these differences 
is the essence of forum shopping.  
Given the strength, multip l ic i ty,  and, i n  some instances, unpredict­
abi l ity of these local i nfluences, j urisdictional rules shoul d  be designed 
and interpreted at least to assure that a case wi l l  be heard in a forum 
whose pol itical and social context is rel ated to the events in the case, 7 
makers." Myres S .  McDougal & W. M ichael Reisman, International Law in Contem­
porary Perspective: The Public Order of the World Community 5 ( 1 98 1  ) .  
6 .  See Jerome Frank, Preface t o  Sixth Printing, Law and the Modern Mind 
( 1 949) ;  cf Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda J. S i lberman, Choice of Law and the 
Supreme Court: A Dialogue Inspired by Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 1 4  U.C. 
Davis L.  Rev. 84 1 ,  847-48 ( 1 98 ! ) . 
7 .  Thi s  may, i n  fact ,  be the principal just ifi cation for rules l imi t ing j udicial 
jurisdict ion. See Wendy Col l ins  Perdue. Personal Jurisdicrion and the Beetle in the 
Spring, 1 995]  CASE THREE 657 
not one that is  solely the domicile of the defendant or a place where 
the defendant does business unrelated to the cause of action. In thi s  
way, all of  the relevant influences on the  result  of the case, not solely 
those addressed by choice of law rules or considerations of geographic 
i nconvenience, are more l ikely to be related to the defendant' s acts that 
generated the cause of action that is subject to the forum' s  adj udication. 
Justice WEINTRAUB i s  absolutely correct when he points out that 
the terms "specific  jurisdiction" and "general jurisdiction" characterize 
opposite ends of a d ichotomy . For this very reason these characteriza­
tions are an inadequate guide to protecting the defendant ' s due process 
rights to fair play and substantial j ustice. Automatic refusal to consider 
case-specific  elements related to the propriety of the forum selected by 
the plaintiff ignores the fundamental premises of International Shoe and 
the cases that have fol lowed it .  Mere rec itation of the mantra, forum 
non conveniens or mechanical reference to the forum court ' s abi lity to 
choose relevant legal rules from other j urisdictions wi l l  not resolve this 
important i ssue. 8 
Although I certainly would not attribute this sentiment to my col­
leagues on this bench, one cannot help but believe that ins istence on 
preserving the avai labil ity of general j urisdiction to permi t  plaintiffs to 
shop for favorable forums stems from an unarticulated premise that 
corporate defendants should always be l i able for i nj uries caused by their 
products, regardless of actual fault .  Therefore, any j urisdictional system 
that contributes to that plaintiff-favoring result i s  j ustified. If  thi s  i nsur­
ance principle i s  the social pol icy that supports maintenance of the 
general j urisdiction concept, this Court should not participate in perpetu­
ating that masquerade. Let us e ither overtly adopt that principle; or 
cease applying i t  without accurate analys is  and identification. 
I ,  for one, believe that procedural fair play and substantial justice 
are equal rights of both plaintiffs and defendants. Procedural rules 
should not be used to mask an inapposite social policy designed to 
Box, 32 B .C .  L. Rev. 529, 57 1 ( 1 99 1 ) . 
8. This unfortunate tendency to lump al l  considerations concerning unfairness to 
the defendant under the general heading of forum non conveniens may have its roots 
in a doctrinal strain in the International Shoe opinion that d iscussed comparative 
inconvenience of available forums. The Court ' s  failure to give any serious attention 
to these concerns in Kulka v .  Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 ( 1 978)  and World- Wide 
Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S .  286 ( 1 980) ,  make it clear that inconvenience of 
forum i s  not the sole consideration i n  determining whether the defendant can rece ive 
fair play and substantial justice in the forum that the plaint iff has selected . See 
Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theon for Judicial Jurisdiction 
and Choice of Law, 39 Am.  J. Comp. L. 249, 270 ( 1 99 1 ) . 
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favor the former while avoiding discussion and evaluation of that 
policy ' s broader economic and social i mplications. I would abol i sh  the 
principle of general j urisdiction as a means for determining the due 
process rights of defendants .  To the extent that Burnham i s  i nconsistent 
with this conclusion, I would overrule it. 
The j udgment below is affirmed. 
* * * 
MULLENIX, 1 .  * : (affirming) 
I .  
I concur with my colleagues that the state constitutional l y  may 
assert personal j urisdiction over Brake-0 and would affirm the S tate Y 
Supreme Court j udgment. I write only to suggest that the Court may re­
solve this case comfortabl y  w ithi n  existing doctrine, without need to 
further expand, c larify ,  modify ,  or reverse existing precedent . 
This case involves a Korean corporate defendant and therefore Asahi 
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S .  1 02 ( 1 987) ,  provides the 
due process considerations for a state' s  assertion of personal j urisdiction 
over a foreign corporate defendant. However, although Asahi embodies 
essential ly a cautious approach in  such c ircumstances, this case is suffi­
ciently d istingui shable as to mitigate any foreign policy concerns evi­
dent in  Asahi. 
Foremost, the California plaintiff in Asahi settled his claims against 
the foreign defendants, leaving only an indemnification cross-claim 
between two foreign corporate defendants, Cheng Shin and Asah i .  As 
Justice O ' Connor' s opinion suggests, Cali fornia' s legitimate i nterest i n  
that dispute was then diminished considerably ( if not fatal ly ) .  Asahi, 
480 U .S .  at 1 1 4. By contrast, the inj ured plaintiff in thi s  case went to 
trial and received a favorable verdict. S ince the structure of the lawsuit 
remained intact, the state retained an undiminished interest in  protecting 
its c i tizen . 
Moreover, in  order to constitutionall y  assert jurisdiction over Brake-
0, I do not believe that Brake-0'  s actions need be measured against a 
standard of "purposeful direction towards the forum state" or any show­
ing of "additional conduct ." Asahi, 480 U.S . at 1 1 2 .  But even under 
* Linda S. Mul len ix :  Bernard 1. Ward Centennial Professor of Law, Uni vers i ty 
of Texas Law Schoo l ;  Vis i t ing Professor, Harvard Law School ,  1 994-95 ;  B .A . ,  1 97 1 ,  
The City College of New York; M .  Phi l . ,  1 974, Ph.D. ,  1 977,  Col umbia Un iversity; 
J .D . , 1 980, Georgetown University Law Center. 
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these heightened stream of commerce standards, there seems to be more 
purposeful  affil iat ing conduct than in Asahi. Thus, Brake-0 admitted i t  
knew its component parts would be  used in  Fishfins ,  l arge numbers of 
which wind up in the state . B y  contrast ,  Asahi ' s  president declared in  
an  affidavit that the corporation never contemplated that i ts l imited sales 
of valves to Cheng Shin in Taiwan would subject i t  to l awsuit in Cali­
fornia. 
I I .  
I a lso agree with my colleagues who urge that some generali zed rule 
of reasonableness should govern assertions of personal j urisdiction. 
Justice Brennan ' s  concurrence in  Asahi supplies such a standard. Thi s  
standard requires only a showi ng of "regular and anticipated flow of 
products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale," Asahi, 480 
U .S .  at 1 1 7 (Brennan, J. , concurri ng), which i s  met on these facts .  ("As 
long as a participant in thi s  process i s  aware that the final product i s  
being marketed i n  the forum S tate, the possib i lity o f  a lawsuit there 
cannot come as a surprise.") !d. at 1 1 7 .  
In addition, w e  need not set forth any new stream o f  commerce 
theory because this case basically satisfies the analytical factors set forth 
i n  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U .S .  286 ( 1 980) 
(burden on the defendant, interests of the forum state, plaintiff' s interest 
in obtai ning rel ief, the interstate j udicial system' s  interest in obtaining 
the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interests of 
the several states in furthering fundamental substantive policies) . 1 
A consideration of these factors suggests that the burden on Brake-0 
to defend this lawsuit probably is somewhat equivalent to that of Asahi, 
although B rake-0 has a greater presence in  State Y than Asahi did in 
California .  Brake-0 conducted legal business i n  State Y, including but 
not l imited to contract negotiations.  Thus,  Brake-0 probably has a weak 
claim to being unfami l iar with either the state law or the American 
legal system. 
As indicated above, State Y has an interest in the l i tigation and in  
protecting i t s  citizens from the  inj urious conduct of  non-resident domes­
tic or foreign defendants. Certainly this interest is greater than in Asahi, 
i n  which California arguably had l i ttle or no interest i n  an indemnity 
l .  With due respect to my colleagues, this case does not seem to cry out for 
overturning World- Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S .  286 ( 1 980),  or for over­
rul ing the entire body of minimum contacts due process juri sprudence articulated by 
this Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S .  3 1 0 ( 1 945 ) ,  and its 
numerous progeny.  
660 NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIE\V [Vol .  29 :627 
action involving two foreign corporations. 
The inj ured plaintiff definitely has an interest in  adj udicat ing his 
c laims in state court, an interest also absent in  Asahi. Moreover, as my 
col leagues sensibly suggest, i f  the plai ntiffs here are unable to legiti­
mately assert j urisdiction over B rake-0, these inj ured plaintiffs essential­
ly  will be left w ithout a forum and remedy. 
The same interstate considerations that informed the Court in Asahi 
are present here. In that case, the Court ' s  sensitivity to international and 
foreign policy implications mitigated against the state' s  legitimate asser­
tion of personal j urisdiction. Bu t  Justice 0' Connor' s opinion also coun­
seled that in assessing these shared interstate interests ,  each case is best 
served "by a careful inquiry i nto the reasonableness of the assertion of 
j urisdiction in the particular case," Asahi, 480 U .S .  at 1 1 5 ,  weighing 
burdens on the defendant against interests of the plaintiffs or the forum 
state. S ince the plaintiffs ' and forum state ' s  interests loom l arge here 
and were de minimis in  Asahi, Justice O 'Connor' s balancing approach 
favors the state ' s  assertion of personal j urisdiction in thi s  particu lar 
case. 
Considering the great i nterests of the inj ured plaintiffs and the forum 
state, balanced against the burden on the defendant, and considering the 
international context, the state ' s  exercise of personal j urisdiction over 
Brake-0 would  not be unreasonable or unfair. 
I I I .  
Because this  case may be resolved under the standards set  forth in 
Asahi and World- Wide Volkswagen, i t  does not seem necessary to ex­
amine whether the state ' s  assertion of j urisdiction is supportable under 
either a theory of general j ur isdiction" or specific  j urisdiction . 3  See 
2. The state court ' s  assert ion of  personal jurisdiction probably  i s  sustainable 
under general jurisdiction standards.  Brake-0 basical ly has more affi l iat ing contacts 
with the state than certain ly  Asahi had with Cali fornia ( such as personnel  and con­
tract negotiations within the state), but i t  is a closer ca l l  whether B rake-0 has more 
affi l iating contacts than Helical with Texas. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colum­
bia, S.A .  v. Hall, 466 U .S .  408 ( 1 984 ). In this l i t igation, the underlying tort occurred 
in the state, B rake-0 has a corporate presence (personnel)  and sales i n  the state, 
conducted contract negotiations in the state, derived income from its activ i ties in  the 
state, and arguably enjoyed the benefits and protections of the state. Addit ional ly ,  
un l ike Helicopteros, the plaintiffs were domici led in  the forum. 
3 .  The underly ing record gives no indication whether this state or federal c ircu i t  
endorses any spec ific jurisdiction standard (e.g. , a "related to," "but for." or "ari sing 
out of' test ) .  While some federal circuits endorse various speci fic  jurisdiction 
standards, the Supreme Court has yet to endorse any particular formu lat ion and 
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Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A .  v. Hall, 466 U .S .  408 
( 1 984) .  
Affirmed. 
S ILBERMAN, J . * : (affirming) 
The j udgment below i s  affirmed. 
* * * 
The chaotic state of j urisdictional theory in  the Uni ted States i s  
apparent when one employs the  doctrinal analysis prompted by this case 
instead of rely ing on common sense. 
The foreign defendant here, Brake-0, has sales of 30 mi l l ion dol lars 
in the United States and State Y is one of Brake-0 '  s l arger Uni ted 
States markets for its general products. State Y is also a convenient 
forum for l itigation since i t  is the place where the accident occurred. 
On what basis then does Brake-0 resist j urisdiction? Brake-O' s  
argument stems i n  part from the fact that with respect to a product 
l iabil ity c laim such as this, j urisdiction is determined on the basis of the 
defendant' s  relationship to an indiv idual state and not the United States 
as a whole. Recently, a different standard has been adopted for the fed­
eral courts when federal claims are asserted against foreign defendants 
not subject to the j urisdiction of any one state . See Fed. R. Civ .  P. 
4(k)(2) .  In such a case, j uri sdiction anywhere i n  the United States i s  
constitutional i f  the foreign defendant has  sufficient aggregate contacts 
with the United States .  
Although it  would be inappropriate to create by j udicial fiat a "na­
tional" standard for asserting jurisdiction over foreign defendants , it 
would be w ise for Congress to take up that task and revi si t  the issue of 
j urisdiction over foreign defendants for al l  types of c laims (both state 
and federal )  and legislate standards for j urisdiction to be appl ied in both 
state and federal courts. See Linda J .  S i lberman, Developments in Juris­
diction and Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation: 
Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 28 Tex .  
indeed has twice left t h i s  question open for future determination. See Carnival Cruise 
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S .  585 ,  589 ( 1 99 1 )  (dec l in ing to address constitutional 
due process i ssue when narrower contract ground for decis ion avai lable) ;  Helicopteros, 
466 U.S .  at 4 1 5  n . l 0. I n  this case, the Court should again avoid addressing the 
val idity or consequences of the dist inction among forms of specific j urisdiction, s ince 
the i ssue has not been presented on the facts or prevail i ng law. 
* Linda J .  S i lberman: Professor of Law, New Y ark University School of Law; 
B .A .  Univers i ty of Michigan, 1 965 ; J .D .  Uni versi ty of M ichigan, 1 968 .  
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Int ' l  L .J .  50 1 , 5 1 3- 1 6  ( 1 993) .  S uch a statute could bring some predict­
abi lity to the field of j urisdiction by setting forth more precise  rules for 
the exercise of j urisdiction. Such rules should be based on the foreign 
defendant ' s  activities with the United States as a whole. Unwitt ing or 
unknowing defendants can be protected by l imit ing jurisdiction in prod­
uct l iabil ity cases to defendants who inj ure Uni ted States claimants i n  
the Uni ted States when the foreign defendants "knew o r  reasonably 
should have known that a product would be i mported for sale or use i n  
the United States ." '  A monetary or quantitative amount o f  bus iness 
could also be i ncluded in such a statute to protect those foreign defen­
dants whose products have only sporadic  use in the United States .  The 
courts in the state where the injury occurs should be the appropriate 
venue for any such action, thus el iminating the possibility of widespread 
forum shopping by an injured plaintiff and assuring that the action i s  
brought in  a forum convenient for l itigation . 
In the instant case, a s imilar result can be achieved under existing 
doctrinal framework, but not without  something of a struggle.  The 
spl intered opinion by this Court i n  Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior 
Court, 480 U .S .  1 02 ( 1 987), leaves open the question of whether a 
foreign manufacturer has to do something more than just put i ts compo­
nent part into the stream of commerce in  order to meet the "minimum 
contacts" threshold required by our cases.2 The present case also adds a 
part icular wrinkle in  that the specific component part causing the i njury 
was i ncorporated into a product sold in another state. 3 In addition, 
I .  Cf S.  1 996, I OOth Cong. ,  I st Sess. ( 1 987) (Bi l l  proposing personal j urisdic­
tion over Citizens or Subjects of Foreign States in Certain Actions ) .  
2 .  Lower courts have continued to  struggle wi th  the  issue in the  aftermath of  
Asahi. Compare Barone v .  Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co. , 25 F. 3d 6 1 0  
(8th Cir. 1 994) (Japanese manufacturer of fireworks-who used a network o f  Uni ted 
States distributors to p lace i ts  products in  the stream of commerce i n  the Mid­
west-was subject to jurisdiction in Nebraska where plaintiff was i njured) and 
Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp . ,  2 1  F.3d 1 558 (Fed. Cir. 1 994) 
(Taiwanese defendant subject to jurisdiction in  Virginia in  patent infringement action 
where defendant sold fans to New Jersey company who in  tum distributed them to 
other United States retailers) with Fa/kirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd. , 906 
F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1 990) (Japanese manufacturer of single component part not subject 
to jurisdiction where i ts product was incorporated by a third party into a piece of 
equipment and sold to plaintiff in forum state) .  
3 .  However, other cars incorporating Brake-O ' s  component appear to be sold in  
State Y .  Thus, th i s  case is  not  l ike  World- Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S .  
286 ( 1 980), where the  New York distri butor and New York dealer did not  d istribute 
to the forum state ' s  market at a l l .  Cf Vermeulen v. Renault U. S.A . ,  Inc. , 985 F.2d 
1 534 ( l i th Cir. 1 993) ,  cert. denied, 1 1 3 S .  Ct. 2334 ( 1 993) (Georgia as the p lace of 
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Asahi 's i ntroduction of a formal second tier of "reasonableness" brings 
into play a myriad of other concerns, such as whether there are particu­
lar burdens for a South Korean defendant responding in an American 
court.4 
On these facts, however, the outcome is c lear. Under either Justice 
O 'Connor' s or Justice Brennan ' s  view in Asahi, Brake-O' s  high volume 
of sales should provide suffic ient contacts when the cla im arises out of 
an inj ury i n  the state, and the defendant engages in additional activity 
that takes advantage of the forum state ' s market .  Nor does there appear 
to be anything "unreasonable" about exercis ing j urisdiction over Brake-
0. Unlike Asahi, claims brought by the resident plaintiff against a num­
ber of defendants did not sett le; thus S tate Y is a forum in  which all 
parties to the dispute should be joined in a s ingle trial .  In  addition, 
Brake-0 appears to have other connections with State Y .  Although I 
would not go so far as to rely on a theory of general j urisdiction in  
asserting j urisdiction over Brake-0 ( i. e. ,  the case might well be  decided 
differently i n  the absence of the accident i n  S tate Y, cf Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S .  408 ( 1 984)), Brake-O ' s  
other activities are not to  be ignored i n  assessing either Brake-0' s con­
tacts with State Y or the reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction. 
As Justice WEINTRAUB has already observed, the concepts of general 
and specific  jurisdiction are not necessari ly hard and fast categories.  At 
the same time, however, there is a need to develop better criteria for 
identifying where a defendant may be sued without regard to the nature 
of the claim. Unlike Justice WEINTRAUB, I do not think the activities 
of Brake-0 do or should satisfy such a "general jurisdiction" require­
ment. I would endorse something closer to the English rule that requ ires 
an overseas company to "establ ish a p lace of business" within the coun­
try for i t  to be subject to the exercise of general j urisdiction . 5  
accident permitted to  assert jurisdiction over foreign car  manufacturer where distribu­
tion network exi sted in  Georgia but was unconnected to the plaintiff' s claim s ince 
the car had been purchased elsewhere) .  
4. The addition of a separate "reasonab leness" t ier  has been subject to substan­
tial crit icism. See, e.g. , Linda Si lberman, Reflections on Burnham v. Superior Court: 
Toward Presumptive Rules of Jurisdiction and Implications for Choice of Law, 22 
Rutgers L ..J. 569, 576-83 ( 1 99 1  ) ; Stephen B .  Burbank, Practice and Procedure: The 
World in Our Courts, 89 Mich. L .  Rev. 1 456, 1 470 ( 1 99 1 ) ; Russe l l  J. Weintraub, 
Asahi Sends Personal Jurisdiction Down the Tubes, 23 Tex. Int ' l L . J .  55 ,  62-63 
( 1 988) .  
5 .  See, e.g. , Sowh India Shipping Corp. v .  Export-Import Bank of Korea, [ 1 985] 
I W.L.R. 585 (CA) ;  see also A. V.  Dicey & J. H .  C .  Morris, The Conflict of Laws 
306-08 (Lawrence Coll ins, ed. ,  1 2th ed. 1 993).  
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One last cautionary note : The only issue we decide here today is 
one of personal jurisdiction . I t  i s  entirely possible that at a l ater time 
we might also find application of State Y ' s  law appropriate depending 
upon the particular issue. B ut the two questions are different, and Jus­
tice COX' s attempt to equate them is  u nfortunate. Different consider­
ations come into p lay with respect to choice of law than for j urisdic­
tion, and even when it i s  appropriate to require a defendant to respond 
in the American forum, it may be nonetheless inappropriate to impose 
American standards of l iabi l ity . In  the context of the international com­
munity, i t  is i nteresting to note that the j urisdictional reach under Eng­
l ish Order 1 1  (Rules of the Supreme Court (England) Order 1 1 , Rule 1 
( 1 )  ( 1 995)) and B russels Convention (Convention on Jurisdiction and 
the Enforcement of Judgments in Civi l  and Commercial M atters, EC 
O.J. c . l 89 (28 July 1 990)) is often more expansive than that of the 
United States. And yet, it is American jurisdiction that i s  so often com­
plained about. Certainly, some of that critique has to do with obj ections 
to American-style discovery, large j ury verdicts, and contingent fees .  
But much of the unhappiness i s  directed to the perceived view that an 
invitation to l i tigation in an American court may mean an u nfai r  asser­
tion of American law. Rules which secure convenience of l i tigation do 
not necessaril y  take account of the competing interests with respect to 
the appl icable l aw .  Those i ssues remain for another day. 
* * * 
WEINTRAUB , J . * : (affirming) 
Affirmed. A court sitting in State Y may constitutional ly exercise 
personal jurisdiction over B rake-0. 
At l ast, a chance to cleanse the Augean Stables of our personal 
jurisdiction leavings. We have constitutionalized personal j urisdiction. 
Instead of this freeing our courts to experiment within broad boundaries 
of civi l ized reasonableness, in our hands it has imposed restraints that 
suggest travel and communication are becoming increasingly more, not 
less, difficult. 
I .  SPECIFIC JURISDICTION AND STREAM OF COMMERCE 
I wi l l  divide my analysis under the headings of "specific" and "gen-
* Russell J. Weintraub: Professor of Law and holder of the John B. Connal ly 
Chair in  Civi l  Jurisprudence, Universi ty of Texas at Austin School of Law. Author of 
Commentary on the Conflict of Laws (3d ed. 1 986, 1 99 1  supp . ) ;  International Litiga­
tion and Arbitration ( 1 994 ) .  
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era!" jurisdiction, but this should not signal some sharp division be­
tween the two. These are analytical tools that lose their utility if we 
treat them as ends in themselves. Some lawyers and j udges may have 
been brainwashed in law school into thinking that there is a bright l ine 
dividing these two concepts, but that i s  not the way the world works. 
Common sense suggests that specific and general jurisdiction are oppo­
site poles of a spectrum of fact si tuations.  At the extreme specific end, 
for example, a nonres ident motorist who drives in the state only once 
and hits a pedestrian, we properly insist that the action ari se out of that 
single contact. At the general j urisdiction end, a defendant who is domi­
ciled or has a principal place of business in  the forum, we invite the 
afflicted of the world to come with their distant complaints, subject to a 
wise use of forum non conveniens. The vast number of cases i n  the 
middle ranges of this spectrum properly receive different treatment. The 
less the cause has to do with events in the forum, the more additional 
forum contacts should exist. The more the action arises out of or i s  
related to acts or consequences i n  the forum, the less the requirement 
for additional nexus between forum and defendant. 
Even this may not be sensible enough. For interstate suits, particu­
larly suits involving companies whose commercial activities are far­
ranging and are l ikely to be represented by an insurer doing bus iness in 
all states ,  perhaps any forum with an interest in providing a remedy to 
the plaintiff should have j urisdiction over the defendant, subject to a 
cogent showing of unfairness .  Such unfairness would include choice of 
a forum for its lunatic contlict of laws rule-such as the now abrogated 
Missi ssippi rule that regarded i ts tort statute of l imitations, longest in 
the states, as "procedural . " 1  For international suits, such as this  one, a 
decent respect for friendly foreign countries requires that the defendant 
have some contact with the United States, not any individual state, that 
makes it reasonable under the c ircumstances to order the foreigner to 
appear and defend here. This  idea has received l imited and halting 
recognition in Fed.  R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2), which took effect on December 
I .  Miss issippi was a target forum because i t  had a s ix-year tort l imi tations 
period and regarded l imi tations as "procedural" so that the M ississippi period applied 
to any suit brought in  Mississippi , even though the i njury occurred in a state with a 
shorter period that had run before su i t  i n  Mississippi . See Ferens v. John Deere Co. , 
494 U.S .  5 1 6  ( 1 990). Mississippi has shortened i ts tort l imitations to 3 years (Miss. 
Code Ann. � 1 5- 1 -49 ( Supp. 1 994)) and has passed a ''borrowing" statute that would 
app ly  the shorter statute of l imitations of the place where the cause of action ''ac­
crued" if  the plaint iff were not a Mississippi resident (Miss. Code Ann .  § 1 5 - 1 -65 
(Supp. 1 994 ) ) .  
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1 ,  1 993 .  For federal law claims, that rule permits accumulating  national 
contacts. It does so, however, in a manner that exhibits an unexpected 
sense of humor. As a condition precedent, the defendant must "not [be] 
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any 
state ."  !d. This puts the plaintiff in  the position of contending that it 
could not get jurisdiction over the defendant i n  a state court, and the 
defendant in  the posture of saying "yes you could." Marvelous .  This 
undoubtedly is  a result of tracking the Parthian shot of Justice 
B lackmun, in Omni Capital Int ' l  v. Rudolf Wolff & Co. 2 Not incidental­
ly, since 1 987, Australian courts have had nation-wide jurisdiction with 
transfer for demonstrated inconvenience. Austl . Acts P . ,  Jurisdiction of 
Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1 987 (No. 24) . Be that as it may, i t  i s  not 
necessary to take such heroic measures to find jurisdiction over Brake-
0. 
First, let us give its deserved quietus to the attempt in Asahi Metal 
Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U .S .  1 02 ( 1 987),  supported by four Jus­
tices, to convert the stream of commerce to a pathetic dribble. Although 
this part of the opinion got only four votes, Boit v. Gar-Tee Prods. , 
Inc. , 967 F.2d 67 1 ,  683 ( l st Cir. 1 992) declared that "those c ircuits that 
have squarely addressed the stream-of-commerce issue since Asahi have 
adopted Justice O ' Connor ' s  plurality view ." !d. at 683 .  Apparently, the 
First Circuit' s  Westlaw and Lexis programs do not include the Fifth 
Circuit .  See Irving v. Owens- Corning Fiberglas Corp. , 864 F.2d 383 
(5th Cir .) ,  cert. denied, 493 U.S .  823 ( 1 989) .  At  least this Court had 
the good sense not to grant certiorari i n  Irving to "clarify" the matter 
and resolve the split between circuits. Now that the AALS has marched 
upon the Court and replaced its members with this panel ,  we can act 
decisively .  A defendant that releases a product for sale i s  subj ect  to 
jurisdiction in any state where the product causes harm if the product 
comes there either in the normal course of commercial distribution or is  
brought into that state by someone us ing that product as  i t  i s  intended 
to be used. Insofar as World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 
U .S .  286 ( 1 980), is inconsistent with this formulation, it is overruled. 
Thus, we end the danger springing from the four-Justice opinion in 
Asahi, that we would turn the clock back fifty years so that manufactur­
ers could proclaim in the words that Tom Lehrer gave to Wernher von 
Braun : "Once the rockets are up, who cares where they come down? 
2 .  484 U.S.  97,  I l l  ( 1 987) ,  suggesting " [a] narrowly tai lored servi ce of process 
provis ion. authorizing service on an al ien in a federal-question case when the a l ien i s  
not amenable to  service under the applicable state long-arm statute . . . . " /d. 
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That ' s  not my department." Tom Lehrer, Wernher von Braun (Warner 
Bros. Records 1 965) .  
Once again, our conclusion i s  bolstered by the wise counsel of our 
European cousins. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judg­
ments (Official J .E.C.  1 89,  v. 33 ,  July 28, 1 990, at 1 -34, reprinted 29 
I .L.M. 1 4 1 3 ;  28 I .L.M.  620 [E.U.-E.F.T.A. Convention] . The European 
Union and European Free Trade Association Conventions on Jurisdiction 
and Enforcement of Judgments provide for jurisdiction "in matters relat­
ing to tort . . . in the courts for the place where the harmful event 
occurred."  This has been interpreted l iberal ly .  In Handelskwekerij G. J. 
Bier B. V. v. Mines de Potasse d 'A lsace S. A . , 1 976 E.C.J .  1 735 ,  the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities permitted a Netherlands 
horticultural company to sue in the Netherlands for damage to its 
seedbeds, located there, caused by defendant' s alleged discharging of 
pollutants i nto the Rhine in France. Moreover, article 6(2) of the Con­
vention permits "any . . .  third party proceedings, in the court seised of 
the original  proceedings, unless these were instituted solely with the 
object of removing [the third-party defendant] from the jurisdiction of 
the court which would be competent in  h is  case." E .U.-E.F.T.A. Con­
vention, supra, at art. 6(2). 
II .  GENERAL JURISDICTION 
It would be sufficient here to say that any doubts we might have 
concerning suit against Brake-0 based on the harm in State Y,  are al­
layed by Brake-O' s  continuous and systematic contacts with S tate Y. 
We elect to go further. Innocent Victim could sue Brake-0 in State Y 
even if  Innocent Victim, a State Y resident, had been inj ured while 
sojourning in State M or State K .  United States courts have been criti­
cized abroad for taking too expansive a view of general j urisdiction. In 
the E .U .-E.F.T.A. Convention, the only basis for general j urisdiction is 
domici le (art . 2), which for a corporation is  its "seat ."  E .U.-E .F.T.A.  
Convention, supra, at art. 53.  The Convention is  fine for specific j uris­
diction when there is  b lood on the ground, but i t  may be too solicitous 
of commercial interests in other matters . Not only is  its basis for gener­
al juri sdiction narrow, but also the speci fic jurisdiction provision for 
contract actions i s  l imited to "the court for the place of performance of 
the obl igation i n  question." E .U. -E.F.T.A. Convention, supra ,  at art. 
5 ( 1 ) . It should give us pause to move where others do not tread. On 
reflection, however, in this day of jet travel  and instantaneous voice and 
televi sion communication, the time has come to declare that a victim 
may sue at home if the defendant' s contacts with that forum are suffi­
ciently continuous and systematic to make this reasonable. If, though 
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unlikely, any unfairness result:-> from evidentiary problems, the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens i s  the necessary pal l iative. 
Japan would find general j urisdiction over Brake-0 on these facts .  
In Go to v .  Malaysian A irline Sys. Berhad, 35  Minshu 1 224 ( 1 98 1  ) ,  the 
Japanese Supreme Court upheld j urisdiction over the Malays ian Airl ine 
in  a suit for breach of an air transportation contract result ing in the 
death of plaintiffs ' husband and father. The crash occurred in Malaysia 
on a domestic Malaysian flight. The court indicated that i n  i nternational 
cases, j urisdiction i s  based on rules of reason for maintaining impartial i­
ty, fairness, and speediness. These requirements are met i f  the Japanese 
court has jurisdiction over the foreign party in accordance with the 
Japanese Code of Civil Procedure ' s  venue provisions including the 
defendant' s res idence (art. 2 ,  CCP), the place where the defendant has a 
place of business (art . 4, CCP) (the provi sion applicable in  Goto - the 
defendant had an office in Tokyo although this office had no connec­
tion to the relevant transportation contract), where the defendant ' s prop­
erty is located (art. 8, CCP), and "a place of tort" (art. 1 5 , CCP 
(Minsoho)) .  The decision i n  Asahi must have provoked gales of  laughter 
in Japan. 
